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Abstract
Essays on Environmental Conditions in Cuba
by
Gonzalo Cordova
Advisor: Professor John Devereux
Cuban environmental conditions have not attracted the attention received by other areas of Cuba’s
economic performance. Chapter 1 examines selected ambient air pollutants and the use of fossil fu-
els in Cuba, indicators for which there are relatively better available data, as of the “Special Period”
extending into recent years. In contrast with prior anecdotally-driven approaches, the empirical ex-
amination aims to specifically identify Cuba’s performance and international standing on these in-
dicators through the use of a heterogeneous individual country adaptation of the income-pollution
relationship known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve. In response to critiques in the literature,
extensive testing of the panel data econometric results illustrates the limitations of the pooled En-
vironmental Kuznets Curve framework. To compensate for deficiencies in Cuban data, a GDP per
capita series for Cuba is estimated, which reflects the deindustrialization of the Cuban economy in
the period under study. The shock which occurred during the “Special Period” on the sugarcane in-
dustry and economic output are shown to have a significant effect on the indicators studied. Cuba’s
results generally underperform peer group samples of tropical, Caribbean and transition countries
as well as a smaller peer group of countries for CO2 emissions and use of energy f rom f ossil f uels,
exhibit mixed results on PM2.5, but perform relatively better on methane, and nitrous oxide.
Chapter 2 critically examines factors influencing Cuba’s performance in the Environmental Per-
formance Index, as compared to health care and education results, employing a logistic regression
approach. The Environmental Performance Index includes CO2 and forest cover, studied respec-
tively in Chapters 1 and 3, but broadens the scope of analysis to a much wider set of indicators.
Strong political rights and civil liberties are shown to play an important role in enhancing perfor-
vmance for a cross-section of participating countries in the index and it is suggested that Cuba’s
environmental performance, which lags health care and education performance at the international
level, could improve if political rights and civil liberties were higher in Cuba. No specific pathway
demonstrates how this occurs but it is suggested that resources used to manage the environment
in a centralized command economy could be more efficiently employed in a less centralized and
participatory system.
Chapter 3 identifies the links between the decline of the sugarcane industry, external debt and
the increase in forest cover with an empirical analysis including the use of an instrumental variable
technique. The spread of the invasive tree species, sickle bush, known locally as marabu´, appears to
be an effect of the abandonment of sugarcane fields and may be an important factor to account for a
substantial amount of measured forest cover, beyond reforestation efforts made by the government.
Given the link between deforestation and high external debt, debt-for-nature swaps are presented
as a policy option that could bring about improvements both to forest management issues and to
reduce external debt.
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Introduction
Cuba is the largest island of the Caribbean, endowed with thousands of kilometers of coastline,
fertile lands, forests and mountains. Its environment has been a major actor in the economic
history of the island but yet it has not received the same level of attention as its economy since the
Cuban Revolution in 1959. On the world stage, Cuba has attracted a level of debate, controversy
and attention beyond what this small country of eleven million inhabitants would warrant, for its
role in world affairs as well as for the observed performance in areas such as health care and
education. Following the announcement of plans to reestablish diplomatic relations between the
US and Cuba on December 17, 2014, which also aroused widespread interest from other regions
for increased commercial relations and expectations of potential future changes and growth, there
is a heightened need by policy makers, foreign investors and researchers for accurate assessments
of Cuba’s economy. In my study, I aim to help clarify how the environment has been affected by
structural changes in the recent past by employing an empirical approach which should shed light
on the environmental performance implications of future development and policy.
As a stylized fact, before 1959 Cuba enjoyed relatively high social and economic indicators
even though its output was heavily dependent on the production of sugarcane and the export of
sugar.1 Along with a centrally planned economy, and a single party communist system, the rev-
olution attempted a large scale industrialization effort after which it reverted to the production of
1Per various editions of the United Nations Statistical Yearbook cited in Kirby and Llorens (1998), the infant
mortality rate in Cuba in 1957 was 32 per 1000, the lowest rate in Latin America, and lower than the Austria, Belgium,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan and Spain, while the literacy rate of 76% in 1950-53 ranked fourth in
Latin America, behind only Argentina, Chile and Costa Rica.
1
2sugar. A cycle of expropriations of US property in Cuba, the declaration of a US embargo on ex-
ports to Cuba in October 1960, and breaking of diplomatic relations by the US in January of 1961
culminated in the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. The existing favorable terms on sugar
exports to the US ended and close economic and political ties between Cuba and the Soviet Union
were formed. This led to Cuba joining the economies of COMECON in 1972.
An emphasis on employing resources to increase sugarcane production and significant Soviet
subsidies, which facilitated the import of capital goods, allowed Cuba to achieve some improve-
ments in economic results by the late 1980’s as compared to the prior 20 years. This allowed
for investments in health care, education as well as in defense and international missions. During
this period, however, sugarcane and sugar production relied on intensive use of energy and heavy
capital equipment, and produced long term damage to the environment.
A dramatic structural break occurred for the Cuban economy after the demise of the Soviet
Union in 1989, which led to the dismantling of the COMECON agreements. A collapse in the pro-
duction of sugarcane ensued, which likely lowered the immediate environmental stresses caused
by this industry, with accompanying falls in energy use and land devoted to the cultivation of
sugar. The dramatic fall in production in the sugar industry is captured in Figure 1. Production of
sugarcane dropped to levels not observed since the early 1900’s.
The economic and environmental changes brought on by the end of the COMECON arrange-
ments went well beyond the impact to the sugar industry. As this signified the end of the highly
subsidized benefits that Cuba received on its oil and capital imports and its sugar exports, new
policies were urgently needed, as almost all sectors of the economy collapsed. There were reforms
which promoted foreign investment and joint ventures with state enterprises. A gradual shift to-
ward a more service-oriented structure began to occur, including increased focus on the tourism
industry. There were also important developments in the oil and gas sector, through tight rela-
tions with Venezuela after the late 90’s, as well as investments in mining. Although the robustness
of Cuba’s GDP calculations is always subject to qualifications as discussed in Section 1.5.2, the
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Figure 1: Sugar Production 1980-2016
Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n, various issues, and Pe´rez-Lo´pez (2016).
Author’s interpolation for 1990.
best available estimates show GDP suffered a drop of 35% from 1989 to 1993, years referred to
as the “Special Period,” before beginning a limited recovery in the 2000’s (see Figure 2). In the
contemporary period, one can only find a similarly drastic fall in GDP among some transition
economies.2 The pattern of environmental impacts that this suggests is that there was a period of
more significant stresses to the environment prior to 1989, followed by reduced damages given the
deindustrialization which ensued.
According to Portela (2004), before the 1980’s, Cuba’s environmental problems were not on
leaders’ agendas, with a Soviet-style system in which environmental issues were left in the hands
2Interestingly, the Russian Federation’s GDP per capita, 2011 constant US$, PPP basis, shows a collapse of 42%
from 1990 to 1998, the year of the Russian financial crisis, while the 1990 level was not surpassed until 2006. See
Feenstra et al. (2015).
4Figure 2: Cuba GDP per capita PPP-adjusted 1970-2014
Source: Author’s calculations, see Section 1.5.2.
of the ministries which generated pollution. Portela (2004) argues that this resulted in large-scale
underestimation, misrepresentation and ignoring of environmental issues, as the government au-
thorities maintained that environmental damages resulted from pre-revolution activities or from the
normal process of development. In this framework, Cuban authorities argued that the State was a
good steward of the environment, and any environmental problems would result from the effects
of private property, which did not exist in Cuba.
In the 1990’s, the institutional approach began to change. Maal-Bared (2006) points out that
after the Earth Summit in 1992, the Cuban government implemented various programs and admin-
istrative changes to increase public awareness of environmental management. In 1994, a national
coordinating organization in charge of environmental monitoring was established, the Agencia de
Medio Ambiente (http://www.ama.cu/), within the Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnologı´a y Medio
5Ambiente (CITMA). In 1997, with Law 81, the Cuban government established a new environ-
mental framework and gave CITMA primary law enforcement responsibility.3 On the interna-
tional front, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (see
estadisticas.cepal.org) lists 16 international environmental agreements to which Cuba has
adhered, beginning in 1981, including the 2016 Paris accord, the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
Some recent editions of the government’s statistics yearbook posted summary reviews of con-
ditions for the years 2009-2015 as well as reports dealing with individual environmental problems
usually related to specific industrial plants or environmental accidents and the costs necessary to
remediate them. A recent publication on National Environmental Strategy 2007-2010, by CITMA,
outlined environmental commitments and management bodies, notably encompassing economic
growth, sustainability and social equity for the island, and identified the main environmental prob-
lems as soil degradation, impacts on forest cover, pollution, loss of biological diversity and water
shortages.4
I will use a more structured empirical framework, including international comparisons, to study
the impact on the environment of the structural economic changes which occurred as the sugar in-
dustry declined. Hence, through the use of a greater level of availability of data, I attempt to move
away from prior anecdotal approaches, a shift from qualitative descriptions of localized environ-
mental damages, typical of previously done studies. Maal-Bared (2006) conducts a Comparative
Environmental Risk Assessment (“CERA”) in Cuba both before and after the “Special Period” and
concludes that the environmental stressors in the island diminished during this time largely as a
result of externally-generated changes in economic production, but they shifted to new areas. To
this author, this reduces the credibility of improvements occurring in the environment due to public
environmental education, as claimed by the government.
3For an early review of the law’s origins, intent and prospects see Houck (2000).
4An English translation can be downloaded at http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/9623_Cuba_
Enviro_Strategy_2007-2010.pdf.
6In Chapter 1, I examine whether the rapid deindustrialization that occurred after 1990 lead to
a fall in ambient air pollutants such as CO2, PM2.5, methane, and nitrous oxide, as well as in the
percentage of energy f rom f ossil f uels. I find that Cuba’s relative international performance is
differentiated depending on the indicator which is examined. My empirical approach examines
the effects of income levels during the “Special Period” and beyond on the selected indicators and
their relative international performance, relying on the Environmental Kuznets Curve framework.
However, I adapt a modified framework to yield insights on individual country performance and
specifically to Cuba.
In Chapter 2, I examine a broader representation of Cuba’s environmental conditions, as em-
bodied by the Environmental Performance Index (Hsu et al. (2016)). This index notably includes
indicators portraying new areas of environmental pressure such as municipal wastewater and ma-
rine coastal degradation, cited as suffering significant stresses in Maal-Bared (2006). I com-
pare Cuba’s relative international performance in the Environmental Performance Index and its
subindexes with that achieved in health care and education. In health care, some authors refer to
Cuba’s relatively robust performance as the “Cuban Health Care Paradox,” in which Cuba achieves
outcomes comparable to those that one would expect in developed countries, whereas its estimates
of per capita income, discussed in Section 1.5.2, rank among the lowest in Latin America (see
Spiegel and Yassi (2004) and Evans (2008)). On a relative international basis, I find that Cuba
does not perform as well in the environmental area as it does in health care and education. In par-
ticular, I also find that Cuba’s results across the environmental, health care and education sectors
are obtained in spite of its poor record in the political and civil liberties area. My analysis indicates
that strong comparative international results are generally observed in countries with higher levels
of political and civil freedom. This may suggest that this may create a less centralized framework
which frees up resources and creates greater efficiency to generate better environmental, health and
education outcomes. In Chapter 3, I examine the increase of forest cover in Cuba observed in the
data and find a significant impact of the dramatic decrease of sugarcane production on this result
7and the residual rise of an invasive species of shrub, sickle bush (“marabu´”), across the island. I
then explore recent trends in Cuba’s external debt, a variable which is shown in the literature to
have a negative effect on reforestation, and how using debt swaps could be used to improve its
performance on forest management and possibly other areas.
Chapter 1
Ambient Air Emissions and Energy From
Fossil Fuels in Cuba: an Environmental
Kuznets Curve Approach
There are quite informative and thorough studies of the Cuban environment, done both domesti-
cally and by authors based outside the island, but these have not attempted to apply an international
empirical comparative approach to measure this aspect of economic performance.1 This contrasts
with widely available information on health care and education. Hence, an empirical analysis of
environmental indicators in Cuba should help to understand performance in this area particularly
with respect to the impact of underlying changes in economic output and structure from 1990-2014,
a period of dramatic changes. Specifically, by studying the relative international performance of
four ambient air indicators, CO2, PM2.5, methane, and nitrous oxide, key indicators of air pollu-
tion, and use of energy from fossil fuels, this chapter aims to provide further insights on the overall
performance of the Cuban economy, beyond what is more traditionally reported.
1See for example, “Las Estadı´sticas de Medio Ambiente y su evolucio´n en la Revolucio´n 1958-2008 available at
www.one.cu/medioambiente.htm, Dı´az-Briquets and Pe´rez-Lo´pez (2000), and Maal-Bared (2006).
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9Economic output in Cuba, which had benefited from a period of relative improvement in the
1980’s, suffered a dramatic decline and structural change after the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1989. The mainstays of the Cuban economy, sugarcane production and sugar exports, were devas-
tated after 1990 by the sudden interruption of the trading arrangements with the Soviet Union and
the nations comprising the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), the economic
organization of the Soviet bloc. Subsidized benefits ended. Cuba was highly dependent on subsi-
dies on oil and capital imports and sugar exports. New policies were urgently required. A gradual
shift toward a more service-oriented composition of output began to occur. GDP suffered a drop
of 35% from 1989 to 1993, years referred to as the “Special Period,” before beginning a limited
recovery in the 2000’s (see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: Cuba GDP per capita PPP-adjusted 1989-2014
Source: Author’s calculations, see Section 1.5.2.
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A more focused look at the economic changes provides an idea of the magnitude of the impact
that the ensuing deindustrialization and increase in service sector activity may have had on the en-
vironment. Figure 1.2 illustrates that sectoral indices had moved in tandem prior to 1989, but fell
sharply in 1989, with the exception of sectors ISIC J-P (revision 3). This is a roughly defined cat-
egory by the government, including “other services,” encompassing education, health care, social
security, sports, culture, and defense all of which are government-provided services (“Servicios
Comunales, Sociales y Personales”).
Agriculture had enjoyed a rapid increase from 1970 to 1985, but it collapsed during the “Special
Period” and has never recovered to its prior levels, in spite of increased holdings given to private
farmers and modified distribution networks. Industry, which includes manufacturing, mining and
utilities, experienced a rapid decline during the “Special Period” but began a recovery after 2000,
such that it is now 20% above its 1989 level. Wholesale trade recovers its 1989 level in 2013, while
construction never regains its 1989 level (see Figure 1.2).
The most significant sector increase occurred in “other services,” suggesting this sector is prin-
cipally responsible for any increase in GDP from 1990-2014. If the service category were to be
measured as if it increased at the same rate as the aggregate of all other sectors of the economy,
an alternative index shown in Figure 1.4 appears much lower than the official GDP per capita
measured by value added. This reflection on methodological issues, further discussed in Section
1.5.2, suggests that GDP per capita figures may have potentially suffered an even more substantial
loss. Weak growth is also suggested from the expenditure side through a measure of consump-
tion, which excludes government-provided services. This indicator shows a 40% drop during the
“Special Period” and a recovery to the 1989 level occurring only in 2010 (Figure 1.3).
Employment trends by sector also provide evidence of the increasing role of services after
1990. Comparing figures in the 1981 census with the 2002 census, employment in the state sector
declined from 92% to 77% of the total, while activity increased in private farms, cooperatives,
joint ventures, and self-employment (Domı´nguez (2004)). As reported by the government’s statis-
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Figure 1.2: Cuba GDP Sector Growth Indices
Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n, author’s estimates.
Note: Sectors are determined by UN System of National Accounts and the International Industry Standard Code (ISIC)
revision 3 of 1989. The government further adjusts these as per local Cuban conditions according to the government’s
“Nomenclador de Actividades Econo´micas (NAE).” Sectors roughly correspond in consecutive order to ISIC A-B
(plus hunting, forestry, fishing), ISIC C-E (plus manufacturing and utilities), ISIC D, ISIC F, ISIC G-H, ISIC I, ISIC
J-P.
tical office (http://www.one.cu), in 2010 and 2014, employment in the government sector was
77.3% and 72.3%, respectively (see Figure 1.5). For the same years, the share of total in private
occupations was 18.5% and 23.1% and self-employment (“cuentapropistas”) was 7.8% and 9.7%.
I use an international comparison framework to help understand the impact of income and struc-
tural changes on emissions of CO2, methane and nitrous oxide and energy f rom f ossil f uels in
the Cuban economy during the “Special Period” (1990-2000) and beyond through 2014. Concen-
tration criteria applied to emissions of CO2, methane and nitrous oxide are ambient air indicators
to gauge their effects on human health, agriculture, buildings and ecosystems. CO2, methane and
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Figure 1.3: Cuba Consumption Index, Excluding Government Services
Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n, author’s estimates.
nitrous oxide are greenhouse gases and are fundamental causes of the greenhouse effect, PM2.5,
refers to small airborne particles that can cause damage to the respiratory system as well as struc-
tures, and energy f rom f ossil f uels has a direct effect on CO2 and other measures of air quality.2
The decline in economic output and deindustrialization implies lower levels of these environmen-
tal stressors. Note that although Maal-Bared (2006) reported hazardous air contaminants as low
risk both before and after the “Special Period,” my analysis particularly indicates that CO2 and
energy f rom f ossil f uels represent persistent environmental stressors in Cuba. For the period in
my study, Table 1.1 provides a characterization of the impacts of the principal sectors of economic
activity in Cuba on the various indicators.
2In Section 1.5.1, I provide more details on the mechanisms through which these indicators damage the environ-
ment.
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Figure 1.4: Cuba - GDP per capita Indices, Official and Alternative
Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n., author’s estimates.
Table 1.1: Environmental impacts by sector
Sector/Activity Indicator Trend
Agriculture methane, nitrous oxide decreasing
Manuf./transp./util. CO2, PM2.5, energy f rom f ossil f uels decreasing
Mining CO2, PM2.5 decreasing
Services CO2, PM2.5, energy f rom f ossil f uels increasing
Sugar CO2, PM2.5, energy f rom f ossil f uels decreasing
My approach builds on the Environmental Kuznets Curve literature originating in Grossman
and Krueger (1991), Grossman and Krueger (1995) and Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992). The
basic premise debated in the literature is that environmental degradation follows an inverted “U”
pattern as income grows, increasing at low income levels at first, but later peaking and reaching
a “turning point” at higher income levels, as captured by a quadratic form such as equation 1.1,
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Figure 1.5: Cuba Shifts in Sector Activity
Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n (various).
where the linear income term coefficient would be positive and the squared income term would
be negative. Stylistically, this is reflected in the pollutant-income relationship appearing in Fig-
ure 1.6, an analogous shape to the income inequality vs. income relation originally described in
Kuznets (1955). This is an ideal situation as it suggests that an optimistic outcome of sustainable
development is possible as income growth in itself leads to improvements in environmental quality
beyond a certain level of income. However, as discussed in Section 1.1, other empirical outcomes
are possible, including continuously rising pollutants (the lower right hand quadrant of Figure 1.7)
or environmental degradation that increases again at relatively high income levels after it has had
a prior decrease (the “N” shape in the upper right hand quadrant of Figure 1.7).3
In my study, I examine whether countries follow an individual and unique relationship between
the environmental indicator and income rather than being homogeneously characterized by an ag-
gregate shape of this relationship resulting from a fitted estimation to a broad sample of countries.
Hence, individual countries may have different intercept and slope coefficients than those esti-
3In such a case, in equation 1.2, the linear and squared income coefficients would be positive and negative, respec-
tively, while the cubic term would be positive.
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mated in aggregate samples and reflect patterns which differ from the ideal inverted “U” for the
indicators studied. This chapter presents an innovative application of the Environmental Kuznets
Curve framework, employing a Partial Variable Coefficients technique, discussed in Section 1.3, to
examine individual country performance. This builds on the work in List and Gallet (1999), Koop
and Tole (1999) and Figueroa and Paste´n (2009). The result allows me to empirically examine the
relative international performance of Cuba’s emissions of the selected air quality indicators as well
as energy f rom f ossil f uels from the perspective of the level of economic output.
Figure 1.6: Environmental Kuznets Curve - Inverted “U”
This chapter will aim to identify the shape and relative position of the pollution-income rela-
tionship in Cuba with respect to various international samples. Specifically, I will examine this
question based a tropical country sample similar to that featured in Bhattarai and Hammig (2001),
a Caribbean sample, and a sample of transition countries. The first two samples intend to capture
relatively homogeneous characteristics, with countries that share with Cuba a similar latitude and
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tropical environment. The third sample is of special interest, as it facilitates comparing results with
respect to transition countries exposed to similar structural shocks resulting from the dissolution of
the Soviet Union. Studies on the experience of transition economies in Eastern Europe show that
many of these economies suffered from a legacy of environmental degradation before incorporat-
ing more environmentally friendly policy choices.4 To complement this approach, I also compare
Cuba’s performance to four individual Latin American and Caribbean countries, as described in
Section 1.3.
I will first examine theoretical and empirical underpinnings in the literature related to the ap-
proach selected here. This is followed by an examination of the underlying data in Section 1.2.
As there are shortcomings in Cuban GDP data, a detailed look at GDP calculations in Cuba is
presented in Section 1.5.2. I then discuss the identification methodology before presenting the
empirical results. I find that Cuba’s performance with respect to the samples is relatively lower
for CO2 and energy f rom f ossil f uels, mixed for PM2.5, and relatively better for methane and
nitrous oxide. Although industrial activity declined, a high level of use of energy f rom f ossil f uels
may be a continuing contributor to CO2 and PM2.5 emissions. On the other hand, the relatively bet-
ter results for methane and nitrous oxide may respond to lower agricultural activity. The shapes of
the aggregate curves for the ambient air indicators are in line with results in the literature but I also
find that it is necessary to move away from more traditional pooled sample approaches to make
inferences regarding an individual country such as Cuba. Section 1.4.3 summarizes and concludes.
1.1 Environmental Kuznets Curve Background
The Environmental Kuznets Curve literature originated in the works of Grossman and Krueger
(1991), Shafik (1994), Selden and Song (1994), and Grossman and Krueger (1995), which is prob-
4For some general comments on the applicability of the Eastern European experience to Cuba, see, for exam-
ple Castan˜eda (2005) and Castan˜eda and Go´mez (2006). Tamazian and Rao (2010) also provides insights into the
importance of institutional factors in environmental performance for a sample of Eastern European economies.
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ably the most cited work in this body of literature.5 The potential for sustainable development was
a key feature of the literature as it suggested that environmental stresses could decline for certain
environmental stressors after income reached a certain point. The “one size fits all” approach to
making global inferences about samples rather than individual countries was a common premise
in the early literature. This, however, missed significant forces which may be at play in individual
countries and would not be reflected in a large sample study. To identify Cuba’s environmental
performance with respect to income at the international level, I adopted a heterogeneous approach
to the Environmental Kuznets Curve framework, based on econometric critiques of pooled sample
approaches (see, for example, List and Gallet (1999), Koop and Tole (1999), Muller-Furstenberger
and Wagner (2007) and Figueroa and Paste´n (2009).) To provide a foundation to understand the
model and the results I obtain, this chapter will examine aspects of the latter literature as well as
discuss theoretical underpinnings and the empirical evidence of observed results in ambient air
pollution studies, which are germane to this study.
To be sure, the origins of the literature featured studies with panel data which incorporated
fixed country effects to account for an element of heterogeneity. One of the first econometric tests
of the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis for various environmental variables appeared in
Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992), and was later enhanced with some changes in Shafik (1994).
The model estimates linear, quadratic and cubic relations from panel data with OLS featuring
individual country and time dummies. Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) also use a panel data set, re-
flecting exogenous, country-specific geographic, climatic and natural resource variables captured
through country fixed effects. Grossman and Krueger (1995) incorporated elements of heterogene-
ity employing a random effects estimator on an unbalanced panel with the addition of dummies to
represent monitoring stations to incorporate geographic or climatic conditions.
However, these prior studies did not attempt to determine whether a unique shape, or an iso-
morphic portrayal, of the Environmental Kuznets Curve is an accurate representation for all coun-
5As of August 17, 2017, this work had garnered 1329 citations as per the Web of Science citation service.
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tries in a panel dataset. This is a key consideration if this framework is to be used more precisely to
make policy inferences for individual countries. Hence, these studies do not account for the possi-
bility that countries within a sample may have a different characterization of the pollution-income
relationship than the aggregate shape estimated in those studies. Kaika and Zervas (2013b) discuss
econometric issues, resulting in potential differences in turning points (the income level at which a
pollution indicator peaks) for countries and omitted variables, which produce different coefficients
in sub-samples, especially with respect to estimation of CO2 emissions. Such concerns led to es-
timations of separate slope parameters for for individual countries in Koop and Tole (1999), List
and Gallet (1999), Lee et al. (2009) and Figueroa and Paste´n (2009).
List and Gallet (1999) features a long dataset, spanning 1924 to 1994, for 48 American states
for the pollutants, SO2 and NOx. The relatively long period studied and the gathering of data
from a relatively homogeneous sample added robustness to the study, responding to a critique that
some prior studies showed biased results due to lack of data availability. The authors estimate
the response coefficients of potentially heterogeneous intercept and income terms as well as time
effects as either fixed effects or random effects parameters. If they are calculated as fixed, the
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) model is used; otherwise, the random model is calculated
as per the original Swamy (1970) model. In all cases, the Hausman test rejects the random effects
model in favor of the fixed effects model as would be suggested by the fact that the state level
intercept terms (β j1i) are likely correlated with state income levels. A similar rejection for the
random effects model also occurs frequently throughout my study.
In spite of the expected relative homogeneity of the sample, the authors found evidence of
non-homogeneity in slope coefficients of individual states rejecting the “one size fits all” or iso-
morphic curve approach for slope coefficients. This suggests that heterogeneity is also likely in a
diverse cross-section of countries, including developed and less developed countries, rather than in
the more uniform, US-state level dataset the authors employ.
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The model in Paste´n and Figueroa (2012) is germane to the methodology which I selected.
These authors pursue the possibility of the existence of individual country Environmental Kuznets
Curves. The framework for this is a study on SO2 in high income countries. They demonstrate the
lack of parameter constancy in the pooled sample and apply a random coefficient model, based on
the approach presented in Swamy (1970). They further calculate individual country intercept and
slope coefficients as per Swamy and Mehta (1975). The authors indicate that institutional factors
favor the existence of individual country Environmental Kuznets curves. These include the use of
environmentally friendly economic instruments and a higher level of openness and transparency of
political systems.
Figueroa and Paste´n (2009) include tests for unit root, as is also done in my study, in order
to respond to critiques such as that of Stern (2004), who stresses that studies generally neglect
to include this test. Presence of unit root may lead to spurious regression results. In addition,
Muller-Furstenberger and Wagner (2007) point out further econometric issues which may occur
in the presence of a unit root. I also perform econometric tests similar to those in List and Gallet
(1999), and Figueroa and Paste´n (2009) to demonstrate the need to estimate individual country
curves, which provides a framework to estimate Cuba’s relative international performance on the
selected variables.
Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) emphasizes the importance of carefully selecting the empirical
sample in order to capture and hold constant the effects of regional characteristics. They acknowl-
edge that country-specific circumstances play a key role in explaining deforestation in individual
countries. Hence, grouping countries in their respective continents provides insights into groups
where many more shared characteristics are possible as opposed to a global sample. The authors
factor consideration of potential data heterogeneity by running a Chow test, which rejects the con-
stant intercept model in favor of fixed effects and then selecting a fixed effects model over the
random effects model on the basis of a Hausman Test. In my study, the model estimations are
based on two strongly homogeneous samples (tropical and Caribbean) and one relatively homoge-
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neous sample (transition), while I also carry out Chow and Hausman tests. This also responds to
the critique in Stern (2004) warning on extrapolating across different samples such as from devel-
oped to underdeveloped country samples. I expand the analysis to ambient air quality indicators,
whereas Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) restricted the analysis to deforestation.
Various other aspects of the Environmental Kuznets Curve literature help to understand the
econometric foundations and to interpret the results obtained. The reduced form model used in
my study follows early studies such as Grossman and Krueger (1995). The reduced form does not
allow one to infer a causal relationship between income and pollution, but it is considered to reveal
more insight into the pollution-income relation than a structural model, which results in an indirect
relationship between environmental quality and income.
Although I am interested in Cuba’s relative international performance, an understanding of the
shape of the estimated relationships between income and the pollutants studied is useful. There
is no conclusive evidence regarding the general empirical existence of Environmental Kuznets
Curves for all pollutants (see, for example, Stern (2004)) but yet the reduced form of income as an
explanatory variable in the Environmental Kuznets Curve models suggests that a theoretical frame-
work may clarify what potential causal changes to environmental results occur along with income
growth. In Grossman and Krueger (1995), economic growth acts primarily through the “scale”
effect to increase environmental degradation but other proximate causes such as changes in eco-
nomic structure or product mix, changes in technology and changes in the input mix play a role that
helps reduce environmental damage. Some authors refer to the latter as a “composition” effect. In
Cuba during the “Special Period”, scale effects would have acted inversely to reduce environmen-
tal degradation given the drop in GDP per capita, but other changes were likely exerting opposing
forces such that continued deterioration occurred in CO2 emissions and energy f rom f ossil f uels,
while other factors contributed to reduce environmental stresses in methane and nitrous oxide.
Note also that according to Ekins (1999), the process of improvement in environmental quality as
income rises is not generally an endogenous result of rising income growth, rather it must be pro-
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moted and maintained by an explicit commitment to environmental policy implementation. This is
echoed by Stern (2004) who argues that the reduced form approach may also mask the influence of
other underlying influences, such as environmental regulation, environmental awareness and ed-
ucation. This is an important consideration in Cuba where specific structural considerations, low
growth and reduced openness to trade appear to be more relevant than other explanations discussed
below.
Due to its role in climate change, many studies have examined specific issues involved with
estimates of CO2 emissions. There is little empirical evidence that environmental damage declines
as income increases when the costs of environmental damage are not private, but rather can be
externalized, such as with CO2, as observed by Shafik (1994) and Selden and Song (1994). Note
also that the negative implications of CO2 and other greenhouse gases are pushed into a distant
future and that countries may have a relatively high rate of discount in assessing those damages, as
discussed by Nordhaus (1991). Conversely, if costs are internalized, better results can be achieved
(Lopez (1994)).6 Related to this is the role of property rights, reviewed in Dinda (2004) who notes
that enforcement of property rights typifies shifting away from resources being treated as a com-
mons. In Kaika and Zervas (2013a), high energy f rom f ossil f uels appears to produce significant
effects increasing CO2 emissions, whereby in spite of improvements over time in technology and
conversion efficiency, CO2 emissions portray a generally rising monotonic shape. The positive re-
lation among CO2 emissions, energy, and economic growth, where energy is mostly based on fossil
fuels that generate CO2, is highlighted. I find a similar rising pattern in energy f rom f ossil f uels
vs. income in my study. In a study of transition economies, Tamazian and Rao (2010) highlights
that energy intensity is used to promote industrialization, but produces accompanying higher levels
of CO2. Note, however, that the authors’ results revealed an inverted “U” for CO2, with particular
emphasis on the impact of institutional and financial development on improved trade flows and
6Note that Andreoni and Levinson (2001) argue more generally that the Environmental Kuznets Curve formulation
is a result of technology rather than growth and externality issues.
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FDI for the transition economies. In contrast, in my study of CO2 for the sample of transition
economies, based only on income as an explanatory variable, a turning point was not confirmed,
but rather an increasing function, as shown in Figure 1.9. My study also highlighted an increasing
monotonic relationship in Cuba.
In the “pollution haven” hypothesis, reviewed in Dinda (2004), higher income countries fre-
quently “export” their more dirty forms of production to developing countries, favored by avail-
ability of commodities or resources, where also dirty activities such as mining are carried out. In
particular, such developing countries may be in the process of transitioning from economic activi-
ties primarily in the primary sector to the secondary sector, an intermediate step before eventually
engaging in tertiary sector activities. Kaika and Zervas (2013b), however, point out that consump-
tion patterns in developing countries are persistent and may produce continued damages in certain
environmental indicators such as CO2. Also, as developing countries like Cuba are themselves
in the development stage, there will be less opportunities for them to outsource the production
of energy-intensive consumer goods to other similarly less regulated developed countries. Dinda
(2004) points out that this may suggest other outcomes for developing countries such as “new
toxics” and “race to the bottom” scenarios. In the former, new pollutants replace old ones as in-
come, technology and the structure of economies evolve. In the latter, countries looking to gain
a competitive edge cut environmental regulation corners and costs in order to attract industries,
leading to more pollution. Hence, one may wonder whether favorable inverted “U” Environmental
Kuznets Curve results in advanced countries may be due in large part to exporting dirty production
activities of the supply chain through trade with developing countries. In this scenario, if one were
to aggregate the resulting environmental degradation produced in developing countries to levels
in the more advanced countries, we would no longer observe desirable outcomes in the advanced
economies.
Nevertheless, a more optimistic outlook for developing countries is offered by Dasgupta et al.
(2001), who discusses the potential for a “Revised EKC”, featuring a lower pollution-income rela-
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tionship which would peak earlier. Factors which would favor this outcome include the effects of
regulation and enforcement where the greatest increases occur from low to middle income levels,
and more efficient use of inputs, with less subsidization of environmentally damaging activities.
This could potentially play a role in Cuba, but other factors such as informal regulation in the
form of decentralized Coasian bargaining and the use of market instruments likely do not influence
outcomes in Cuba.
As discussed in Section 1.5.2, the service sector in Cuba increased in the period under study,
implying that it is important to understand its impact on the environment. Kaika and Zervas (2013a)
discuss the influence of the tertiary sector in production, where a larger relative size of the latter is
normally considered as a mitigating factor in pollution. Many of the developed countries already
had significant service sectors in the 1970’s and hence developed country samples for some of the
original Environmental Kuznets studies would not capture the transition toward a greater share
of service activity. Interestingly, there are relatively high levels of CO2 emissions in the USA,
attributed to the services and residential sectors, while in Japan, the increase in CO2 in the 90’s
is attributed to the high amount of energy and material goods consumed by the services sector. I
show that as Cuba transitioned in the 1990’s to a more service-driven economy, its CO2 emissions
and energy f rom f ossil f uels also rose.
Underlying the Environmental Kuznets Curve literature is a recurrent discussion of the income
elasticity of demand for environmental quality. Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) and Selden and
Song (1994) argued that income growth raises the demand for higher environmental quality. For
Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995), a key factor is that rising incomes are typically associated with
increasing demand for leisure. McConnell (1997) indicates that elasticity must be high to derive
the ideal inverted “U” shape of the Environmental Kuznets Curve although it is not sufficient. Lieb
(2001) sees satisfaction of consumption needs as a necessary pre-condition for pollution reduction.
However, it is also important to note that some empirical studies have shown an elasticity below
1 and Ekins (1999) argued that the majority of studies pointed against these results. This may
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also imply that other factors are playing a role. The relevance of the income elasticity of demand
for better environmental outcomes is more likely to play a role only if Cuba transitions to a more
market driven economy. Also, the implication that higher demand for environmental quality re-
quires a higher willingness to pay has limited applicability in a country like Cuba with very low
consumption.
Kaika and Zervas (2013a) also emphasize the paradigm transition that occurred from original
concerns that natural resources would be exhausted as economic growth proceeded, to an assess-
ment that new discoveries and technological change avoided that exhaustion, but left pollution con-
cerns as a prime worry, hence acting as a constraint on growth. Thus, “sustainable development”
replaces “limits to growth”. Such concerns are of primary importance in developing countries in-
cluding those in the samples in this study. In Brock and Taylor (2005), the focus is on the planet
acting as a “sink” with a finite capacity to absorb degradation and waste.
1.2 Data
This study aims to measure Cuba’s relative international performance of CO2, PM2.5, methane
and nitrous oxide emissions and use of energy f rom f ossil f uels with relation to income for the
years 1990-2013. I perform the comparison across three different samples of countries that share
similar characteristics as Cuba. The first of these is a tropical country sample of 68 countries,
based on the criteria employed in Bhattarai and Hammig (2001), which selected countries with
similar environmental and economic conditions in tropical regions of Latin America, Africa and
Asia, with stipulated minimum levels of forest and woodland area. Similarly, the second sample
of 19 Caribbean countries restricts the geographical area but represents a closer environmental fit
to conditions in Cuba. Finally, a transition country sample of 34 countries was selected to judge
performance on the basis of prior similar economic system and subsequent change in economic
structures. The composition of all three samples appears in Section 1.5.3.
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As I position the empirical analysis from an international perspective, available data needs to
be comparable. Since the 1990’s, interest in environmental indicators and monitoring has risen,
such that my study benefits from improved production of statistics for national and international
monitoring. For air pollution, these trends are enhanced as it is both a national and international
problem and the ambient air pollution indicators that were selected for this study were among those
with the highest availability.7 Nevertheless, environmental data is subject to specific issues such as
location and frequency of monitoring, bottom-up vs. top-down approaches, and aggregation, which
vary according to the specific pollutant observed. The indicators studied here generally featured
top-down calculation methods, though PM2.5 is also monitored with ground-level and atmospheric
methods. The variables, methane and nitrous oxide, were measured as per their CO2 equivalent of
their global warming potential. More details are in Section 1.5.1.
The ambient air emissions variables which I consider have been featured frequently in prior En-
vironmental Kuznets Curve studies. This data is sourced from the World Bank, similar to original
papers in the Environmental Kuznets Curve literature, such as Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992),
and Shafik (1994), who also studied suspended particulate matter, and carbon emissions per capita.
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables by sample appear in Section 1.5.3.
In this study, the log transformations of GDP per capita, GDPPC, and its square and cube are
the sole explanatory variable in the analysis. The GDPPC series is sourced from the Penn World
Tables 9.0 (Feenstra et al. (2015)), which is frequently used as a source in Environmental Kuznets
Curve studies and is considered the best available global PPP-adjusted data. PPP-adjusted data
reduces the impact of volatile FX fluctuations, which otherwise distort the real value of measuring
GDP.
7Coverage of environmental indicators seeks to conform to requirements needed to monitor domestic and interna-
tional environmental quality. In Cuba, the government’s national statistics agency website lists 59 indicators related
to the environment and environmental policy (http://www.one.cu/aec2011/esp/20080618_tabla_cuadro.htm).
These span a wide spectrum, with coverage of data such as global warming gases, ozone depleting substances, renew-
able energy, water resources, biodiversity, protected areas, and international protocols and conventions, to which Cuba
has adhered.
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However, a GDPPC series for Cuba is not available in the 9.0 Penn World Tables dataset. Sec-
tion 1.5.2 presents the GDPPC series for Cuba used in this empirical work and examines stylized
facts, background and methodology issues that helped guide the use of this measure.
Data selection has frequently been considered a major drawback in the interpretation and ro-
bustness of Environmental Kuznets Curve studies. In order to increase sample size, early studies
employed cross-country datasets, often with limitations relating to the number of years in the
observations as well as with data collection that could be hampered by poor measurement of pol-
lutants, especially in developing countries. More modern studies, have the advantage of tapping
into a broader cross-country sample, with a potentially longer time period. The advantages of such
panel datasets are discussed in Section 1.3.
1.3 Methodology
In this study, relative structural differences are illustrated econometrically through the endogenous
process of economic growth. The starting point of the empirical analysis estimates reduced form
quadratic and cubic models. Grossman and Krueger (1995) corrected for omitted variable problems
in this simple model by including individual pollutant monitoring station control variables. Time
effects were also employed to reflect changes in technology. Since I employ a partial variable
coefficient model, to be explained below, a simple reduced form including only the environmental
indicator and income is more suitable than adding additional variables due to computational issues
arising from the inclusion of additional explanatory variables. I first calculate pooled and fixed
effects models calculated with OLS, while a random effects model is calculated with GLS. Fixed
effects models allow for correlation to exist between the explanatory variables and country fixed
effects for each group, while random effects require the more restrictive condition that there is no
correlation between the explanatory variables and country fixed effects in each group, as expressed
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by equation 1.8. In practice, such a restriction is seldom met since it implies a great degree of
homogeneity across groups. The pooled models for quadratic and cubic forms are represented as:
Eit = α+β1 · lnYit +β2 · (lnYit)2 + εit , (1.1)
Eit = α+β1 · lnYit +β2 · (lnYit)2 +β3 · (lnYit)3 + εit , (1.2)
while the fixed effect models are
Eit = βi +β1 · lnYit +β2 · (lnYit)2 + εit , (1.3)
Eit = βi +β1 · lnYit +β2 · (lnYit)2 +β3 · (lnYit)3 + εit , (1.4)
where Eit = country i log or level of an environmental indicator,
βi = country-specific dummies,
lnYit = country i log of per capita gdp, at time t,
εit = a disturbance term.
A key feature to determine the existence in an estimated relationship of a stylized inverted
“U” Environmental Kuznets Curve is the presence of a turning point (“TP”). This corresponds
to the income level at the maximum point in the estimated functional form where environmental
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degradation peaks and then begins to decline as income increases. In its quadratic formulation 8, it
is estimated, for the equation in levels or logs, respectively, as:
T Plevel =
−βˆ1
2βˆ2
, or (1.5)
T Plog = exp
−βˆ1
2βˆ2 , (1.6)
These estimations imply a process of endogenous change that accompanies income growth,
which may lead to the best case scenario inverted “U” shape. However, prior studies have shown
that the relationship may not necessarily reflect a stylized optimistic inverted “U” shape (see Figure
1.7). Empirical studies have found other shapes such as monotonically increasing or decreasing
relationships or “N”-shaped and inverse “N” patterns. The occurrence of a pollution-income rela-
tion shape other than the inverted “U” implies violation of the basic premise of the Environmental
Kuznets Curve or the of other factors, which overwhelm the assumed scale and composition ef-
fects discussed in Section 1.1. My objective is to build an econometrically robust approach to
estimate the shape of Cuba’s environmental results in CO2, PM2.5, methane, nitrous oxide, and
energy f rom f ossil f uels with respect to its income level and to compare this to an international
peer country universe. In the period covered in my study, the observed plunge in GDP in Cuba
includes a deindustrialization which would suggest reduced stresses on air pollution indicators.
The subsequent period of partial recovery includes structural and policy changes which led to an
expansion of the service sector, which, as discussed in Section 1.1, could be expected to produce
influences to both increase and reduce pressure on ambient air pollutants and energy needs. The
period hence provides an excellent framework to gauge Cuba’s relative performance in the envi-
8For cubic models, turning points are calculated by solving for the roots of the first derivative of those estimated
relationships.
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ronmental area, which has policy implications, as well as to make inferences on the applicability
of various premises of the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis.
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Figure 1.7: Stylized Shapes of Pollution-Income Relationship
In line with the discussion in Section 1.1, given that I use a panel dataset, I estimate fixed or ran-
dom effects methods to account for heterogeneous constant country and time effects. Wooldridge
(2009) indicates that fixed effects estimates are unbiased under the assumptions of the fixed effects
model, but there may be a problem with consistency, especially if the time period, T , is small.
This occurs if T is fixed and new group observations N → ∞, since new individual effects, ai’s,
are added without information accumulating on each ai. In calculating the within transformation,
it is important to note also that the degrees of freedom are reduced by the number of groups in the
panel as a mean has to be calculated for each group. In my empirical analysis, given T = 24 in my
sample (period 1990-2013), this potential issue may not be entirely eliminated, especially in the
tropical sample where there is a larger number of individual cross-sectional country units as com-
30
pared to the Caribbean and transition samples. As it requires the estimation of fewer parameters,
the random effects model should be selected over the fixed effects model, but this is conditional
on failure to reject the Hausmann test described below. When the explanatory variable is time
invariant, random effects models are generally selected, but this is unlikely to occur in my study
where income is the explanatory variable.
Greene (2003), pp.318-319, describes the foundations in the literature and derivation of models
which account for parameter heterogeneity across groups, which correspond to countries in my
study. The models build upon the the random effects models and can include cases in which
coefficients other than the intercept can vary randomly across individuals, such that vectors of
coefficients are obtained for each individual or group. Greene (2003) refers to these models as
“Random Coefficient” models. I follow the terminology and software application in Croissant and
Mello (2008), pp. 15-16, where the models are referred to as “partial variable coefficient (PVCM)”
models. I followed the “fixed” model option in the estimation, which calculates an OLS regression
for each cross-sectional country group. I refer to this as the PVCM models below. Note that the
“random” model option in the the discussion of the variable coefficient models in Croissant and
Mello (2008) calculates the parameter heterogeneity as stochastic variation across an individual or
group i, in notation similar to Greene (2003), pp.285-286, as:
yit = x′it(β+hi)+αi + εit , (1.7)
where hi is a random vector inducing variation in parameters around the parameter mean vector,
β, across individuals or groups.
I estimate both pooled sample and “PVCM” models and perform an F-test (Chow Test) to test
the null hypothesis that the same slope coefficients apply to each individual country assuming both
constant and variable intercept coefficients, a test of a hypothesis that may not be entirely plausible.
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Hence, the test is performed comparing coefficients of the PVCM model vs. the fixed effects, with
variable intercepts, and the simple OLS model with only an aggregate fixed intercept. Pooled
estimates with OLS produce coefficients that are biased and inconsistent if the null hypothesis is
violated as the individual country heterogeneous fixed effects will be correlated with the regressors.
Rejection of the pooled model would suggest that accounting for parameter heterogeneity should
be made and hence “PVCM” models should be selected. I also test for the presence of fixed effects
through an F-test and for random effects with a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test. The latter
tests for the presence of serial correlation in the random effects regression with the null hypothesis
that σ = 0. A Hausman Test compares coefficients of time-varying explanatory variables of the
fixed effects vs. random effects model. The key assumption of the null hypothesis of the Hausmann
Test is Equation 1.8,
Cov(xi jt ,ai) = 0, t = 1,2, ...T ; j = 1,2, ...k. (1.8)
If there is no significant difference in the coefficients of time-varying explanatory variables, then
the test fails to reject the null hypothesis, and the random effects model is selected. This selection
is also conditional on a rejection of the null hypothesis in the Breusch-Pagan test, which confirms
the presence of random effects. Rejection of the the null hypothesis of the Hausmann Test indicates
that there is a nonzero covariance between the explanatory variables and the country fixed effects,
ai, which can be eliminated by the fixed effects model. This leads to selection of the fixed effects
model over the random effects model. These procedures add robustness to the estimates in my
study, in response to critiques in Stern (2004).
Use of these tests and methodology provide a platform for presenting the results of the Envi-
ronmental Kuznets Curve estimates for the selected indicators, but especially to estimate Cuba’s
individual pollutant-income relationships and to gauge the relative performance of Cuba for these
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indicators. When the null hypothesis of poolability is violated, the “PVCM” models, which ac-
count for individual country intercept and slope heterogeneity, are the most robust. Models with
characteristics similar to variable coefficients models have been used by various authors (Paste´n
and Figueroa (2012), Koop and Tole (1999), List and Gallet (1999), and Lee et al. (2009)), as
discussed in Section 1.1.
I present quadratic pooled and “PVCM” estimates of the Environmental Kuznets Curve, which
plausibly are the most appropriate models to fit the panel data in my study, where country income
levels represented are low and middle income levels. A cubic model would seem more appropriate
in a panel data set including more developed high income countries such that a potential “turning
point” could be captured at higher income levels, which could reflect an “N” or inverted “N”-type
pollutant-income relationship. Cubic models would also increase computational requirements and
reduced degrees of freedom, which could be an issue especially in the “PVCM” estimates as the
panel dataset in this study may not have sufficiently long T . Nevertheless, in order to avoid the risk
that the estimated relationships may be under-fitted with a quadratic form and therefore not truly
represent the empirical relationships, where an additional turning point is present, I also present
pooled and ““PVCM” results of cubic models. It also bears mentioning that most though not all
of the models in the literature are in log-log form, which I also follow. This can be useful as the
log-log models allow one to interpret the linear coefficient of income as an income elasticity of
environmental degradation.
I also present a qualitative graphical estimate of the relative position of Cuba for each of
the environmental variables based on the individual country coefficient estimates in the quadratic
“PVCM” models. Comparisons are performed vs. tropical, Caribbean and transition samples as
well as compared to a select group of individual countries. The latter includes both a notably
richer (Chile) and poorer country (Honduras), but also two with similar geographic and climatic
conditions (Costa Rica and Dominican Republic).
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In the presence of the Environmental Kuznets Curve, I also calculate if a turning point is present
in the estimated quadratic models as per equation 1.6. This refers only to the presence of a max-
imum in the estimated function. Hence, a minimum point in the quadratic form is not considered
a turning point. If a maximum is calculated at an income level above USD 50,000, it is con-
sidered “out of sample.” For the estimated cubic models, the turning points includes both the
maximum and the minimum of the estimated function. Hence, a resulting benefit of the Environ-
mental Kuznets Curve framework is to provide researchers with insights to make inferences on the
expected change in selected indicators of environmental quality as income levels rise. Neverthe-
less, it is important to point out that there may be underlying forces such as environmental policy
and societal preferences which may play a significant role.9 As such, even for pollution indicators
exhibiting an inverted “U” relationship with income, it may not be sufficient to merely adhere to a
strict pro-growth policy.
To add further robustness and other econometric critiques expressed in the literature, I also
carry out unit root tests on the dependent variables as well as on the logarithm of GDP per capita.
The unit root tests are intended to identify invalid estimates produced by OLS. To test for unit
roots, I employ the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) tests featured in Croissant and Mello (2008), which
are deemed by Muller-Furstenberger and Wagner (2007) to be more relevant for heterogeneous
samples.10 Muller-Furstenberger and Wagner (2007) also point out that additional issues occur as
the square of the explanatory variable, the logarithm of GDP per capita, cannot also be stationary
even if the logarithm of GDP per capita is an integrated process of degree one, I(1). Hence, no unit
root test is provided for the square of the logarithm of GDP per capita. Additionally, to test for unit
roots, “first generation” tests assume cross-sectional independence, which is deemed by Muller-
9In the computational general equilibrium (CGE) approach, pioneered by Nordhaus (1991), climate change caused
by global warming gases such as CO2 emissions is viewed as a process involving the effects of energy technology
as well as the valuation by society of environmental damage. Hence, these forces may not be reflected properly in
interpreting reductions in an environmental indicator, such as CO2 emissions, as due to composition effects as income
rises if an inverted “U” process occurs.
10This step required imputing missing values in the data, for which I used the software and methodology in van
Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn (2011).
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Furstenberger and Wagner (2007) to be difficult to achieve in a world with increasing economic
interactions between countries and responses to common shocks. I test the null hypothesis of cross
sectional independence based on Croissant and Mello (2008).11
1.4 Empirical Results and Discussion
Regression results for the various indicators are presented in Section 1.5.4. A summary of the
quadratic PVCM estimates, and hypothesis tests of the underlying quadratic regressions are pre-
sented for each dependent variable (Tables 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6). Abbreviated results for cubic
estimates appear in Table 1.7. Hypothesis tests for the cubic models were carried out and were
generally in line with the quadratic models though I do not report them in tabular form. The hy-
pothesis tests reflect results for the presence of fixed or random effects, homogeneity of the slope
parameters, as well as for unit root and cross sectional dependence. These robustness tests reveal
whether selection of the PVCM estimates are preferable to pooled estimates, and they are used
to illustrate the performance of Cuba versus the samples and the selected peer countries. Turning
points, which indicate the presence of an inverted “U” relationship for the PVCM curves are also
shown. I report the estimated coefficients for Cuba and the comparison countries as well as means
and medians of the country-wise coefficients by sample. The graphical quadratic model represen-
tations of the PVCM models appear in Figures 1.9, 1.17, 1.20, 1.22, and 1.24. The upper limit of
the GDP per capita range is restricted in order to view estimates that are not too far out of sample
for the selected countries.
The results of the regressions suggest that pooling models are rejected in favor of variable co-
efficient models for all the environmental variables studied in both quadratic and cubic models.
11Also, as pointed out by Muller-Furstenberger and Wagner (2007), in order to fully avoid the “spurious regression
problem,” variables must be cointegrated. This illustrates complex issues with traditional Environmental Kuznets
Curve econometric estimates. As my focus is on the PVCM approach and not pooled estimates, I did not perform a
test for unit roots in the presence of cross-sectional dependence even though Costantini and Lupi (2013) provide such
a test. I also do not perform a cointegration test due to the issues related to the potential presence of cross sectional
dependence discussed by Muller-Furstenberger and Wagner (2007).
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This is a significant result as it shows that pooled coefficient estimates are not robust to perform
individual country fixed effects, a result suggested by prior work (List and Gallet (1999)). This
result also suggests that the individual country PVCM models discussed below are the best rep-
resentation of actual country behavior. The null hypotheses of no fixed effects and no random
effects are rejected across all indicators and samples for both quadratic and cubic cases.12 Simi-
larly, the random effects model is generally rejected in favor of the fixed effects model. The unit
root hypothesis is rejected across almost all estimates but this is subject to cross-sectional panel
independence which, however, is rejected across most estimates in both the quadratic and cubic
cases. This latter suggests that additional work in connection with cross-sectional dependence may
be required to increase robustness of my estimates.
I begin the discussion of Cuba’s performance with CO2. The quadratic PVCM results in Figure
1.9 indicate a rising “U”-shape trend for CO2 vs. income. The result in the left panel of this figure
shows that Cuba lies above each of the sample median regression curves, confirming the sample
data in Figure 1.8. It displays a sharply declining then rapidly rising pattern of CO2 emissions,
distinctly above the comparison countries as well. As per Table 1.2, no turning point from the peak
occurs for Cuba, in contrast to all the other comparison countries, and there are cases where there
are also turning points for the broader sample means or medians. Pooled regression results for the
Tropical sample in Table 1.17 confirm the rising CO2 vs. income relationship. This sample has
more significant results for the income coefficients and higher explained variation as compared to
the Caribbean and Transition samples (Tables 1.18, and 1.19). A rising CO2 vs. income quadratic
relationship conforms with frequent results in the literature. This result reflects that the damages
from CO2 emissions are not fully internalized, hence the local cost is lessened and there is a
reduced need to mitigate emissions, as in a classic externality. In the cubic relationship in Table
1.17, the squared income variable (GDPPC2) retains a positive coefficient, while a negative sign
appears for the cubed income variable (GDPPC3), indicating an improvement in CO2 emissions at
12Note, however, that for simplicity the BP LM test for random effects is not reported in the tables.
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Figure 1.8: Cuba CO2 Emissions per capita
Source: World Bank DataBank.
higher income levels. In contrast, the cubic PVCM estimations in Table 1.7 revealed a negative
sign for the squared term and a positive sign for the cubed term for Cuba, indicative of an “N”-
shaped curve. While this may be thought to be an indication of lower CO2 emissions, the result also
showed turning points at relative low income levels, USD 1134 for the quadratic term and USD
5558 for the cubic term, which indicate a resurgence of CO2 emissions at relatively low income
levels.
These results are in accordance with what one might expect as a result of the fall in output
which occurred during the “Special Period”. Figure 1.8 shows CO2 dropped sharply whereas it had
shown a steady increase during the 1970’s and 1980’s, when Cuba’s economy relied principally on
the production of sugarcane, as discussed in more detail below. A rebound in the 2000’s brought
CO2 emissions back to the levels prior to 1990. Also, levels of CO2 in Cuba remained above the
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Table 1.2: PVCM Coefficients, Turning Points, Hypothesis Tests - CO2
Country/sample Intercept ln gdpcap (ln gdpcap)ˆ2 Turning Point Shape
Cuba 176.709 -41.000 2.389 NO U
Chile -39.630 7.760 -0.364 42361 inv U
Costa Rica -143.014 30.546 -1.625 12089 inv U
Dominican Republic -166.614 36.707 -2.012 9170 inv U
Honduras -753.477 180.765 -10.840 4180 inv U
Tropical
Mean 9.856 -3.623 0.308 NO U
Median -48.022 10.062 -0.613 3662 inv U
Caribbean
Mean -42.590 6.634 -0.199 out of sample NA
Median -15.820 3.142 -0.140 out of sample NA
Transition
Mean 69.940 -14.846 0.804 10248 U
Median 16.900 -4.442 0.276 3116 U
Pooling (intercept) No effects Hausman Turning Point*
(fixed intercept) (individual) (random effects)
(variable intercepts) (time)
Tropical reject (***) reject (***) reject (***) NO
reject (***) fail to reject (.32)
Caribbean reject (***) reject (***) fail to reject (.12) out of sample
reject (***) reject (***)
Transition reject (***) reject (***) reject (***) 12550
reject (***) reject (***)
Cross Sectional independence Unit root CO 2 Unit root ln gdpcap
(Levin-Lin) (Levin-Lin)
(IPS) (IPS)
Tropical reject(***) reject (***) reject(***)
reject (***) reject(***)
Caribbean fail to reject (.28) reject (**) reject(***)
fail to reject (.32) reject (**)
Transition reject(***) reject (**) fail to reject (.86)
reject (***) reject (**)
**- Turning point calculated from fixed effects regression.
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
average of the selected comparative samples. Relatively intense use of fossil fuels for energy needs
in Cuba, discussed below, is a contributor to CO2 emissions.
Cuba’s performance in energy percentage f rom f ossil f uels follows a similar pattern as its
CO2 results. Figure 1.10 portrays a rising trend in Cuba after a period of decline, concurrent with
a plunge in GDP per capita after 1990.
An examination of the underlying historical energy needs helps shed light on these results.
Prior to 1990, energy needs in Cuba were especially high as this period included the years of
heavy sugar production, which required power for refining as well as for transportation of stalks to
the mills and sugar to export terminals. In addition to producing numerous damages to water, soil
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Figure 1.9: CO2 Emissions PVCM Cuba vs. Sample Medians and Selected Countries
Source: Table 1.2.
and forests, as described in Chapter 3, Dı´az-Briquets and Pe´rez-Lo´pez (2000) portray the sugar
industry as highly energy intensive and inefficient. Prior to the “Special Period” Cuba had access
to cheap oil from the Soviet Union. After the mid 90’s, Soviet oil supplies were largely replaced
with Venezuelan oil.13 Energy derived from crushed cane bagasse was also an important fuel
source for burning sugar, which reduces the need for the use of other energy sources, even though
Dı´az-Briquets and Pe´rez-Lo´pez (2000) note that this is highly inefficient from a caloric efficiency
viewpoint, as 5.6 metric tons of bagasse are equivalent to one metric ton of medium quality oil.
13Although the Soviet Union was the principal supplier of oil to Cuba through the Comecon before the “Special
Period,” Morris (2014) notes agreements for export of professional services to Venezuela in exchange for oil were
signed in the 2000’s. Recent economic hardship in Venezuela may jeopardize these arrangements, which may lead to
the search for other oil sources such as Russia, as described in “¿Adio´s Venezuela, bienvenida Rusia? Putin sale al
rescate de Cuba,” El Nuevo Herald, December 27,2017.
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Figure 1.10: Cuba Energy From Fossil Fuels
Source: World Bank DataBank.
A decline in ethanol produced from cane bagasse (Figure 1.11), a significant source of energy
for the country (see, for example, Pin˜o´n and Benjamı´n-Alvarado (2010)), also resulted from the
loss of sugarcane production. Loss of cane bagasse production and the Cuban authorities’ argu-
ment that diversion of crop production toward ethanol would impact food prices are obstacles to
further development of this energy source. The relative decline in ethanol appears to be the most
significant among other sources of secondary energy (Figure 1.12).14
Electricity production in 1988 was heavily dependent on fossil fuels as 98.7% of generation
capacity was from thermoelectric plants (fuel oil, diesel oil, crude oil, natural gas) (see Dı´az-
Briquets and Pe´rez-Lo´pez (2000), p.195). Prior to the “Special Period,” the authors also indicated
primary energy needs fulfillment in ’86-88 at 60% from oil, 30% from biomass (including bagasse,
14However, Pe´rez-Lo´pez (2016) points out various opportunities, including solid fuels such as cane bagasse and
liquid fuels such as ethanol, which could arise in the sugar agroindusty, even if sugar production itself does not
recover.
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Figure 1.11: Cuba Cane Bagasse Production, 1990-2007
Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n (2007).
fuelwood, charcoal, ethyl alcohol) and the rest from hydroelectricity, coal, coke and manufactured
gas. Dı´az-Briquets and Pe´rez-Lo´pez (2000) point out that the primary environmental impact of oil
comes from the transport of imported oil, which affects the quality of waters but, also, refineries
are also sources of air and water pollution. Additionally, in oil refineries, the use of inefficient
technologies from Eastern European countries lead to a high degree of energy inefficiency.
Following the fall in economic output and sugarcane production in the early years of the “Spe-
cial Period,” energy from fossil fuels moved in tandem but appeared to recover much more quickly
than output, exhibiting a trend in excess of the means of the comparative samples (Figure 1.10).
The emphasis on fossil fuels in the Cuban economy is much more evident, however, in Figure 1.10,
which shows that, following the economic recovery around 2000, higher levels of usage returned
and far exceeded those that prevailed prior to 1990 in spite of the lack of recovery in sugarcane
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Figure 1.12: Secondary Energy Production by Source 1990-2011
Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n (2012).
production. Figure 1.13 also shows steep increases in oil and gas production. Concurrently, the
potential for higher fossil fuel needs could also result from increasing energy needs as power con-
sumption rises (Figure 1.14). Figure 1.15 reflects the continued dependence on fossil fuels as
installed energy capacity relies heavily on thermoelectric plants.15 This is also confirmed by the
lack of significance of the renewables sector as shown by historical trends in Figure 1.16.
Energy needs in mining are also high. The limonite type of lateritic nickel found in Cuba (see
production trends of associated serpentinite deposits in Figure 1.18) is mined via a hydrometallur-
gical process of smelting and leaching, in particular high pressure acid leaching (“HPAL”). This
15Installed generation capacity also includes the addition in the 2000’s of gensets (“grupos electro´genos”), mini-
generators that are extremely widespread in the country (see Pin˜o´n and Benjamı´n-Alvarado (2010)). These generators
are powered by internal combustion engines running on fuel oil, diesel or natural gas. The resulting additional CO2
emissions and smoke that can cause damage to the lungs, especially in confined areas, may be contributing to environ-
mental stresses.
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Figure 1.13: Crude Oil and Natural Gas Production Cuba 1990-2013
Source: Anuario Estadı´stico de Cuba, Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n, various
issues.
process involves a much higher energy cost (8-10X higher) than for sulfides (Dı´az-Briquets and
Pe´rez-Lo´pez (2000), p. 176).
The quadratic empirical results in Table 1.3 show there is no turning point for Cuba, whereas
there are turning points for all the comparison countries and virtually all PVCM sample means
and medians. This implies there is a an inverted “U” relationship that is not observed for Cuba.
In the cubic case, there is an inverted “N” shape for Cuba, which confirms the coefficients of the
quadratic estimation, but suggests an improvement at USD 8661. However, this improvement has
to be read with caution as the income level for this second turning point lies close to the top end of
Cuba’s estimated GDP per capita for the period under study. The pooled regression results for all
the samples in Tables 1.20, 1.21 and 1.22 also display inverted “U” shapes with highly significant
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Figure 1.14: Cuba Power Consumption Total and Principal Sectors
Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n.
coefficients. In the quadratic case for Caribbean sample, the Chow test fails to reject the hypothesis
of equal coefficients across groups for the comparison of the fixed effects model vs. the PVCM
model. Also, the null hypotheses of no fixed effects failed to be rejected for both individual and
time effects. This suggests more relative homogeneity in the Caribbean sample. However, the
mean and median coefficients of the PVCM models displayed inverted “U” shapes, while Cuba
was a “U” shape. The PVCM result in the left panel of Figure 1.9 shows that Cuba lies above each
of the sample regression curves, confirming the sample data as suggested in Figure 1.10. Similar
to what is observed for CO2, these results suggest negative effects from high use of fossil fuels in
thermoelectric plants. It is also possible that this reflects intensive needs of energy from fossil fuels
in the growing service sector. Cuba’s high level of energy percentage f rom f ossil f uels contrasts
with the more optimistic outcome of the samples and comparison countries.
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Figure 1.15: Cuba Sources of Electricity
Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n.
It is possible that reductions in the associated co-production of contaminants from electricity
generation may result from a higher concentration of more efficient foreign technology and invest-
ment. Such improvements from the natural gas-fired generators run by Sherritt International, part
of the Energas consortium, with Unio´n Ele´ctrica, the national electricity company, have allowed
for large increases in production and the use of oil and gas for electricity production as well as
in other industries. The natural gas has been found in association with oil exploration. There has
been discussion that the potential for production of domestic oil and gas could attain proportions
that would eventually make Cuba self-sufficient.
PM2.5 emissions and concentrations are heavily influenced by the level and composition of
economic activity, especially industry and mining, affected in turn by the choice of energy and
technology. Discharges of dust into the atmosphere from mining in Cuba contribute to PM2.5
emissions, though it is difficult to quantify their impact given that the available data do not specify
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Figure 1.16: Cuba Sources of Electricity
Source: World Bank DataBank.
the location of monitoring stations. As such, it is not possible to properly control for this factor,
as pointed out in Section 1.5.1. Nickel deposits in Cuba lie close to the surface, and they require
environmentally stressful open pit mining. According to www.mining.com, Cuba is the 6th largest
nickel producer in the world and the 10th largest nickel mining country (production trends in Figure
1.18).16 Cuba’s mining of nickel ore and cobalt provided an intermediate input in the refining of
nickel that was done in the Soviet Union before trading relations were disrupted. Production
and refining activity subsequently continued as Canada, through Sherritt International, the largest
foreign investor in Cuba (with interests in oil & gas, mining and electricity), established a joint
venture with Cuba. This helped improve production and energy efficiency and led to a recovery
in production at the Moa Nickel joint project in northeastern Cuba. Note also that of the two
major mines in Holguı´n, where the bulk of the mining occurs, one of the mines, the state-owned
16A by-product is cobalt and 10% of the world’s cobalt is produced in Cuba.
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Table 1.3: PVCM Coefficients, Turning Points, Hypothesis Tests - Energy From Fossil Fuels
Country/sample Intercept ln gdpcap (ln gdpcap)ˆ2 Turning Point Shape
Cuba 11.557 -2.157 0.152 NO U
Chile -27.293 6.555 -0.340 15387 inv U
Costa Rica -17.228 5.059 -0.299 4675 inv U
Dominican Republic -34.726 8.577 -0.469 9339 inv U
Honduras -745.282 180.466 -10.866 4041 inv U
Tropical
Mean -108.498 26.098 -1.506 5809 inv U
Median -36.461 9.184 -0.508 8443 inv U
Caribbean
Mean -47.850 15.187 -1.087 1079 inv U
Median 3.586 0.197 -0.010 30304 inv U
Transition
Mean 13.523 -2.153 0.127 NO inv U
Median 3.517 0.245 -0.014 4910 inv U
Pooling (intercept) No effects Hausman Turning Point*
(fixed intercept) (individual) (random effects)
(variable intercepts) (time)
Tropical reject (***) reject (***) reject (***) 18200
reject (***) reject (***)
Caribbean reject(**) fail to reject (.35) reject (***) 16899
fail to reject(.54) fail to reject (.54)
Transition reject (***) reject (***) fail to reject (.28) 8442
reject (***) fail to reject(.54)
Cross Sectional independence Unit root fossil
(Levin-Lin)
(IPS)
Tropical reject (***) reject (**)
reject (**)
Caribbean reject (*) reject (***)
reject (***)
Transition reject (***) fail to reject (.65)
NA
*- Turning point calculated from fixed effects regression.
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Che Guevara plant, which opened in 1986 and uses Soviet technology, was partially shut down
with a view to overhaul and re-engineer and lower the costs of production. This accounts for a
recent drop in nickel production as this mine had a capacity of 30,000 tons a year,17 but also lower
environmental stresses may result as the existing technology was known to co-produce damaging
pollutants, thereby reducing a “pollution haven” aspect of this activity. As discussed in Section
1.5.1, note also that thermoelectric plants burning fossil fuels may also be a contributing force to
PM2.5 emissions.
17Search “Cuba to cut nickel plant output for major overhaul” in https://www.reuters.com/articles.
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Figure 1.17: Energy from Fossil Fuels PVCM Cuba vs. Sample Medians and Selected Countries
Source: Table 1.3.
PM2.5 emissions in Cuba fall in conjunction with the “Special Period”, but as opposed to CO2,
they continue to decline almost continuously during the period of this study, as shown by Figure
1.19. This also shows that PM2.5 emissions remain below the means of the samples and levels in
Cuba appear to be below recommended maxima set by the World Health Organization, except for
the last few years of period under study.
In the quadratic specification of the PVCM model, Cuba does not achieve a turning point in
PM2.5 emissions, but the Dominican Republic and the Caribbean and tropical country samples
similarly do not (Figure 1.20 and Table 1.4). For the mean and median of the PVCM coefficients,
the transition countries attain an improvement with respect to income, but at a relatively high
turning point, whereas in the pooled regression the turning point is achieved at USD 5573. PM2.5
concentration in Cuba in the last few years of the sample exceed the maximum allowed exposure,
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Figure 1.18: Cuba - Nickel Production, 2002-2013
Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n, Anuario Estadstico de Cuba, various
issues.
which may be tilting these results upward, as suggested by a rising curve as income increases.18
The “N” pattern which results from the cubic estimation in Table 1.7 reflects resumption of higher
emissions of PM2.5 emissions at higher income levels, with an indication that this occurs at an
income of USD 6806, well within the estimated GDP per capita during the study period. It is also
worth pointing out that the results in Tables 1.23, 1.24 and 1.25 generally display inverted “U”
shapes and the quadratic regressions have significant coefficients, but the R2 are lower than for the
regressions of CO2 and energy percentage f rom f ossil f uels. The Hausmann Test failed to reject
the preference of random effects over fixed effects in both quadratic and cubic models in two out
of three samples. Since the PVCM results indicate different and less favorable shapes for Cuba
18Increased burning of sickle bush charcoal discussed in Chapter 3 may also be leading to co-production of PM2.5.
49
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
year
pm
2.5
 em
iss
ion
s m
icro
gra
m
s p
er 
cub
ic m
ete
r
Cuba
Tropical
Transition
Caribbean0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Figure 1.19: PM2.5 Emissions Cuba vs. Sample Averages 1990-2013
Source: World Bank DataBank.
than the pooled coefficients, but tests confirmed that the pooled coefficient approach was rejected,
this again suggests that incorrect conclusions may result from relying on pooled results only.
Large volumes of chemical products and inputs derived from petroleum (fertilizers and pesti-
cides) were used extensively in the growing of sugarcane and in the agricultural industry prior to
1990. These inputs contributed to high emissions of methane and N2O prior to 1990. A greater
level of industrial activity, manufacturing and transportation prior to 1990 likely also helped in-
crease levels of N2O prior to 1990. As per Figure 1.21, a steady decline in methane emissions is
observed in Cuba after 1990, only stabilizing near the year 2010, a result which is surprising given
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Table 1.4: PVCM Coefficients, Turning Points, Hypothesis Tests - PM2.5
Country/sample Intercept ln gdpcap (ln gdpcap)ˆ2 Turning Point Shape
Cuba 57.789 -12.832 0.740 NO U
Chile -37.942 8.521 -0.444 14792 inv U
Costa Rica -31.353 7.115 -0.377 12531 inv U
Dominican Republic 5.520 -0.676 0.037 NO U
Honduras -178.878 43.868 -2.656 3856 inv U
Tropical
Mean 1.929 -0.376 0.057 NO inv U
Median 10.738 -2.618 0.195 NO inv U
Caribbean
Mean 69.130 -13.424 0.677 NO inv U
Median 11.580 -2.084 0.120 NO inv U
Transition
Mean -3.183 1.240 -0.059 34545 inv U
Median 0.427 0.507 -0.023 out of sample NA
Pooling No effects Hausman Turning Point*
(fixed intercept) (individual) (random effects)
(variable intercepts) (time)
Tropical reject (***) reject (***) reject (***) out of sample
reject (***) fail to reject (.42)
Caribbean reject (***) reject (***) fail to reject (.23) NO
fail to reject (.98) fail to reject (.11)
Transition reject (***) reject (***) fail to reject (.52) 5573
reject (***) reject (**)
Cross Sectional independence Unit root pm 2.5
(Levin-Lin)
(IPS)
Tropical reject (***) fail to reject (.94)
reject (***)
Caribbean reject (***) fail to reject (.26)
reject (***)
Transition reject (***) fail to reject (.52)
reject (***)
*- Turning point calculated from fixed effects regression.
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
the increase in petroleum and related activities, such that it is likely that weakening agricultural
output in Cuba contributed significantly to this decline during the period under consideration.19
Methane emissions in Cuba appear to fall as income levels increase, but its emissions appear to
be higher than for the comparative countries or samples at initial low income levels (Figure 1.22).
Also, Figure 1.21 shows significantly higher levels of methane emissions in the years before 1990
when agricultural activities were higher. In the quadratic estimates, only the mean of the PVCM
coefficient estimates in the tropical sample achieves a lower turning point than Cuba (Table 1.5),
19Also, the lack of data series on livestock manure prevented additional analysis that could have enhanced the
understanding of methane emissions.
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Figure 1.20: PM2.5 Emissions PVCM Cuba vs. Sample Medians and Selected Countries
Source: Table 1.4.
which displays an inverted “U.” Generally, however, there were relatively few samples or countries
exhibiting turning points at in-sample levels. The cubic PVCM estimates confirm the quadratic
coefficients but the “N” shape indicates a turn toward increased emissions at USD 7323. Pooled
regressions were rejected in all cases as were the no individual and time effects hypotheses. Pooled
regression coefficients were generally not significant for the transition sample (Table 1.28), which
is likely due to the diverse composition of the sample with respect to agricultural and regional
characteristics. The Hausmann Test failed to be rejected for all the samples, which is an indication
that one cannot automatically conclude that fixed effects models are preferable even in the presence
of the time-varying explanatory variable, income.
The years of relatively high sugarcane production, characterized by intensive use of nitrate
fertilizers, and the precipitous fall in sugarcane production after 1990 most likely account for the
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Figure 1.21: Cuba Methane Emissions
Source: World Bank DataBank.
pattern of increase in N2O emissions in the decades leading up to 1990, followed by a sharp fall
thereafter (see Figure 1.23). The pooled results for methane and N2O indicated significantly more
robust coefficients for fixed and random models than the pooled fixed coefficient OLS model as
well as higher explanatory power. Shapes were generally inverted “U,” but there were both “N”
and inverted “N” shapes produced by the estimates. The results of the quadratic and cubic PVCM
estimations for N2O yield shapes that are nearly symmetrical to methane. This includes an upward
drift of the shape at a level of USD 7602, which is slightly higher than for methane and close to
the upper range of GDP per capita observations for Cuba for the study period. However, similar to
methane, emissions levels observed prior to 1990 are never again attained so that one should not
read too much into this upturn. Also, lower availability of data lead to computational difficulties
which prevented calculation of turning points for all the sample medians.
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Table 1.5: PVCM Coefficients, Turning Points, Hypothesis Tests - methane
Country/sample Intercept ln gdpcap (ln gdpcap)ˆ2 Turning Point Shape
Cuba -25.063 8.272 -0.498 4049 inv U
Chile -45.714 11.074 -0.552 22770 inv U
Costa Rica 75.074 -13.779 0.704 NO U
Dominican Republic 1.898 1.491 -0.080 10775 inv U
Honduras 119.197 -28.200 1.791 NO U
Tropical
Mean -42.708 13.327 -0.875 2037 inv U
Median 1.984 1.395 -0.057 out of sample NA
Caribbean
Mean 98.326 -16.710 0.736 NO U
Median -9.713 2.797 -0.146 14840 inv U
Transition
Mean 27.236 -4.247 0.255 NO U
Median 18.699 -2.562 0.159 NO U
Pooling (intercept) No effects Hausman Turning Point*
(fixed intercept) (individual) (random effects)
(variable intercepts) (time)
Tropical reject (***) reject (***) fail to reject (.32) NO
reject (***) reject (***)
Caribbean reject (***) reject (***) fail to reject (.15) NO
reject (***) reject (***)
Transition reject (***) reject (***) fail to reject (.96) 15841
reject (***) reject (***)
Cross Sectional independence Unit root methane
(Levin-Lin)
(IPS)
Tropical reject (***) reject (***)
reject (***)
Caribbean reject (***) reject (***)
fail to reject (.32)
Transition reject (***) reject (***)
reject (***)
*- Turning point calculated from fixed effects regression.
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 1.6 indicates that Cuba achieves a lower turning point in nitrous oxide emissions than any
of the comparison countries or samples but the level of emissions is generally higher than that of
the comparison countries and samples (Figure 1.24). This likely indicates the effects of decreased
industrial activity but that initial levels were high. Pooled regression results in Tables 1.29, 1.30,
and 1.31) display generally less robust significance of coefficients and R2 than for other indicators,
though the transition sample fixed effects and random effects stood out with more robust results.
The random effects estimator was not rejected in favor of the fixed effects estimator but pooling of
regressions was rejected for all the sample tests. The unit root hypothesis was rejected across all
samples and the cross-sectional independence hypothesis failed to be rejected for the Caribbean
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Figure 1.22: Methane Emissions PVCM Cuba vs. Sample Medians and Selected Countries
Source: Table 1.5.
sample, though it was not significant, while this hypothesis was rejected for the two other samples.
There was a turning point in the pooled fixed effects transition regression (Table 1.6) whereas in
the PVCM transition mean and median calculation there was not, indicating again that pooling
results may be misleading.
Generally, broad forces that may help attribute the relatively poorer performance in CO2,
energy f rom f ossl f uels and PM2.5 appear to be the sectoral changes described in Section 1.5.2,
which suggest a significant level of deindustrialization in the early years of the period, with poten-
tial environmental stressors switching from agriculture to industry and services in the later years of
the period. Conversely, the declines in methane and nitrous oxide emissions and relatively better
results achieved in Cuba in these indicators reflect the lasting effects of the decline in sugarcane
and agricultural production.
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Figure 1.23: Cuba Nitrous Oxide Emissions
Source: World Bank DataBank.
1.4.1 Robustness check
As a comparative exercise and robustness check, in Table 1.8, I also summarize Cuba’s results as
calibrated by its fixed effects coefficient in each of the fixed effects sample quadratic regressions
as compared to the quadratic PVCM results. Positive coefficients suggest Cuba’s results are above
mean estimates, hence underperforming and, inversely, negative coefficients imply outperforming
the sample. These results illustrate the greater robustness of the PVCM approach. For example,
the fixed effects estimates would suggest Cuba outperforming in CO2 in the Caribbean and tran-
sition samples, whereas the PVCM approach illustrated underperformance. The differences are
even more striking for energy f rom f ossil f uels, where the results of the two approaches are di-
vergent across all samples. Similar divergence is encountered in comparing fixed country effects
coefficients with PVCM results for the comparison countries vs. Cuba. It bears emphasizing that
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Table 1.6: PVCM Coefficients, Turning Points, Hypothesis Tests - nitrous oxide
Country/sample Intercept ln gdpcap (ln gdpcap)ˆ2 Turning Point Shape
Cuba -25.063 8.272 -0.498 4049 inv U
Chile -45.714 11.074 -0.552 22770 inv U
Costa Rica 75.074 -13.779 0.704 NO U
Dominican Republic 1.898 1.491 -0.080 10775 inv U
Honduras 119.197 -28.200 1.791 NO U
Tropical
Mean -42.708 13.327 -0.875 2037 inv U
Median 1.984 1.395 -0.057 out of sample NA
Caribbean
Mean 98.326 -16.710 0.736 NO U
Median -9.713 2.797 -0.146 14840 inv U
Transition
Mean 27.236 -4.247 0.255 NO U
Median 18.699 -2.562 0.159 NO U
Pooling (intercept) No effects Hausman Turning Point*
(fixed intercept) (individual) (random effects)
(variable intercepts) (time)
Tropical reject (***) reject (***) fail to reject (.28) 23768
reject (***) reject (***)
Caribbean reject (***) reject (***) reject (***) 10783
reject (***) reject (**)
Transition reject (***) reject (***) fail to reject (.91) 8363
reject (***) reject (***)
Cross Sectional independence Unit root nitrous oxide
(Levin-Lin)
(IPS)
Tropical reject (***) reject (***)
reject (***)
Caribbean fail to reject (.31) reject (*)
reject (***)
Transition reject (***) reject (***)
reject (***)
*- Turning point calculated from fixed effects regression.
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
the PVCM approach was supported by testing which showed the pooled models were rejected in
favor of the former.
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Figure 1.24: Nitrous Oxide PVCM Cuba vs. Sample Medians and Selected Countries
Source: Table 1.6.
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Table 1.7: Cubic PVCM Model - Coefficients, Turning Points and Shapes
Intercept GDPPC GDPPC2 GDPPC3 Turning Point 1 Turning Point 1 Shape
CO2
Cuba -462.106 181.426 -23.417 0.997 1134 5558 N
Caribbean median -462.100 181.400 -23.420 1.089 NA NA NA
Transition median -370.800 109.900 -11.390 0.669 NA NA NA
Tropical median -462.100 193.700 -27.050 1.103 199 63169 N
Fossil f uels
Cuba 847.646 -292.648 33.782 -1.297 3397 8661 inverted N
Caribbean median -14.670 5.757 -0.574 0.572 NA NA NA
Transition median 115.400 -36.650 3.880 -0.134 3798 63661 inverted N
Tropical median -270.700 105.900 -12.890 0.514 924 30038 N
PM 2.5
Cuba -9694.960 3368.810 -389.960 15.040 4721 6806 N
Caribbean median -493.700 0.148 -14.600 0.950 1 27986 N
Transition median 210.100 -72.560 7.764 -0.277 9471 13952 inverted N
Tropical median 50.430 -17.480 2.105 -0.152 NA NA NA
methane
Cuba -2684.526 933.349 -107.720 4.141 4639 7323 N
Caribbean median 2304.000 -699.400 70.810 -2.950 NA NA NA
Transition median -131.400 47.660 -5.376 0.202 6304 7982 N
Tropical median 192.100 -60.000 6.860 -0.343 NA NA NA
nitrous oxide
Cuba 1323.801 463.170 -53.610 2.066 4282 7602 N
Caribbean median 811.600 -244.800 24.630 -1.230 NA NA NA
Transition median -640.200 225.700 -26.390 1.015 NA NA NA
Tropical median -541.900 194.000 -18.760 0.742 NA NA NA
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Table 1.8: Cuba PVCM Results vs. Fixed Effects by Sample and Indicator
Tropical Caribbean Transition
CO2 (PVCM) underperform underperform underperform
F.E.(divergence) 0.246 (no) -16.176 (yes) -27.378 (yes)
Fossil (PVCM) underperform underperform underperform
F.E.(divergence) -8.182 (yes) -7.601 (yes) -5.654 (yes)
PM2.5 (PVCM) mixed underperform underperform
F.E.(divergence) -0.842 (n.a.) 5.6 (no) -11.658 (yes)
Methane (PVCM) underperform mixed outperform
F.E.(divergence) 7.548 (no) 26.064 (n.a.) 0.803 (yes)
Nitrous oxide (PVCM) underperform underperform outperform
F.E.(divergence) 4.308 (no) -18.802 (yes) -9.204 (no)
1.4.2 Structural Comparison
The reduced-form Environmental Kuznets Curve framework used in this study implies that there
are endogenous structural changes occurring through time in the underlying economies, which are
embodied in GDP per capita. Nevertheless, a more detailed look at certain structural factors in
Cuba vs. the comparison peer countries may be useful to interpret the results. In addition, ex-
plicit consideration of structural variables may be useful in future research on ambient air quality
in Cuba. Dasgupta et al. (2001) discusses the significance of various structural factors on envi-
ronmental results in predominantly agricultural (“green”) or urbanized (“brown”) countries. They
estimate the impact of population density and the share of agriculture in GDP on the results of a
“green” performance index, as well as the influence of urban/total population, population density,
and manufacturing share of GDP on a “brown” performance index. Table 1.9 indicates a higher
share of agricultural and arable land in Cuba. However, agriculture has been declining in Cuba
(see Figure 1.4) and its share of value added is now relatively low (Table 1.12), which would sug-
gest reduced pressure on CO2 and methane and nitrous oxide. Additionally, the effect would also
depend on the use of mechanization and fertilizers in agriculture. Both of these inputs depended
on imports which declined sharply in Cuba following the “Special Period”. Forests are useful to
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mitigate the effects of CO2, but even though forest cover has been increasing in Cuba as discussed
in Chapter 3, they cover a relatively smaller share of land in Cuba, as shown in Table 1.9.
The relative environmental effects of higher comparative population density and urban pop-
ulation in Cuba, illustrated in Table 1.10, might be mixed. On the one hand, these factors imply
higher stresses on infrastructure and transport, which would generally produce higher environmen-
tal pressure. However, the transport sector in Cuba was relatively less developed during the study
period if we proxy it, for example, by the number of automobiles. Although this would tend to
reduce energy f rom f ossil f uels, CO2 and nitrous oxide at the margin, one would have to net out
the effect of higher pollution emissions from the existing cars, which are generally old and would
produce more pollutants. Also, a higher level of urbanization would generally suggest greater
efficiency in energy use, hence lower production of air pollutants.
Table 1.12 reflects the low level of industrial activity in the Cuban economy and high per-
centage of services versus its peers, which would argue that there should be lower environmental
damage to air quality.20 However, as discussed in Section 1.1, in some cases, a higher percentage
of services in output may in some cases be responsible for high relative CO2 emissions. Table 1.11
confirms higher reliance on fossil fuels and illustrates low use of renewables, signs of higher air
quality stress factors in Cuba versus the comparison countries. The latter table also highlights low
levels of electric power consumption, which indicate a need to widen service, a potential contrib-
utor to air pollution.
1.4.3 Conclusions
The analysis performed in this chapter provides evidence that pooled characterizations of the
relationship between environmental indicators and income levels may not reflect what is occur-
ring at the individual country level. Hence, the analysis performed in this chapter allowed more
20Nevertheless, it is important to caution that this data relies on what is likely a misestimated level of GDP in Cuba,
in the World Bank data, as discussed in Section 1.5.2.
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Table 1.9: Land (2010)
Category Agricultural land Arable land Forest Area Total area
(% of total) (% of total) (% of total) (km2)
Cuba 60.7 31.8 27.5 106440
Chile 21.2 1.7 21.8 743532
Costa Rica 35.6 4.4 51.0 51060
Dom. Rep. 49.6 16.6 37.6 48320
Honduras 28.9 9.1 46.4 111890
Lat Am & Carib. 37.1 8.2 46.8 20041794
Source: World Bank DataBank.
Table 1.10: Population (2010)
Category Population Population density Urban population
(’000) per $kmˆ2$ (% of total)
Cuba 11308 106.2 76.6
Chile 17015 22.9 88.6
Costa Rica 4545 89.0 71.7
Dom. Rep. 9898 204.0 73.8
Honduras 7504 67.1 51.7
Lat Am & Carib. 598690 29.9 78.5
Source: World Bank DataBank.
Table 1.11: Energy (2010)
Category Energy from Electric power Electricity from Renewable energy
fossil fuels consumption renewables consumption
per capita excl. Hydro
(percent) (kW) (percent) (percent)
Cuba 88.8 1293.7 2.7 17.3
Chile 77.6 3316.2 4.3 27.0
Costa Rica 47.5 1901.3 17.5 42.3
Dom. Rep. 86.9 1366.1 0.9 13.3
Honduras 51.2 684.8 2.4 53.1
Lat Am & Carib. 73.5 1950.4 4.4 28.7
Source: World Bank DataBank.
precise comparisons of Cuba’s international performance of various ambient air indicators and
energy percentage f rom f ossil f uels. Nevertheless, detailed testing of various hypotheses also re-
vealed the need for future work in the presence of cross sectional dependence, which was revealed
in my panel data. Tests also showed that fixed effects should not always be selected in pooled ex-
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Table 1.12: Value added by sectors (2010)
Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services
ISIC 1-5 ISIC 10-45 ISIC 15-37 ISIC 50-99
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP)
Cuba 3.7 23.1 15.1 73.2
Chile 3.9 38.8 11.7 57.3
Costa Rica 7.2 25.4 15.8 67.4
Dominican Republic 6.4 27.7 16.4 65.9
Honduras 12.5 27.6 17.8 59.9
Latin America & Caribbean 5.4 33.2 15.9 61.4
Source: World Bank DataBank.
Percentage totals for ISIC categories above do not equal 100 due to overlaps and exclusion of
other sectors.
aminations of the data and that cubic functional forms should be considered along with quadratic
ones.
Cuba’s mixed relative performance across the indicators requires careful application of any
particular label or theory from the vast Environmental Kuznets literature to characterize its results.
This is also compounded by the fact that my samples do not include large industrial developed
nations, which was a deliberate construct, as my goal was to use more homogeneous samples and
show the need for even greater granularity in describing Cuba’s performance. Tentatively, Cuba
may be portrayed as a “pollution haven” in activities which result in emissions of CO2 and use of
energy percentage f rom f ossil f uels, where we saw a lower relative performance. To be sure, the
years of intensive sugarcane production embodied this categorization more closely. To a lesser ex-
tent this may also describe PM2.5 emissions, through mining activities, especially in the later years
of the period, when emissions of this pollutant increased. For indicators where the relative perfor-
mance appears to be relatively better where the curves point to evidence of inverted “U” shaped
relationships, such as for methane and nitrous oxide, one might be tempted to suggest evidence of
a “revised EKC”to explain Cuba’s performance. However, it appears more likely that the results
and tests presented here seem to reflect the very particular structural changes which have affected
Cuba during the “Special Period”. These include negative output effects from deindustrialization
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following the fall in the sugarcane industry, as well as negative composition effects from the con-
tinued attachment to fossil fuels, the rise of the service sector, including tourism, and the limited
recovery in industrial and agricultural activities. Especially in the early years of the period under
study, when GDP per capita fell sharply, it is interesting to note that these changes are unlike the
usual output and composition effects observed in an inverted “U” shaped Environmental Kuznets
Curve resulting from income growth. Consequently, future industrial policy choices with impli-
cations of rising income growth may have a more stressful effect on ambient air indicators. The
example of transition economies which pursued more environmentally friendly policies should be
kept in mind. Within the scope offered by the evidence presented here on the available air pollu-
tion indicators vs. peer countries and the samples, there does not appear to be sufficient empirical
evidence to speak of a “paradox” in the form of superior comparative performance in Cuba for the
indicators in this study.
1.5 Appendix
1.5.1 Detailed Description of Variables
Descriptions of the environmental variables are derived from sources at http://www.epa.gov,
http://databank.worldbank.org, and United Nations Statistics Division (2013). A description
of the dependent environmental variables that were used appears below.
Various editions of the Annual Cuban statistical yearbook (Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas
e Informacio´n (2007), Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n (2010), Oficina Nacional
de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n (2012), and Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n (2015))
provide a primary source of data on the Cuban economy and environment, which I use throughout
my study.
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GDPPC (Gross domestic product per capita, chain-weighted), natural logarithm, 1990-2013,
see Feenstra et al. (2015).
CO2 (emissions, metric tons per capita), natural logarithm, 1966-2011, downloadable at
http://databank.worldbank.org/. Data is sourced from Carbon Dioxide Information
Analysis Center, Environmental Sciences Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
CO2 is considered the primary greenhouse gas resulting from human activities, though it
has a smaller effect than other greenhouse gases. Higher emissions of any greenhouse gas
lead to higher concentrations diffused in the atmosphere, such that the amount measured
in the atmosphere is approximately the same, regardless of where it is measured. Local
emissions of CO2 are exported to the global atmosphere and are a classic externality. Its
effects are said to lead to warming of the planet which may cause significant economic and
societal disruptions. Its primary source results from burning fossil fuels (coal, natural gas
and oil) principally for energy, transportation and some industrial processes. It is also highly
related to uses of land, as forests and reforestation can act as a sink to absorb CO2 from
the atmosphere. Over time, emissions can be influenced by economic growth and the level
of economic activity, population growth, temperatures, energy prices, behavior patterns and
technology.
Energy f ossil (energy percentage f rom f ossil f uels, total), natural logarithm, 1971-2013,
downloadable at http://databank.worldbank.org/.
In addition to CO2 emissions, high fossil fuel use in power plants and industrial facilities also
produce significant detrimental respiratory effects caused by SO2 emissions, a component of
the sulfur oxides group, SOx. SO2 is often associated with generic nitrogen oxide pollutants,
NOx, and the formation of health-threatening microscopic particles. These components con-
tribute to a man-made form of acid rain, which damages the ecological system dependent
on bodies of water. Decay to buildings and structures and visibility impairment is another
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byproduct of acid rain. Insufficient data availability prevented the addition of contaminants
from the SOx group to my study. Cuban domestic crude, which has a high sulfur content is
used extensively to power electric utilities,
Methane (kt of CO2 equivalent), natural logarithm, 1970-2012, chemical symbol CH4,
downloadable at http://databank.worldbank.org/.
Methane (CH4 ) is a highly prevalent and powerful greenhouse gas, with over 60% of its
emissions sourced from human activities according to the EPA. However, wetlands, which
are widespread in Cuba, are the largest source of emissions from natural sources.21
Activities that can produce emissions of methane include the production, processing and
transporting of natural gas as well as of petroleum, as natural gas is often found in
conjunction with it. Also, manure management of livestock is a prominent source of
methane emissions.
Nitrous oxide (kt of CO2 equivalent), natural logarithm, 1970-2012, chemical symbol N2O,
downloaded from databank.worldbank.org
Emissions of nitrous oxide, N2O, result in part from the effects of human activities. This
includes the use of synthetic fertilizers containing nitrogen but also from combustion of fuel
in motor vehicle transportation and various manufacturing processes. Even though only
40% of total N2O emissions result from human activities, it is also important to note that
N2O is 300 times more powerful than CO2 as a greenhouse gas.22 Reduction of emissions is
part of international efforts to curb greenhouse gases, though, due to low concentration, its
greenhouse effect is behind other principal contributors, led by water vapor, CO2 and
methane. N2O is also considered to be the single most important contributor to ozone
depletion. N2O is not generally considered part of the NOx group.
21See https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/ch4.html.
22See https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/n20.html.
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PM2.5 (mean annual exposure, micrograms per m3), natural logarithm, 1990-2013,
downloadable at http://databank.worldbank.org/.
Exposure is calculated by weighting mean annual concentrations of PM2.5, suspended
pollution particles measuring less than 2.5 microns in aerodynamic diameter, by population
in both urban and rural areas. The World Bank DataBank indicates that direct monitoring of
PM2.5 is still rare in many parts of the world and differences exist in measurement standards
and protocols. Hence, the World Bank DataBank indicates the data should be considered
only a general indication of air quality.
High concentrations of ambient PM2.5 particles are especially dangerous as they may
penetrate deep into the respiratory tract. They are a major worldwide threat to health,
respiratory conditions and mortality. A principal cause of emissions is burning of wood and
other organic matter for energy needs, an activity carried out by 40% of the world’s
population according to the World Bank. Particles form in the atmosphere as a result of
complex reactions of chemicals involving SO2 and NOx, themselves emitted from power
plants, industries and automobiles. Other factors include pollution regulation and the
effects of geographic and atmospheric conditions. As the polluted particles can travel long
distances their effects cannot be fully internalized, especially in a small country.23 Effects
can include acidification of lakes and streams, modified nutrient balance in coastal waters
and river basins, soil depletion, forest and farm crops damage, and decreased diversity of
ecosystems. They can also cause damage to stone and other materials in constructions,
which includes damaging important cultural heritage sites.
23Maal-Bared (2006) notes that air contaminants such as particulates and nitrous oxides have not been a problem
for Cuba due to the particular shape of the island and its wind patterns.
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The guideline set by the World Health Organization (WHO) for PM2.5 is that annual mean
concentrations should not exceed 10 micrograms per cubic meter, representing the lower
range over which adverse health effects have been observed.24
24Maximum recommended PM2.5 concentrations are also included in National Ambient Air Quality Standards for
“criteria” pollutants, which also include CO, lead, NxO, ozone, particle pollution (PM10), and SO2.
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1.5.2 GDP in Cuba - Issues and Estimation
With version 8.0 in 2013, the Penn World Tables stopped publication of GDP estimates for coun-
tries, such as Cuba, which have never participated in the International Comparison Project (“ICP”),
an integral part of the methodology of this source.25 The prior estimates calculated by PWT 8.0
featured a technique to impute prices which led to an understated price level. Together with an
overvalued exchange rate, this produced high GDP estimates, including Cuba.26 I structure a new
GDP per capita series for Cuba, which can be anchored to the Penn World Tables.
This series relies on a relative comparison of Cuban consumption vs. Costa Rica in the year
2000 as presented in Devereux and Locay (2009). Costa Rica is a country often used as a natural
comparison with Cuba. The authors had access to Cuban prices for the years 2000-2001 from
a survey by the United Nations Civil Service Commission. The availability of this price study
is useful as the composition of the Cuban consumption basket in the Cuban price indexes is not
published.27 For the year 2000, Devereux and Locay (2009) calculated a relative consumption
level for Cuba of 47 (Costa Rica = 100). This contrasts with results in Devereux and Ward (2012),
which estimated that Cuba was a middle income country in 1955. Those authors argue Cuba then
had a level of income which was very similar to that of Italy, higher than Portugal or Spain, and
among the top countries in Latin America.
To allow for a margin of error and to bring the estimates of consumption closer to those pub-
lished by the government, which, for reasons discussed below, can be considered an upper bound, I
adjust the relative level of Cuban consumption to 60% of the level of Costa Rica, instead of 47%. I
multiply the level of GDP per capita in Costa Rica in 2000, using 2011 PPP prices, as published in
Feenstra et al. (2015), by this factor to create an anchor to the Penn World Tables 9.0 figures. From
25This resulted in a reduction of the countries in the PWT sample by 22 to 167 in PWT 8.0, a figure equivalent to
the number of countries which have at some point participated in the ICP.
26The PWT noted this shortcoming in the appendix to the 6.0 version of the PWT, stating: “...our short-cut estimates
were considered high relative to other Caribbean countries.”
27Note, however, that the GDP calculations with constant prices in the Cuban government accounts are based on a
basket of 409 goods at 1997 prices.
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this base, I calculated GDP per capita levels from 1990 to 2014 using GDP growth rates published
in the Cuban government’s national accounts.28 This measure also avoids other issues and biases
discussed below, such as those resulting from the exchange rate.
It is important to note that the consumption estimate in Devereux and Locay (2009) is based
on “AIC” (actual individual consumption), which includes household consumption (“HC”) plus
individual consumption by the government (“IC”), thereby including health care and education
provided to individuals by the government.29 Devereux and Locay (2009) also provided additional
calculations of Cuba’s relative consumption excluding housing, education and health care. The
inclusion of health care at the margin did not increase the relative consumption estimate. This
suggests high prices paid by Cubans for this service, as indicated by the UN survey. The authors
further argue that Cuban consumption and investment have fallen closer to those of a relatively un-
developed country like Honduras. Further, various studies have pointed out that pre-revolutionary
educational and health standards were already relatively high by Latin American standards. At the
margin, this would dampen the estimates of the contribution to growth of post-1959 investment in
these areas.30
Creation of this series for my study is grounded and justified upon additional issues. Dif-
ficulties involved in calculating GDP per capita in Cuba per international standards are rooted
in the poor quality of Cuban historical data, including the use of the communist Material Prod-
uct System (MPS) method of calculating output before 1990, which typically overstated produc-
tion of material goods. In contrast to the United Nations System of National Accounts (SNA)
(Pe´rez-Lopez (2010)), total value, rather than value-added, was computed at all stages of produc-
tion, while services were not included. A government source (http://www.one.cu/aec2014/
28Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n, Anuario Estadı´stico de Cuba, various issues.
29These categories are used in PPP calculations in the Penn World Tables 7.0. For details on these classifica-
tions and modifications in PWT 8.0, see http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwc/v80/comparing_pwt80_
withpwt71.pdf.
30In the most recent published estimates by the Cuban Government, the category of Education and Health Care and
Social Assistance hovers around 25% of the GDP totals. See http://www.one.cu.
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05CuentasNacionales.pdf) indicates how, in the 1980’s, the Cuban government studied and
adopted the United Nations System of National Accounts. Subject to adaptations, the Cuban gov-
ernment calculated Cuba’s accounts from the mid 1980’s onward according to the UN system of
national accounts.31
Nevertheless, GDP calculations made by the Cuban government still harbor methodological
problems. Abrupt changes in growth and composition of output occurred after 1990, adding to
measurement difficulties. Pe´rez-Lo´pez and Mesa-Lago (2009) and Mesa-Lago (2005) further dis-
cuss methodological issues in official government GDP calculations, which boosted estimates.
Since 2001, Cuba shifted the base year (without publishing data on the consumption basket) to
estimate GDP in constant Cuban pesos (“CUP”) from 1981 to 1997, which led to an artificial in-
crease in the value of GDP growth in 1989-2000. Referring to exchange rate anomalies, which
include a dual currency system, Mesa-Lago (2005) points out that the induced distortions were
significant. Thus, he pointed out that the United Nations Human Development Index calculation
in 2005 included a GDP per capita PPP which was twice the value of 1989. This occurred despite
the fact that the official Cuban data for 2003, which was inflated as indicated above, had a GDP
per capita level that was 10% below its 1989 level.
Another methodological change occurred when the Cuban government modified the output
of the service sector in 2004 following a period of study described in https://www.ecured.cu/
Producto_Interno_Bruto_en_Cuba. Hence, the national accounts were adjusted by valuing free
government-provided services in health, education, sports and culture by proxying these services
through a system of tariffs. This adjusted the data from 2000, modifying what would otherwise be
excluded in the value-added method of calculating GDP. According to Mesa-Lago (2005), these
31Aslund (2002), p.122, cites Johnson et al. (1997), who suggest that a relatively robust proxy for growth in GDP
in transition economies is electricity consumption. Any shortfall in the latter compared to GDP per capita is attributed
to the underground economy. An electricity consumption series for Cuba for 1990-2011 is available from the govern-
ment’s statistics office, though this required linear interpolation for the years 1991-1994 and 1996-1999. I estimated
its Pearson correlation with the GDP per capita series constructed for this study to be .87.
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changes were a departure from international methodology, which value such services at cost, and
it resulted in the addition of 2 percentage points to the GDP estimates.
Earlier, Mesa-Lago (2002) recommended that the United Nations suspend calculating the Hu-
man Development Index for Cuba, which included a one-third weighting of GDP per capita, until
an adequate measure of the latter is made available. Mesa-Lago (2002) argues exchange rate issues
and the lack of availability of published price and consumption information required to estimate
PPP-adjusted GDP per capita made it “impossible” to calculate the latter. Castillo (2011) discusses
Cuba’s monetary duality, which features the existence of a non-convertible national currency, the
Cuban Peso (CUP), along with a convertible unit, the CUC, and argues that the absence of a real
exchange rate is one of the most serious problems of the Cuban economy. The author also indi-
cates that it is not known how nominal GDP is calculated given the presence of dual currencies and
that prices for transactions between government entities are meaningless. The Cuban Government
announced in October 2013 that it would move away from the system of monetary duality, and
the CUP would serve as the sole national currency. There was no timetable announced, though
the eventual scrapping of the CUC should in time lead to a more accurate assessment of GDP per
capita.32 33
Access to CUC’s is granted in the tourism industry and also for activities which are environ-
mentally stressful, such as nickel mining and oil imports. Prices for goods in hard currency stores
accessed with CUC’s are not included in the CPI, which creates difficulties for PPP estimates.
Morris (2014) discusses the existence of multi-tier pricing structures in official, non official, CUP
and CUC sectors. Nominal CUP wage structures and disparities in CUP vs. earnings potential in
CUC in non-state activities create distorted incentives and rising inequalities. This author points
out that the CUP/USD rate fluctuated from 7:1 in 1990 to levels around 100 in the aftermath of the
32One may speculate at this time that this process may accelerate with the establishment of diplomatic relations with
the US in July 2015, which would entail the possible enlargement of trade relations with the US, while the loosening
of the embargo rules could follow.
33see El Pais, January 16, 2015, “Cuba avanza hacia el fin del sistema de dos monedas”.
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“Special Period” but argues that it remains undervalued, at the current rate of 26.5:1. The non-state
sector is a subsidized competitive beneficiary of this structure.
Unavailability of items distributed per the rationing booklets and the low value of the CUP
create hardships for Cuban consumers. Access to hard currency stores is often necessary in order
to avail themselves of goods not available otherwise, but this is an extremely expensive exercise
to those without access to CUC’s or remittances. The weakness of the purchasing power of the
CUP decreases the robustness of PPP estimates that feature a PPP exchange estimate of less than
1 CUP/USD.34 It is also reasonable to suggest that these conditions were likely to have been even
more acute in the earlier years of the “Special Period”, beginning in 1990, when access by Cubans
to hard currency stores was lower. The continued stream of migrants from the island, many in
search of economic opportunity, is further evidence of a poor standard of living on the island.
Sanguinetty (2009) points out difficulties, often present in centrally-planned economies, related
to necessary adjustments to the quality of goods. The rationing system of consumer goods, with
prices set by the government, also helps produce fluctuations in output which present additional
problems.35 Sanguinetty (2009) also notes other stylized facts which suggest a relatively low level
of Cuban GDP per capita. These include the deterioration of Cuban infrastructure and housing, the
relative lack of consumer durables owned by the Cuban population, and the effects of the virtual
disappearance of sectors, such as the financial sector, which have not been adequately replaced in a
manner which emphasizes controls and efficiency of enterprises. Other distortions and inefficien-
cies occurred as the result of the elimination of subsidies from the Soviet era and the effects of the
US embargo.36
34This appears to be the case of the PWT 7.1 and World Bank estimates discussed further below.
35The system, started in 1962, is in effect in spite of plans announced by the government in the new lineamientos
policies to reform it. In a symposium in April 2011, A.R.M. Ritter discussed the reform features (see
http://www.thecubaneconomy.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/
Cuba-FuturesConference-Bildner-Center-Program.pdf).
36It is also interesting to note that Sanguinetty (2009) argues that the Cuban government is eager to publish favorable
statistics like health and education indicators but it considers that it is less important to report on areas where there is
a less significant element of success. In particular, he mentions GDP reporting.
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Garcı´a Ribeiro et al. (2013) conduct a synthetic control experiment to examine the counterfac-
tual of what Cuban GDP would have been in the period through 1974 in the absence of the Cuban
Revolution. In the counterfactual, Cuba would have maintained analogous institutions to those
of a previously similar control group of countries, with a common colonial extractive history.37
They attribute the shortfall of actual GDP as compared to the counterfactual and the control group,
which includes Latin American countries, to institutional change, specifically the end of market
mechanisms and the adoption of socialist institutions, which led to recurrent changes in economic
policies. Garcı´a Ribeiro et al. (2013) conclude that the gap between Cuba and the control countries
began to grow post-1959, while both series had closely tracked each other previously.
Morris (2014) cites changes made in response to the “Special Period,” such as increased non-
state employment, but notes difficulties in other sectors. Caloric intake was not restored to 1990
levels until 9 years later.38 Investment/GDP is very weak at 10% of GDP vs. higher levels in
transition economies, as is FDI, at 1% compared to 4% of GDP in transition economies.
Other Sources
Table 1.13 presents estimates of PPP-adjusted GDP per capita in Cuba from other sources as well
as the calculations in this study reflecting the beginning and end of the study period. The relative
position of peer Latin American countries with respect to the Cuban estimates is also shown. As
these sources all use official government estimates, as per standard international methodology, and
mostly calculate on a PPP basis, they reflect issues in monetary duality and pricing difficulties to
varying degrees. For example, to estimate the PPP-adjusted real GDP series in 2005 prices, The
Economist uses a standardized procedure in order to make it comparable across countries. The
PPP-adjusted GDP in USD terms is derived using real and nominal GDP data published by the
37The synthetic control method was first described by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and used to study the coun-
terfactual in Germany had unification not occurred.
38Along with other toxic contributing factors, the acute nutritional crisis is also considered as one of the causes of
the epidemic of optic and peripheral neuropathy which struck 50,000 people in the island from 1991 to 1994.
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government’s statistics office. The MOXLAD figures are available only for Latin America and are
derived closely from the well-known Maddison estimates. The United Nations (United Nations
Statistics Division (2013)) results for Cuba in 2010 (one of two non-PPP adjusted measures of
GDP per capita) are the same as the figures produced by the Cuban Government Oficina Nacional
de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n.
With respect to rate of growth estimates by source, I present results for the entire period, 1990-
2010, and two subintervals, one for the “Special Period,” 1990-2000, and one for the remainder of
the study period, from 2001-2010 (see Table 1.13). The latter segment is intended to capture the
effects of the previously mentioned methodology changes introduced by the Cuban Government
in 2001 and 2003. The unadjusted UN estimates, reflect, as discussed, the official Government
growth calculations, as do the estimates in my study. It bears repeating that the estimates in my
study were anchored to the Feenstra et al. (2015) database, the most widely used in Environmental
Kuznets Curve studies. The series in my study is not affected by PPP calculations, which will
remain suspect until more is known about Cuban prices and the exchange rate is unified.39
1.5.3 Summary Description of Samples
Three different samples, tropical, Caribbean and transition were used in the empirical estimations.
The country list selection for the tropical sample is based on that used in Bhattarai and Hammig
(2001). Specifically, it includes countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America/Caribbean. Only
39Progress seems to be appearing in this respect as the 2015 UN Human Development Index indicated a GNI
per capita of USD 7,455 based on 2011 PPP $ (hdr.undp.org). This source indicates that this estimate is based
on a “cross-country regression and the projected growth rate from UNECLAC”. This would appear to be a similar
methodology as that which is used by the ICP, a step toward inclusion again in the Penn World Tables, though a search
of the UNECLAC data did not reveal that a series of GDP per capita PPP basis had yet been published for Cuba
(estadisticas.cepal.org). This figure contrasts with a GDP per capita figure PPP 2011 basis of USD 19,950,
which the UN HDI reported for 2013 in the 2015 report. Indeed, in the 2015 UN HDI report (hdr.undp.org), one
finds: “The 2013 HDI value published in the 2014 Human Development Report was based on miscalculated GNI
per capita in 2011 PPP dollars, as published in the World Bank (2014). A more realistic value, based on the model
developed by HDRO and verified and fail to rejected by Cuba’s National Statistics Office is USD 7,222.”
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Table 1.13: GDP per capita (USD) by Source
Source Price basis Cuba 1990 Cuba 2010 CAGR CAGR CAGR
1990-2001 2001-2010 1990-2010
Author (PWT 9.0) 2011 PPP 7642 7351 -2.73% 3.00% -0.19%
MOXLAD 1990 PPP 2933 3945 -1.49% 5.26% 1.49%
Maddison 1990 PPP 2957 3764 -1.58% 6.13% 1.35%
PWT 7.1 2005 PPP 8314 11511 -1.01% 4.98% 1.64%
The Economist 2005 PPP 7032 9139 n.a. n.a. 1.32%
World Bank 2011 PPP 13533 18291 -2.98% 5.32% 1.52%
ECLA 2005 3635 4906 -1.49% 5.30% 1.51%
UN Current 2707 5689 0.44% 8.07% 3.80%
Country 1990 2010
Chile 2011 PPP 114 256
Costa Rica 2011 PPP 91 163
Dominican Republic 2011 PPP 72 157
Honduras 2011 PPP 42 59
a Country GDP indexes based on Feenstra et al. (2015).
b Cuba = 100 (1990 and 2010).
Bhutan and Papua New Guinea are missing with respect to the original sample. The composition
of the samples appears below, followed by descriptive statistics in Tables 1.14. 1.15, and 1.16.
Tropical (N=68)
Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo Democratic Re-
public, Congo Republic of, Costa Rica, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea Republic of, Liberia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra
Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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Caribbean (N=19)
Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas The, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Is-
lands, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, St.
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and
Caicos Islands, Virgin Islands (U.S.).
Transition (N=34)
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia,
China, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Krygyz
Republic, Lao People’s DR, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia FYR, Moldova, Mongolia, Mon-
tenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajik-
istan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam.
Table 1.14: Tropical Sample Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
gdp capita 1,699 5,942.4 6,268.2 161.6 46,590.1
CO2 1,496 1.6 3.4 0.01 38.3
PM2.5 476 18.7 12.3 5.3 76.5
methane 1,564 60,382.5 172,887.5 117.7 1,752,290.0
nitrous oxide 1,564 25,440.1 64,335.1 18.1 587,166.4
energy fossil 1,241 49.7 28.5 1.8 99.9
Source: Feenstra et al. (2015), World Bank DataBank.
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Table 1.15: Caribbean Sample Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
GDPPC 474 15,780.7 10,476.8 1,584.2 41,540.9
CO2 369 6.0 7.3 0.04 38.3
PM2.5 84 12.9 2.3 8.4 16.9
methane 437 1,723.6 3,227.1 2.3 14,788.6
nitrous oxide 437 659.5 1,660.1 0.1 9,705.4
energy fossil 120 72.7 28.4 4.4 99.9
Source: Feenstra et al. (2015), World bank DataBank.
Table 1.16: Transition Sample Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
gdp capita 849 10,223.9 6,473.3 906.1 28,066.7
CO2 675 4.9 3.6 0.05 15.9
PM2.5 238 19.5 8.1 8.3 54.4
methane 741 71,378.2 230,781.2 1,350.1 1,752,290.0
nitrous oxide 741 23,290.7 77,810.0 448.8 587,166.4
energy fossil 752 76.3 19.6 14.8 99.9
Source: Feenstra et al. (2015), World Bank DataBank.
1.5.4 Regression Tables and Hypothesis Tests
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Table 1.17: Log CO2 per capita on Log GDP per capita, Tropical Sample
CO2
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPPC −0.13 −15.42∗∗∗ −0.81∗∗∗ −4.58∗∗∗ −0.72∗∗∗ −5.68∗∗∗
(0.24) (1.94) (0.17) (1.08) (0.17) (1.07)
GDPPC2 0.09∗∗∗ 2.00∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.24) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.14)
GDPPC3 −0.08∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant −5.56∗∗∗ 34.67∗∗∗ −1.48∗∗ 11.12∗∗∗
(0.98) (5.15) (0.72) (2.78)
Observations 1,496 1,496 1,496 1,496 1,496 1,496
R2 0.82 0.82 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.56
Adjusted R2 0.81 0.82 0.51 0.51 0.55 0.56
F Statistic 3,306.01∗∗∗ 2,317.00∗∗∗ 811.37∗∗∗ 549.44∗∗∗ 933.12∗∗∗ 639.60∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 1.18: Log CO2 per capita on Log GDP per capita, Caribbean Sample
CO2
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPPC 4.02∗∗∗ 46.21∗∗∗ 2.88∗∗ −93.51∗∗∗ 3.56∗∗∗ −65.30∗∗∗
(0.71) (12.17) (1.39) (16.99) (1.25) (15.65)
GDPPC2 −0.14∗∗∗ −4.87∗∗∗ −0.10 10.35∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗ 7.38∗∗∗
(0.04) (1.36) (0.07) (1.84) (0.07) (1.70)
GDPPC3 0.17∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
Constant −23.61∗∗∗ −148.32∗∗∗ −20.09∗∗∗ 189.10∗∗∗
(3.24) (36.05) (5.87) (47.74)
Observations 369 369 369 369 369 369
R2 0.76 0.76 0.26 0.33 0.33 0.36
Adjusted R2 0.75 0.76 0.25 0.31 0.33 0.36
F Statistic 569.20∗∗∗ 394.95∗∗∗ 62.79∗∗∗ 56.40∗∗∗ 89.48∗∗∗ 69.13∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.19: Log CO2 per capita on Log GDP per capita, Transition Sample
CO2
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPPC 10.05∗∗∗ −0.58 6.04∗∗∗ 25.35∗∗∗ 6.17∗∗∗ 23.72∗∗∗
(0.65) (8.89) (0.38) (4.53) (0.39) (4.72)
GDPPC2 −0.50∗∗∗ 0.74 −0.32∗∗∗ −2.56∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ −2.36∗∗∗
(0.04) (1.03) (0.02) (0.52) (0.02) (0.55)
GDPPC3 −0.05 0.09∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant −48.38∗∗∗ −18.12 −28.02∗∗∗ −78.07∗∗∗
(2.81) (25.39) (1.71) (13.51)
Observations 653 653 653 653 653 653
R2 0.75 0.75 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.46
Adjusted R2 0.75 0.75 0.42 0.43 0.45 0.46
F Statistic 978.21∗∗∗ 653.06∗∗∗ 245.34∗∗∗ 174.22∗∗∗ 268.73∗∗∗ 187.22∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 1.20: Log Fossil Fuels Percentage Energy Use on Log GDP per capita, Tropical Sample
energy f ossil
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPPC 3.57∗∗∗ −1.48 2.57∗∗∗ −0.60 2.65∗∗∗ −1.25
(0.22) (2.25) (0.20) (1.53) (0.20) (1.52)
GDPPC2 −0.17∗∗∗ 0.45 −0.13∗∗∗ 0.26 −0.13∗∗∗ 0.35∗
(0.01) (0.28) (0.01) (0.19) (0.01) (0.19)
GDPPC3 −0.03∗∗ −0.02∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant −14.11∗∗∗ −0.58 −9.14∗∗∗ 1.25
(0.90) (6.08) (0.85) (4.09)
Observations 1,241 1,241 1,241 1,241 1,241 1,241
R2 0.68 0.68 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.27
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.68 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.27
F Statistic 1,303.52∗∗∗ 873.56∗∗∗ 184.10∗∗∗ 124.55∗∗∗ 229.40∗∗∗ 155.84∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.21: Log Fossil Fuels Percentage Energy Use on Log GDP per capita, Caribbean Sample
energy f ossil
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPPC 6.50∗∗∗ 23.14∗∗∗ 2.44∗∗ 0.90 6.54∗∗∗ 23.14∗∗∗
(0.34) (8.41) (1.04) (12.26) (0.32) (8.41)
GDPPC2 −0.33∗∗∗ −2.23∗∗ −0.12∗∗ 0.05 −0.34∗∗∗ −2.23∗∗
(0.02) (0.96) (0.06) (1.35) (0.02) (0.96)
GDPPC3 0.07∗ −0.01 0.07∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Constant −26.99∗∗∗ −75.35∗∗∗ −27.15∗∗∗ −75.35∗∗∗
(1.50) (24.47) (1.40) (24.46)
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
R2 0.92 0.93 0.07 0.07 0.94 0.93
Adjusted R2 0.90 0.90 0.07 0.07 0.91 0.90
F Statistic 715.66∗∗∗ 490.33∗∗∗ 4.30∗∗ 2.85∗∗ 845.33∗∗∗ 492.11∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 1.22: Log Fossil Fuels Percentage Energy Use on Log GDP per capita, Transition Sample
energy f ossil
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPPC 5.11∗∗∗ 25.70∗∗∗ 2.19∗∗∗ 7.10∗∗∗ 2.23∗∗∗ 7.32∗∗∗
(0.32) (4.65) (0.16) (2.07) (0.16) (2.09)
GDPPC2 −0.28∗∗∗ −2.65∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.69∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.71∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.53) (0.01) (0.24) (0.01) (0.24)
GDPPC3 0.09∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant −18.75∗∗∗ −78.09∗∗∗ −5.71∗∗∗ −20.39∗∗∗
(1.40) (13.45) (0.69) (6.04)
Observations 728 728 728 728 728 728
R2 0.31 0.33 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.33 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.25
F Statistic 166.53∗∗∗ 120.44∗∗∗ 104.93∗∗∗ 72.31∗∗∗ 118.52∗∗∗ 81.92∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.23: Log PM2.5 on Log GDP per capita, Tropical Sample
PM2.5
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPPC 0.74∗∗ 13.51∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ −3.90∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ −3.21∗∗∗
(0.36) (2.84) (0.12) (0.76) (0.12) (0.78)
GDPPC2 −0.05∗∗ −1.63∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.35) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.10)
GDPPC3 0.06∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.42 −33.61∗∗∗ −0.03 9.54∗∗∗
(1.49) (7.64) (0.53) (2.04)
Observations 476 476 476 476 476 476
R2 0.09 0.13 0.23 0.29 0.17 0.21
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.17 0.21
F Statistic 23.38∗∗∗ 23.09∗∗∗ 59.98∗∗∗ 55.25∗∗∗ 48.20∗∗∗ 41.52∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 1.24: Log PM2.5 on Log GDP per capita, Caribbean Sample
PM2.5
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPPC 1.04∗∗ −43.24∗∗∗ −0.77 −4.59 −0.63 −3.86
(0.51) (10.79) (0.47) (5.33) (0.44) (5.31)
GDPPC2 −0.06∗∗ 4.97∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.46 0.04 0.40
(0.03) (1.23) (0.03) (0.58) (0.02) (0.59)
GDPPC3 −0.19∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.01
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant −1.97 126.97∗∗∗ 5.24∗∗ 14.63
(2.26) (31.45) (2.04) (15.97)
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84
R2 0.06 0.22 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.03
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.03
F Statistic 2.36 7.51∗∗∗ 2.86∗ 2.07 2.20 0.91
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.25: Log PM2.5 on Log GDP per capita, Transition Sample
PM2.5
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPPC 2.82∗∗∗ 7.43 3.23∗∗∗ −0.76 3.20∗∗∗ −0.37
(0.60) (8.33) (0.38) (4.73) (0.38) (4.68)
GDPPC2 −0.16∗∗∗ −0.69 −0.19∗∗∗ 0.27 −0.19∗∗∗ 0.23
(0.03) (0.96) (0.02) (0.55) (0.02) (0.54)
GDPPC3 0.02 −0.02 −0.02
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant −9.23∗∗∗ −22.43 −10.73∗∗∗ −0.51
(2.63) (23.97) (1.66) (13.45)
Observations 231 231 231 231 231 231
R2 0.10 0.10 0.28 0.29 0.26 0.26
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.10 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.26
F Statistic 12.85∗∗∗ 8.64∗∗∗ 39.05∗∗∗ 26.23∗∗∗ 39.75∗∗∗ 26.60∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 1.26: Log Methane on Log GDP per capita, Tropical Sample
methane
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPPC 2.12∗∗∗ 0.04 −0.09 2.77∗∗∗ −0.09 2.82∗∗∗
(0.56) (4.52) (0.16) (1.02) (0.16) (1.02)
GDPPC2 −0.11∗∗∗ 0.15 0.03∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.56) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.13)
GDPPC3 −0.01 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.03 5.51 8.14∗∗∗ 0.76
(2.25) (12.04) (0.70) (2.65)
Observations 1,564 1,564 1,564 1,564 1,564 1,564
R2 0.04 0.04 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.23
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.04 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.23
F Statistic 28.94∗∗∗ 19.36∗∗∗ 226.31∗∗∗ 154.28∗∗∗ 226.42∗∗∗ 154.46∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.27: Log Methane on Log GDP per capita, Caribbean Sample
methane
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPPC −9.10∗∗∗ −117.06∗∗∗ −4.09∗∗∗ −35.00∗∗∗ −4.14∗∗∗ −35.72∗∗∗
(2.52) (42.04) (0.68) (8.75) (0.68) (8.77)
GDPPC2 0.43∗∗∗ 12.47∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 3.59∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 3.66∗∗∗
(0.14) (4.68) (0.04) (0.94) (0.04) (0.95)
GDPPC3 −0.44∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 51.93∗∗∗ 372.08∗∗∗ 21.70∗∗∗ 118.63∗∗∗
(11.60) (124.98) (3.27) (27.05)
Observations 437 437 437 437 437 437
R2 0.14 0.15 0.38 0.40 0.37 0.38
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.15 0.36 0.38 0.36 0.38
F Statistic 34.59∗∗∗ 25.57∗∗∗ 127.31∗∗∗ 91.40∗∗∗ 125.01∗∗∗ 90.06∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 1.28: Log Methane on Log GDP per capita, Transition Sample
methane
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPPC 0.44 −34.95 1.78∗∗∗ 4.36 1.78∗∗∗ 4.33
(1.60) (22.24) (0.24) (3.05) (0.24) (3.04)
GDPPC2 −0.02 4.09 −0.09∗∗∗ −0.39 −0.09∗∗∗ −0.39
(0.09) (2.58) (0.01) (0.35) (0.01) (0.35)
GDPPC3 −0.16 0.01 0.01
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 7.30 108.18∗ 0.88 −6.43
(6.98) (63.61) (1.10) (8.74)
Observations 718 718 718 718 718 718
R2 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16
F Statistic 0.19 0.97 65.18∗∗∗ 43.68∗∗∗ 69.22∗∗∗ 46.37∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
84
Table 1.29: Log Nitrous oxide on Log GDP per capita, Tropical Sample
nitrous oxide
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPPC 4.10∗∗∗ −9.52∗ 0.93∗∗∗ −4.40∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ −4.31∗∗∗
(0.62) (5.01) (0.22) (1.37) (0.22) (1.36)
GDPPC2 −0.25∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.62) (0.01) (0.17) (0.01) (0.17)
GDPPC3 −0.07∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant −7.78∗∗∗ 28.16∗∗ 4.28∗∗∗ 17.64∗∗∗
(2.50) (13.34) (0.93) (3.55)
Observations 1,564 1,564 1,564 1,564 1,564 1,564
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04
F Statistic 21.96∗∗∗ 17.21∗∗∗ 21.27∗∗∗ 19.50∗∗∗ 21.25∗∗∗ 19.37∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 1.30: Log Nitrous oxide on Log GDP per capita, Caribbean Sample
nitrous oxide
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPPC −5.36∗∗ −113.82∗∗∗ 5.98∗∗∗ −72.54∗∗∗ 5.72∗∗∗ −75.23∗∗∗
(2.52) (41.97) (1.41) (17.95) (1.40) (17.84)
GDPPC2 0.22 12.32∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ 8.16∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ 8.44∗∗∗
(0.14) (4.67) (0.07) (1.94) (0.07) (1.92)
GDPPC3 −0.45∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.07) (0.07)
Constant 34.78∗∗∗ 356.42∗∗∗ −22.32∗∗∗ 226.06∗∗∗
(11.59) (124.78) (6.64) (54.97)
Observations 437 437 437 437 437 437
R2 0.17 0.18 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.09
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.18 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.09
F Statistic 43.38∗∗∗ 31.54∗∗∗ 10.03∗∗∗ 13.40∗∗∗ 9.59∗∗∗ 13.61∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.31: Log Nitrous oxide on Log GDP per capita, Transition Sample
nitrous oxide
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPPC 0.60 −40.88∗ 4.03∗∗∗ 10.54∗∗ 4.02∗∗∗ 10.42∗∗
(1.51) (20.98) (0.36) (4.43) (0.35) (4.42)
GDPPC2 −0.02 4.80∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.98∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.96∗
(0.09) (2.43) (0.02) (0.51) (0.02) (0.51)
GDPPC3 −0.19∗∗ 0.03 0.03
(0.09) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 4.92 123.17∗∗ −9.57∗∗∗ −27.87∗∗
(6.59) (60.01) (1.57) (12.70)
Observations 718 718 718 718 718 718
R2 0.01 0.02 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.02 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18
F Statistic 4.03∗∗ 4.01∗∗∗ 72.44∗∗∗ 49.10∗∗∗ 77.05∗∗∗ 52.16∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Chapter 2
A Comparison of Cuba’s Outcomes in the
Environmental Performance Index With
Results in a Health Care and Education
Indicator
An examination of economic and governance factors contributing to Cuba’s environmental perfor-
mance, as reflected in a composite index, can yield insights to policy makers and focus attention on
areas of weakness. This complements the analysis performed in Chapter 1, which examined indi-
vidual environmental indicators. Aggregate measures of environmental performance in a compos-
ite index which captures desirable environmental outcomes have been examined in the literature.
One recognized measure encompassing multiple dimensions of environmental health and ecosys-
tem vitality is the 2016 Environmental Performance Index (Hsu et al. (2016)). First published in
2000 as the Environmental Sustainability Index, the biennial report is now in its 10th iteration. It
reflects indicators related both to United Nations Sustainable Development Goals relating to the
environment, which succeeded the Millennium Development Goals 7, which expired in 2015, and
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the Paris Climate Agreement. This includes essential environmental indicators to gauge impacts
on human health of air and water pollutants as well as climate change indicators that are believed
to signal potentially significant negative GDP impacts especially to developing countries. As Cuba
is included in this benchmark index, this facilitates the creation of an expanded framework in this
study in which its relative performance can be compared to other countries.
The existence of democratic institutions is also an essential component of development. This
paper proposes an approach based on logistic regression to explore the effects of GDP per capita
and the degree of democracy on Cuba’s performance in the Environmental Performance Index and
its two subindexes, Environmental Health and Ecosystem Vitality. This paper also applies this
framework to understand the influence of the same factors on Cuba’s health care and education
performance. In Section 2.1, Hwang (2007) provides evidence of the positive influence of GDP
per capita on both environmental and health outcomes, while Dasgupta et al. (2001) and Tamazian
et al. (2005), Bhattarai and Hammig (2001), and Arvin and Lew (2011) discuss the significant
role of democracy in improving environmental results. Kabir (2008) further discusses ambivalent
effects of health care expenditures on health outcomes and I explore these links in Cuba.
In this paper I create an indicator to represent health care and education outcomes, which is
based on the United Nations Human Development Index, where Cuba scores well despite relatively
low income levels.1 This should provide support to analysts calibrating policy results achieved by
the Cuban government and to gauge areas of environmental stress. The results in this paper show
that Cuba’s environmental results are not on par compared to those in health care and education and
higher relative outcomes are achieved in the Environmental Health area than Ecosystem Vitality.
Moreover, in a broad sample, greater political and civil rights are shown to enhance the chances
1In the 2015 edition of the UN Human Development Index, Cuba ranked 68th among 188 countries and was placed
in the “High Human Development” group, behind only Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Panama and Costa Rica in Latin
America (see hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI). However, it scored the highest score in the sample as measured
by the Gross National Income rank minus the HDI rank, indicating that it performed highly on education and health
care with respect to its national income. Note also that this edition of the HDI featured a more accurate level of GNI,
as discussed in Section 1.5.2.
88
of achieving a higher level of performance not only in the environment but also in health care and
education, indicating that a shift in that direction would be beneficial to Cuba.
The remainder of this paper first reviews the importance of the relationship between envi-
ronmental results and GDP per capita and institutional factors, drawing from the Environmental
Kuznets Curve literature. I also provide some background on links between health outcomes, in-
come levels and democracy. This section also examines issues involved in the construction and
weighting of the Environmental Performance Index. This leads to the data and methodology sec-
tion, which then introduces the logistic regression model that is used to quantify the impact of
the control variables on Cuba’s performance in the selected environmental and health/education
indexes. The empirical results and discussion section first broadly examines the OLS relationship
between the various indexes and GDP per capita and Freedom House variables representing the
presence of democracy. The logistic regression results then focus more closely on the existence
of these relationships in Cuba. I also present results of a counterfactual experiment which suggest
how Cuba’s results could be improved with the presence of higher levels of democracy. Concluding
remarks follow.
2.1 Composite Environmental Indexes and Impact of Institu-
tional Factors on Environmental and Health Results
Composite indexes include indexes measuring competitiveness, health performance, human devel-
opment and the environment. The Environmental Performance Index falls into the category. The
construction and weighting of composite indexes is of primary importance in the production and
interpretation of results but information for the verification of the value of the most representative
weights is typically not available. In Section 2.2, I discuss an example of how a potential bias
can occur in the construction of the Environmental Performance Index when an index component
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for a participating country is excluded and a reweighting of remaining components occurs for this
country.
Rogge (2012) contains a discussion of issues involved when flexibility is embedded into index
construction, in particular when Benefit-of-the-Doubt models are used. In these models, when
endogenous weighting is allowed, in some cases countries may select a weighting scheme which
puts them in a most favorable light. This occurs as countries may include only the most favorable
components of the index, excluding those in which results are poor. Such a procedure leads to
exclusion of categories which are considered by experts to be important, such that the results are no
longer good representations of performance. Rogge (2012) tests the impact of this Benefit-of-the-
Doubt methodology on the calculation of the Environmental Performance Index, comparing it to
the fixed weights originally used in the EPI. In order to compensate for unwanted biases, the author
makes restrictions to the models, such that all index components are subject to minimal weights,
avoiding extreme cases in which only one or a few components may be used in the calculations. In
this manner, the author’s simulations do not depart markedly from the fixed weight schemes of the
original EPI. Hence, Rogge (2012) provides robustness to the existing EPI calculations, confirming
that good performance across a wide spectrum of environmental indicators, which is selected by
experts, avoids specialization and is the best measure of performance.
Ebert and Welsch (2004) discuss the issues involved when constructing a composite index of
environmental indicators which are measured in different units, as is the case of the Environmental
Performance Index. Drawing from models in the theory of social choice, the authors conclude
that transformations of variables by normalization and standardization as is done in an environ-
mental performance index results in inconsistencies in preference orderings, as reflected in index
calculations. For them, such indexes in which data transformations result in changes in preference
ordering produce indexes that are not “meaningful”.
Das Neves Almeida and Garcia-Sanchez (2016) examine various composite international en-
vironmental indexes and compare two that have wide use among policy makers and the most data
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availability, the Composite Index of Environmental Performance (CIEP) and the Environmental
Performance Index. The authors highlight how, in spite of sharing 20% of the same variables,
differences in methodology, variable selection, and methodological choices lead to significant dif-
ferences in rankings between indexes for the same country. The authors praise the EPI for its
widespread availability, no missing data imputation, and free downloads. However, they indicate
that the index weights are subject to a a degree of subjectivity and are not clearly justified. There
are significant differences in mean and variance between the two compared indexes but neverthe-
less there are five countries, one of which is Cuba, that have little variation in rank between the
indexes. It is also interesting to point out the impact on the EPI of several of the five dimension
areas in the CIEP. This includes the positive influence on the EPI of efforts by society to improve
the environment (proxied by the variable “action”) as well as the negative influence on the EPI
of underlying structural pressures on the environment such as population growth (proxied by the
variable “driving force”). The authors claim that the two indexes complement each other and offer
valuable insights to public policy makers.
In reference to the Rio Earth Summit conference in 1992, Hsu et al. (2013) present abridged
“Rio” versions of the 2012 Environmental Performance Index (“Rio EPI”) as well as the Trend EPI
(“Rio Trend EPI”), based on five policy categories that are prominent in the the Millennium De-
velopment Goal 7. They discuss the effects of income, human development (United Nations HDI
including and excluding income)2 and corruption on performance on the Rio indexes. The selected
policy categories in the Rio indexes include the effects on human health of water, Biodiversity and
Habitat, Fisheries, Climate Change, Energy, and Forestry. The authors emphasize that there have
been deficiencies in data availability and indicators that are needed specifically by policy makers
in the environmental area but view the Environmental Performance Index as providing the best
available source of environmental indicators.
2I have also used a measure of the HDI excluding income, though as a dependent variable. I seek to explore
the impact of income level and institutional variables on this indicator, as well as on the Environmental Performance
Indexes.
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Hsu et al. (2013) present various indications of unfavorable outcomes for wealthier countries
as the correlation between income and performance on the Rio indexes is relatively low but it is
negative and high between income and the Climate Change and Energy indicator.3 The mixed
results the authors see in the relationship between income and the Rio index leads to the author’s
suggestion that Environmental Kuznets Curve relationships may be more relevant on individual
indicators. Public health issues may improve with higher income and investment but certain pol-
lution indicators may fare worse as income rises. The authors also recommend that policy makers
adopt a mixed approach by examining both the indicator level and the aggregate index level. The
relevance of this for Cuba is that the information embodied in the Environmental Performance In-
dex embodies both relatively high outcome in the Environmental Health indicator, which includes
public health factors and PM2.5 air pollution (studied in Chapter 1), and lower results in Ecosys-
tem Vitality, which include forest cover and fossil fuels used for electricity production, examined
in Chapter 2. Hence, drilling down by analysts to the sub-index or indicator level is a valuable
exercise. This is also helps avoid potential pitfalls in interpreting index results due to weighting
distortions as discussed in Ebert and Welsch (2004).
Emphasizing the need to look beyond income as an explanatory variable, the authors also
see a strong positive correlation between lower corruption4 and higher performance on the Rio
Index. They highlight literature pointing to a link between higher corruption and a reduction in a
government’s ability to enforce environmental regulations as well as higher environmental quality
and democratic governance. The ability of citizens in democracies to be able to express their views
on protecting the environment may lead to greater pressure on the public and politicians through
elections to respond to environmental demands. In the framework of Nordhaus (1991), this is
equivalent to saying that democracies may have a lower rate of discount of future environmental
3In spite of its relatively low income level, in Chapter 1, Cuba did not perform well in the climate change and
energy categories as shown by the CO2 and energy f rom f ossil f uels indicators.
4The corruption indicators are sourced from the World Governance Institute.
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conditions, thereby assessing a higher damage function today for future damages resulting from
lack of environmental protection today.
Dasgupta et al. (2001) presents an early effort to construct a composite environmental index,
based on air, water, land, and living resources. In their 145 country sample based on survey data,
they also found significant explanatory power for GNP per capita and a PPP-adjusted measure
to explain index results. They also studied the influence of various institutional variables on the
composite index. The institutional variables followed the prior work of Gastil (see Scully (1992)),
a methodology which is also used by the Freedom House, the source of democratic variables in
my study. For Dasgupta et al. (2001), environmental regulation is prioritized once individuals’
educational and health needs have been met, and more developed countries have the means to
monitor and enforce environmental regulations at the federal and local levels. Also, education
may increase individuals’ awareness of environmental quality and environmental health, which
may drive demand for improvement in these areas. Dasgupta et al. (2001) also construct “green”
and “brown” indexes. These are intended to reflect the emphasis on environmental factors tied to,
respectively, a more agricultural or industrial economy. The Environmental Performance Indexes
more generally represent both agricultural and industrial economies and I also regress the Environ-
mental Performance Index and its subcomponents on selected democratic variables and GDP per
capita.
The importance of institutional factors appeared early in environmental studies. Political open-
ness was examined as a factor influencing environmental outcomes in Shafik and Bandyopadhyay
(1992), though results in this area are mixed as shown by the same authors and Torras and Boyce
(1998). Tamazian et al. (2005) review literature emphasizing the interactions between environment
and economic growth and the influence of institutional factors such as democracy, property rights,
regulatory institutions and rule of law. Tamazian and Rao (2010) further make a strong empirical
case for the promotion of institutional quality by policy makers in order to increase the chances
of improving environmental results in a sample of European transition economies. Institutional
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factors are also key elements in a study on municipal solid waste (MSW) in the European Union
(Mazzanti and Zoboli (2009)). Panayotou (1997) emphasized the key role that property rights,
under rule of law and the enforcement of environmental regulations, can have on flattening the
Environmental Kuznets Curve, hence leading to quicker improvements in environmental quality.
Institutional factors in low income countries can lead to potentially better environmental perfor-
mance as per Torras and Boyce (1998).
Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) show that institutional factors reduce the deforestation process in
Latin America and Africa but have an unexpected effect in Asia, where other variables may play a
more significant role. They proxy institutional quality on political rights and civil liberties indexes
compiled yearly by Freedom House, the same indicators which are used in this study for 2014.
The authors emphasize that the deforestation process is highly complex but the empirical results
confirmed the existence of an Environmental Kuznets Curve for deforestation in Latin America and
Africa and also signaled that institutional factors generally appeared to be significant. In Bhattarai
and Hammig (2004), the authors confirmed the results and added governance indicators as an
additional explanatory factor, which they find to have a significant impact on better forestation
outcomes.
Arvin and Lew (2011) also explore the influence of income and democracy5 on CO2 emissions,
water pollution and deforestation in a broad country panel sample as well as in various subsam-
ples based on income level and regions. Their Environmental Kuznets Curve estimation includes
income and squared income variables but also growth of GDP, urban population percentage and
population density. Arvin and Lew (2011) note factors through which a higher level of democracy
may exert better environmental outcomes such as a greater level of information and participation
in the decision-making process, more accountability and the fact that more autocratic regimes may
have lower environmental standards as its leaders could profit directly from environmental degra-
5The democracy variable is the average of Freedom House political rights and civil liberties indexes, whereas their
sum, with the ordering reversed , is employed in Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) and Bhattarai and Hammig (2004),
and their simple sum is used in this study.
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dation. For the total sample of 141 developing countries, a notable empirical result is that the
democracy variable exerts a positive and significant influence on reducing CO2 emissions and wa-
ter pollution, but democracy produces an opposite and significant result increasing deforestation,
though there are variations depending on income group and region.
In Kaika and Zervas (2013a), short term electoral considerations may lead to little interest in
environmental issues by governments, leading to higher income turning points for the Environ-
mental Kuznets Curve. Similarly, though consumer preferences may reflect demands for better
environmental quality, this may be trumped by an unwillingness to pay for benefits that are pushed
too far into the future. Once again referring to the framework in Nordhaus (1991), this would be
equivalent to a society with a high rate of discount of future environmental conditions.
To provide a useful background for the models which are employed in this study, a review
of health outcome models based on economic and institutional factors is useful, although a com-
plete review would be beyond the scope of this study. Hence, I have included a brief summary of
some significant results of this literature. The influence of the level of income and health expen-
ditures/GDP per capita on life expectancy is examined in Kabir (2008). Using linear as well as
a log-linear probit approach, this author found that factors such as per capita income and health
expenditures cannot be considered consistently responsible for strong life expectancy results in a
sample of 91 developing countries between 1992 and 2002. This is somewhat unexpected com-
pared to conventional thinking as income and health expenditures/GDP per capita are found to be
significant contributors for improved results in both life expectancy and infant mortality in various
studies reviewed by the same author. This author also points out that beyond a certain income level
there may be diminishing returns to scale and also that there may be a correlation between income
and health expenditures/GDP per capita that reduces the individual significance of the variables. It
is, however, interesting to note that political stability is a particularly relevant influence in increas-
ing the chances of improved life expectancy in Kabir (2008) and it also plays a role in reducing
infant mortality in work reviewed by this author. Also highlighted by this author is the positive
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role played by literacy and the availability of physicians per 100,000 population in improving life
expectancy. Gilligan and Skrepnek (2010) also confirmed an insignificant effect of health expen-
ditures on life expectancy for a sample of 21 Eastern Mediterranean nations from 1995-2006.
Kazemi Karyani et al. (2015) study the effects of democracy on health expenditures for a sam-
ple of 20 Eastern Mediterranean countries from 1995-2010, utilizing the Polity score and Freedom
House’s Freedom of the Press Index. They emphasize that both negative and positive relations
have been observed in prior studies relating health expenditures to health outcomes, including in-
fant mortality. Their results indicate that a higher indicator of democracy increases overall health
expenditures but freedom of the press lowers them. A GDP and an education variable also in-
creased health expenditures. Chuang et al. (2013) also include the Polity index as a proxy for
democracy in a study of under-five infant mortality in 46 less-developed countries from 1980 to
2009. Though the results were subject to the influence of other control variables including foreign
investment and debt, the authors found that democracy positively influenced the infant mortality
rate in non sub-Saharan countries but it decreased infant mortality in sub-Saharan countries.
Hwang (2007) examines pairwise relationships between income, environment and health. The
focus is on pollutant indicators based on direct, locally-based monitoring and the author highlights
the significance of the positive influence of income on environmental quality and the presence of
Environmental Kuznets Curve relationships, resulting from composition and technique effects as
income increases. There are potentially negative effects of income on health discussed, which
occur as income rises and environmental quality demand also increases, which in turn leads due
to higher environmental monitoring and compliance costs. As companies subsequently adjust
production costs and prices, wage earners and consumers suffer income losses which in turn reduce
health outcomes at the margin, due to the positive effects of income on health, through increased
purchases of inputs, such as health care and education. Nevertheless, Hwang (2007) emphasizes
the positive relationship observed in cross-sectional country studies between higher income levels
and better outcomes in infant mortality and life expectancy, a premise that is central to the analysis
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which follows below in this paper. This effect, known as the Preston Curve (Preston (1975)),
however, experiences diminishing returns to scale.
2.2 Calculation of the Environmental Performance Index
The authors of the Environmental Performance Index face significant challenges in constructing
the index, many stemming from data collection, quality, monitoring and frequency. Higher qual-
ity standards over succeeding editions and changing policy needs and objectives have influenced
the composition of the index. The Environmental Performance Index currently covers 180 coun-
tries, featuring 19 performance indicators in 9 high priority policy categories, broadly grouped into
two main headings, environmental public health and ecosystem vitality (see Table 2.18). The first
subindex, the Environmental Health Index includes categories relevant to infrastructure such as
access to sanitation and clean water, air pollution and burden of disease, areas which are typically
subject to pressure in a developing country coping with increasing levels of urbanization. The sec-
ond subindex, the Ecosystem Vitality Index, covers areas more closely related to natural resource
endowments and protection.
One interesting feature of the index is to incorporate a specific performance target for indica-
tors, established by scientific consensus of panel of specialists. When targets are not agreed upon,
comparisons are made on a relative basis across countries, and a benchmark target level is set at the
95th percentile of the data range. The indicators take into account tangible achievement goals and
the relevance of the indicator for specific countries. The indicators are then normalized to a scale
of 0 to 100, with the latter being the closest to the target. The performance targets by indicator
allow policy makers to have access to more focused results, which identify strengths as well as
deficient areas requiring special attention.
Materiality thresholds are introduced to exclude indicators in countries where they are not
relevant. Hence, only the most relevant indicators are included in the calculation of the index
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for individual countries and weights are adjusted accordingly. For instance, the Fisheries or the
Biodiversity and Habitat - Marine Protected Areas indicators are excluded for landlocked countries.
Similarly, countries with naturally limited forest coverage are excluded from the Forests indicator.
A reweighting is then called upon. For Forests, the reweighting affects 10% of the Environmental
Vitality index and 5% of the EPI. For Fisheries and Biodiversity and Habitat-Marine Protected
Areas combined, the effects are of equal magnitude.
More significant impacts occur due to exclusions in the Climate and Energy category. This re-
sults from countries belonging to the “SIDS” (Small Island Development States) category, which
groups countries with specific challenges. It leads to the exclusion of CO2 indicators, which have
a high headline impact and are the focus of the Paris Climate Agreement. These exclusions impact
25% of the weighting in Ecosystem Vitality and, hence 12.5% of the EPI. In the EPI subsample
used in this paper, this affected nearly one third of the countries, including Cuba.6 This has reper-
cussions which can lead to undesirable shifts in weights to other areas where results may be better,
as discussed in Rogge (2012). Hsu et al. (2013) also discuss the potentially distorting impact of
this on rankings, such that, for example, there are countries that are landlocked and therefore they
are not impacted negatively by low scores on Fisheries, an area where countries generally receive
low scores. They admit the weaknesses of their approach but defend its ability to serve as a closer
mirror of environmental goals than other approaches. The EPI indexes also incorporate fixed re-
strictions determined by experts such that together with the previously mentioned reweighting,
a balanced approach may be reached.7 This necessarily combines elements which favor specific
countries, while remaining within a framework determined by experts to meet performance targets.
and may be a necessary concession for policymakers in developing countries. These features of
the EPI respond to the critiques expressed in2.1.
6This likely biases Cuba’s results upward as its CO2 relative international performance was argued to be unfavor-
able in Chapter 1.
7To be sure, in the EPI, the impact of the exclusion of individual categories is reduced by the fact that the index is
a geometric mean rather than an arithmetic mean.
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In the Forests category within the Ecosystem Vitality subindex, Cuba’s score is 58.72, which
ranks 49th among ranked countries. However, Cuba had the highest level of improvement in
forestation. A few observations may be instructive in this regard. The materiality thresholds ap-
plied in this category resulted in 51 countries classified “NA” in the index calculations. This may
introduce some biases, though this is qualified by the restrictions on weighting previously dis-
cussed.8
2.3 Data and Methodology
I wish to determine how income level and various governance and structural indicators impact
Cuba’s relative international environmental performance and compare its results vs. those in health
care and education. I also wish to illustrate how estimates of Cuba’s performance could be higher
in counterfactual simulations that represent higher political rights and civil liberties. This chapter
focuses on cross-sectional analysis, examining the 2016 Environmental Performance Index (Hsu
et al. (2016)), rather than employing a panel methods approach such as that used in Chapter 1.
Omission of component indicators included in prior years of the Environmental Performance In-
dex makes comparisons across years difficult.9 Descriptions of variable names and descriptive
statistics appear in Sections 2.6.1 and 2.6.2. The EPI indexes are EPI (Environmental Performance
Index), EH (Environmental Health), and EV (Ecosystem Vitality). I also calculate a Modified
Human Development Index, modi f ied hdi, to proxy health and education performance.10 Health
expenditures as a percentage of GDP per capita, HLTHEXP, are particularly high in Cuba in Table
2.16. The democracy variables, which include a dummy for non-free societies, NONFREE, and
8This positive representation contrasts with the results from Chapter 3, which suggest that the increased forest
cover in Cuba that began in the 1990’s may reflect the propagation of the invasive species “sickle bush, known locally
as marabu´, which was classified as “forest” in the data gathering process (see Section 3.7).
9Backcasted data is provided on http://www.epi.yale.edu in case comparability is desired.
10The United Nations Human Development Index (“HDI”) excluding Gross National Income is discussed in Section
2.6. Note also that Mesa-Lago (2002) has previously indicated the difficulties of including an income variable for Cuba
in the Human Development Index calculation.
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for the sum of political rights and civil liberties, SUM PR CL, are derived from Freedom House,
a non-governmental organization (NGO) that conducts research and advocacy on democracy, po-
litical freedom, and human rights. Control variables that are used in the counterfactual simulations
are a dummy to represent a free society, FREE, and dummies for political rights and health ex-
penditures above the third quartile, PR CL Q3, and HLTHEXP Q3, respectively. Throughout the
comparisons, PPP-adjusted GDP per capita, GDPPC, is sourced from Penn World Tables (“PWT”)
9.0 (Feenstra et al. (2015). As in Chapter 1, for comparability with the PWT and inclusion in the
dataset, the Cuban GDP per capita figure is derived as per the methodology described in Section
1.5.2. Although the EPI consists of 180 countries, I used a smaller subsample of 165 countries due
to lower availability of GDP per capita data in Feenstra et al. (2015).
To provide a stylistic framework and underpin the logistic regression approach which fol-
lows, OLS regressions are first presented to illustrate the impact of GDPPC, NONFREE, and
SUM PR CL on the EPI and its component subindexes, EH and EV. I also regress modi f ied hdi
on GDPPC, SUM PR CL, and HLTHEXP. I then estimate logistic regressions based on the same
control variables, xk, to determine log-odds, first, of attaining an observation at the third quartile
index level or above and, second, at Cuba’s index level or above. In these models, the response
variables, y, for the environmental indexes and the modi f ied hdi are = 1 for levels at or above the
third quartile, represented by epi Q3, eh Q3, ev Q3, and hdi Q3, while for levels observed at or
above Cuba’s reported scores they are epi cuba, eh cuba, ev cuba and hdi cuba.11
Formally, as per equation 2.1, the logistic models estimate the maximum likelihood estimators
for the response variable y based on independent variables, xk, xi to xp. The probability of the
binary event of interest is represented by:
11An analogous logistic regression model using only the natural log of Gross National Income as an explanatory
variable to calculate probabilities for a given country to rank in the top two deciles of various quality of life indexes
was employed in Chaaban et al. (2016). A search of the literature indicated that no prior studies have used a logistic
regression approach to examine country results in the Environmental Performance Index.
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Estimate o f P(y = 1|x1, · · · ,xp) = 11+ exp−(α+ΣkβkXk) , (2.1)
or
Estimate o f P(y = 1|x1, · · · ,xp) = exp
(α+ΣkβkXk)
1+ exp(α+ΣkβkXk)
. (2.2)
Taking the natural log of the probability of the occurrences above to the probability of that
event not occurring, the logit or log odds are created,
log(odds) = logit(P) = ln(
P
1−P), (2.3)
and the logistic regression below is performed:
logit(P) = α+ΣkβkXk. (2.4)
The log odds ratios are then converted to percentages per:
ln(
P
1−P) = α+ΣkβkXk, (2.5)
(
P
1−P) = exp
(α+ΣkβkXk), (2.6)
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P =
exp(α+ΣkβkXk)
1+ exp(α+ΣkβkXk)
. (2.7)
This allows one to determine the response probability of Cuba attaining performance standards
equivalent to a third quartile index level or above and also to its actual index or above, based on
its observed levels for the control variables in 2014. This first requires estimating equation 2.4
with independent variables GDPPC, NONFREE, SUM PR CL, and HLTHEXP. This results in
calculating the model numbers ( j), which appear in the regression summaries:
logit(P( j)) = α+βk · · ·Xk, (2.8)
where, for j = 1, k = GDPPC,
for j = 2, k = GDPPC, SUM PR CL,
for j = 4, k = GDPPC, NONFREE, and
for j = 6, k = GDPPC, SUM PR CL, HLTHEXP.
With the resulting calculated parameters, to obtain response probabilities for Cuba, I substitute
into equation 2.7 the actual levels observed in Cuba of the control variables corresponding to USD
8021 GDP per capita (estimated in Section 1.5.2), and the Freedom House variables in 2014,
“nonfree” (NONFREE = 1), and the sum of its political and civil liberties index (SUM PR CL =
13). For the modi f ied hdi model, I also include HLTHEXP = 10.57%. This results in calculating
response probabilities from Equation 2.7 as
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P( j) =
exp(α+ΣkβkXk)
1+ exp(α+ΣkβkXk)
(2.9)
where, for j = 1, k = GDPPC (= USD 8021),
j = 2, k = GDPPC (= USD 8021), SUM PR CL (= 13),
j = 4, k = GDPPC (= USD 8021), NONFREE (= 1), and
j = 6, k = GDPPC = USD 8021, SUM PR CL (= 13), HLTHEXP (= 10.57).
In the next step, I perform simulations to surmise how increases could be achieved in Cuba’s
response probabilities, as calculated above. This involves estimating the response probabilities
in a counterfactual model which can be compared to the response probabilities calculated in the
established base level. For the EPI, EH and EV models, I first calculate counterfactual models
with the control variables GDPPC, FREE and PR CL Q3 while for the modi f ied hdi estimation,
I use GDPPC, PR CL Q3, and HLTHEXP Q3. I then predict the response probabilities of Cuba
obtaining results at or above its observed index level or the third quartile with the control variables
taking on the counterfactual values of FREE or PR CL Q3, while GDPPC is again set at USD
8021. In order to avoid multicollinearity issues given that the calculations of the variables are
similar, the effects of NONFREE and SUM PR CL are estimated separately. To summarize, the
control variables in the counterfactual models can hence be shown for equation 2.8 as:
for j = 1, k = GDPPC,
for j = 3, k = GDPPC, SUM PR CL,
for j = 5, k = GDPPC, FREE, and
for j = 7, k = GDPPC, SUM PR CL Q3, HLTHEXP,
and for equation 2.9 as
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for j = 1, k = GDPPC (= USD 8021),
j = 3, k = GDPPC (= USD 8021), SUM PR CL Q3 (= 1),
j = 5, k = GDPPC (= USD 8021), FREE (= 1), and
j = 7, k = GDPPC (= USD 8021), SUM PR CL Q3 (= 1), HLTHEXP Q3 (= 1).
In this framework, I can thus calculate the marginal change in the response probabilities for
Cuba in a counterfactual situation, featuring a higher level of democracy and also lower health
expenditures for the modi f ied hdi estimates.
2.4 Empirical Results and Discussion
A casual examination of the results in Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 which compare the Environmen-
tal Performance Index, and the Environmental Health and Ecosystem Vitality subindexes to GDP
per capita reveal a statistically significant positive relationship. It also indicates a relatively fa-
vorable performance position for Cuba in the various indexes. Cuba’s index levels and relative
ranking, illustrated in Table 2.1, reveal that its performance is higher in Environmental Health than
in Ecosystem Vitality.
Table 2.1: Cuba Relative Performance by Environmental Index (Rankings), 2016
Results EPI EH EV
Actual 79.04 91.09 66.98
Rank(total) 45 (180) 24 (180) 77 (180)
Figure 2.4 illustrates the positive and significant relationship between the Modified HDI and
GDP per capita. At the relatively low level estimate of GDP per capita for Cuba in 2014 of USD
8020, these results indicate a relatively strong position for Cuba in the environment and the ed-
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EPI ~  −22.71 + 9.87 * GDPPC, R^2 = 0.65
Figure 2.1: Linear Regression Environmental Performance Index 2014 on Log GDP per capita
Source: Hsu et al. (2016), Feenstra et al. (2015).
ucation and health care area, though they appear to be relatively higher in education/health care
sectors.
In light of the potential importance of institutional variables such as the participation of in-
dividuals in the electoral and civil process, as highlighted in Section 2.1, and Cuba’s relatively
low standing in that area,12 I sought to identify how these factors, along with GDP per capita,
may be affecting Cuba’s performance in the environmental, health care and education areas. For
dependent variables, epi 2014, eh 2014, ev 2014 and modi f ied hdi, I tested for the influence of
Freedom House variables in 2014 including “nonfree” status and political and civil rights. The sum
of political and civil rights was used previously in Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) as an explanatory
12A recent study by Human Rights Watch indicates that even one year after the announcement of the re-
establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States, Cuba’s record on political freedom remains poor. See
“Cuba: sin mejoras en los derechos humanos”, El Nuevo Herald, January 31, 2016.
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EH ~  −41.07 + 12.37 * GDPPC, R^2 = 0.66
Figure 2.2: Linear Regression Environmental Health Index 2014 on Log GDP per capita
Source: Hsu et al. (2016), Feenstra et al. (2015).
variable in a forestation study. The cross-sectional OLS results in Tables 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5
demonstrate the existence of a significant relationship. The fit and precision of the positive income
coefficient of the naive regressions with only income as an explanatory variable is improved by
adding the Freedom House variables. The signs of the Freedom House variables are negative as
expected and significant, indicating that weaker political rights and civil liberties (indicated by a
higher value of SUM PR CL) decrease performance in the measured environmental and health
criteria. The modi f ied hdi OLS regression has a notably high R2 and highlights that democratic
variables also play an important role in the health care and education outcomes.
Logistic regression results for dependent variables epi Q3, eh Q3, and ev Q3 ) appear in Tables
2.6, 2.8, and 2.10, while results for dependent variables epi cuba, eh cuba, ev cuba appear in
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Table 2.2: OLS Regression EPI on Log GDP per capita and Freedom House Variables
Dependent variable:
epi 2014
(1) (2) (3)
GDPPC 9.87∗∗∗ 9.52∗∗∗ 8.63∗∗∗
(0.56) (0.54) (0.57)
NONFREE −6.28∗∗∗
(1.43)
SUM PR CL −0.93∗∗∗
(0.17)
Constant −22.71∗∗∗ −17.81∗∗∗ −4.89
(5.24) (5.10) (5.82)
Observations 166 166 166
R2 0.65 0.69 0.71
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.68 0.70
F Statistic 306.60∗∗∗ 180.04∗∗∗ 195.46∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2.3: OLS Regression EH on Log GDP per capita and Freedom House Variables
Dependent variable:
eh 2014
(1) (2) (3)
GDPPC 12.37∗∗∗ 11.95∗∗∗ 10.80∗∗∗
(0.69) (0.66) (0.69)
NONFREE −7.60∗∗∗
(1.75)
SUM PR CL −1.18∗∗∗
(0.21)
Constant −41.07∗∗∗ −35.13∗∗∗ −18.41∗∗∗
(6.41) (6.24) (7.06)
Observations 166 166 166
R2 0.66 0.70 0.72
Adjusted R2 0.66 0.69 0.72
F Statistic 322.85∗∗∗ 188.44∗∗∗ 209.44∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.4: OLS Regression EV on Log GDP per capita and Freedom House Variables
Dependent variable:
ev 2014
(1) (2) (3)
GDPPC 7.36∗∗∗ 7.09∗∗∗ 6.46∗∗∗
(0.84) (0.84) (0.90)
NONFREE −4.96∗∗
(2.21)
SUM PR CL −0.68∗∗
(0.27)
Constant −4.36 −0.48 8.62
(7.79) (7.88) (9.24)
Observations 166 166 166
R2 0.32 0.34 0.35
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.33 0.34
F Statistic 77.35∗∗∗ 42.14∗∗∗ 43.11∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2.5: OLS Regression Modified HDI on Log GDP per capita, Freedom House Variables and
Health Expenditures
Dependent variable:
modified hdi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDPPC 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.005) (0.01) (0.005) (0.01)
NONFREE −0.07∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
HLTHEXP 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
SUM PR CL −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
Constant −0.32∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗ −0.12∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 165 165 165 165 165
R2 0.74 0.77 0.79 0.80 0.80
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.80
F Statistic 453.92∗∗∗ 274.13∗∗∗ 206.18∗∗∗ 316.35∗∗∗ 220.70∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 2.3: Linear Regression Ecosystem Vitality Index 2014 on Log GDP per capita
Source: Hsu et al. (2016), Feenstra et al. (2015).
Tables 2.7, 2.9, and 2.11. The regression coefficients and their corresponding counterfactuals have
reversed signs which corresponds to the expected outcome in the literature.
Table 2.14 presents summary results of the response probabilities of attaining results, with
the model numbers representing the model used in the logistic regressions. For the fact-based
regressions, the response probability of Cuba attaining its observed level of performance across
the various indexes is relatively low. Also, the response probabilities of attaining third quartile
or above performance are similarly low. This is indicative of attaining a strong outcome in spite
of its relatively unfavorable low GDP per capita and low-performing Freedom House variables
(NONFREE = 1, and SUM PR CL = 13). This table also indicates the results of likelihood ratio
(LR) tests of the null hypothesis tests of reduction in log likelihood when explanatory variables are
removed from the estimation. This comparison of unrestricted vs. restricted models and a rejection
109
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
GDPPC
Mo
difi
ed
_H
DI
Cuba
Modified_HDI ~  −0.32 + 0.11 * GDPPC, R^2 = 0.74
Figure 2.4: Linear Regression Modified HDI on Log GDP per capita
Source: Author’s calculations, UNHDRO, Feenstra et al. (2015).
of the null hypothesis is generally indicative of increased explanatory power when incremental
variables are included.
Table 2.14 also indicates that the response probabilities of attaining Cuba’s or third quartile
or above results are dramatically improved when the counterfactual dummies for higher political
freedoms (FREE, PR CL Q3) are compared vs. Cuba’s actual status. At the margin, the response
probability improvements are even higher for changes from NONFREE (model 2) status to FREE
status (model 3) than for SUM PR CL = 13 (model 4) vs. PR CL Q3 (model 5). This may be
subject to multiple interpretation. It shows that Cuba achieves its results in spite of the unfavorable
institutional framework but that the environmental performance outcomes would likely be higher
in the counterfactual. In the former case, the lack of an electoral process may have positive con-
sequences for the environment as in Kaika and Zervas (2013a). However, it seems plausible to
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assume that the counterfactual of higher freedom or increase in political rights and civil liberties
suggests a more participatory institutional process or a shift in available resources away from using
centralized controls which produces better environmental outcomes. This would conform to other
results discussed in Section 2.1.
Table 2.6: EPI Logistic Regression Model (Q3 or above = 1)
Dependent variable:
epi Q3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDPPC 2.08∗∗∗ 2.07∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗∗ 2.38∗∗∗ 2.10∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.43) (0.38) (0.43) (0.44)
SUM PR CL −0.39∗∗∗
(0.09)
PR CL Q3 2.61∗∗∗
(0.53)
NONFREE −2.87∗∗∗
(0.89)
FREE 2.83∗∗∗
(0.68)
Constant −21.35∗∗∗ −19.32∗∗∗ −17.98∗∗∗ −23.88∗∗∗ −23.58∗∗∗
(3.73) (4.22) (3.79) (4.32) (4.61)
Observations 166 166 166 166 166
Log Likelihood −60.10 −45.73 −46.61 −52.45 −47.52
Akaike Inf. Crit. 124.20 97.46 99.21 110.90 101.05
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
In a similar manner, the modified HDI regression results in Tables 2.12 for hdi Q3 and 2.13
for hdi cuba have the expected coefficient signs and an indication of significance. However, in
the regression for Cuba’s level or above, the sign of HLTHEXP is unexpectedly negative and not
significant, while it is positive but not significant for exp Q3. These results may be due to the
fact that the universe of countries with health expenditures at that level or higher is extremely
low (see Table 2.16). Table 2.14 shows that the chances of Cuba achieving its modified HDI
results are even lower than for the environmental outcomes. This suggests a higher relative level of
performance vs. the environmental results. As in the environmental case, the results also indicate
that the same outcomes can be achieved with a higher response probability in the presence of the
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Table 2.7: EPI Logistic Regression Model (Cuba level or above = 1)
Dependent variable:
epi cuba
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDPPC 1.98∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 2.25∗∗∗ 1.89∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.40) (0.35) (0.41) (0.39)
SUM PR CL −0.38∗∗∗
(0.09)
PR CL Q3 2.35∗∗∗
(0.51)
NONFREE −2.90∗∗∗
(0.88)
FREE 2.52∗∗∗
(0.60)
Constant −20.17∗∗∗ −17.67∗∗∗ −16.66∗∗∗ −22.51∗∗∗ −21.11∗∗∗
(3.51) (3.91) (3.49) (4.06) (4.07)
Observations 166 166 166 166 166
Log Likelihood −62.86 −48.46 −51.23 −54.61 −51.34
Akaike Inf. Crit. 129.71 102.91 108.45 115.22 108.68
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2.8: EH Logistic Regression Model (Q3 or above = 1)
Dependent variable:
eh Q3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDPPC 1.52∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.30) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30)
SUM PR CL −0.20∗∗∗
(0.06)
PR CL Q3 1.32∗∗∗
(0.46)
NONFREE −1.39∗∗
(0.62)
FREE 1.47∗∗∗
(0.48)
Constant −15.75∗∗∗ −13.04∗∗∗ −13.26∗∗∗ −15.88∗∗∗ −14.90∗∗∗
(2.87) (3.01) (2.85) (2.97) (2.97)
Observations 166 166 166 166 166
Log Likelihood −69.43 −63.65 −65.31 −66.50 −64.31
Akaike Inf. Crit. 142.87 133.30 136.62 139.00 134.63
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.9: EH Logistic Regression Model (Cuba level or above = 1)
Dependent variable:
eh cuba
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDPPC 1.53∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 1.99∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.55) (0.42) (0.47) (0.49)
SUM PR CL −0.64∗∗∗
(0.22)
PR CL Q3 2.74∗∗∗
(0.68)
NONFREE −18.70
(1,248.19)
FREE 3.51∗∗∗
(1.14)
Constant −16.84∗∗∗ −12.46∗∗ −14.41∗∗∗ −21.09∗∗∗ −21.12∗∗∗
(3.63) (5.80) (4.29) (4.82) (5.38)
Observations 166 166 166 166 166
Log Likelihood −51.13 −36.60 −40.15 −41.95 −40.68
Akaike Inf. Crit. 106.26 79.20 86.30 89.89 87.36
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2.10: EV Logistic Regression Model (Q3 or above = 1)
Dependent variable:
ev Q3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDPPC 1.73∗∗∗ 1.59∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ 1.84∗∗∗ 1.58∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.34) (0.32) (0.34) (0.34)
SUM PR CL −0.28∗∗∗
(0.07)
PR CL Q3 2.13∗∗∗
(0.49)
NONFREE −1.94∗∗∗
(0.72)
FREE 1.98∗∗∗
(0.53)
Constant −17.86∗∗∗ −14.94∗∗∗ −14.51∗∗∗ −18.62∗∗∗ −17.64∗∗∗
(3.19) (3.42) (3.18) (3.41) (3.46)
Observations 166 166 166 166 166
Log Likelihood −65.69 −55.99 −55.58 −60.95 −57.55
Akaike Inf. Crit. 135.38 117.98 117.16 127.89 121.11
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.11: EV Logistic Regression Model (Cuba level or above = 1)
Dependent variable:
ev cuba
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDPPC 1.27∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22)
SUM PR CL −0.16∗∗∗
(0.05)
PR CL Q3 0.62
(0.46)
NONFREE −1.25∗∗∗
(0.47)
FREE 1.16∗∗∗
(0.40)
Constant −12.05∗∗∗ −9.37∗∗∗ −10.98∗∗∗ −11.63∗∗∗ −10.56∗∗∗
(2.04) (2.15) (2.13) (2.06) (2.05)
Observations 166 166 166 166 166
Log Likelihood −86.71 −82.08 −85.79 −82.91 −82.45
Akaike Inf. Crit. 177.42 170.17 177.59 171.82 170.89
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
PR CL Q3 counterfactual. The improvements achieved are reflected in the increase in the response
probability comparing model 2) to model 3). Substantial increases are also obtained in decreasing
the amount spent on health care, as shown by the increase in response probability while moving
from model 6) to 7). However, this may be due to the increasing universe of countries in the sample
that spend relatively less than Cuba on health care (See Table 2.17) rather than a validation of the
argument suggested in the literature in Section 2.1 that sheds doubt on the positive impact of health
expenditures on health outcomes. The latter hypothesis would require additional testing beyond
my analysis. It is also worth pointing out that similar factors may be leading to insignificance
of likelihood ratio tests for the dependent variable hdi Q3 in the comparison of models 6) and
7) as compared to results in the EPI variables. This is also verified by increases in the AIC for
comparisons between models 6) and 7) for the hdi Q3 model. Nevertheless, it is also plausible
that greater available resources for the environment would be available for Cuba and in the sample
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counterfactual if less resources were spent on health care and education, such as suggested in
Hwang (2007).
Table 2.12: Modified HDI Logistic Regression Model (Q3 or above = 1)
Dependent variable:
hdi Q3
(1) (2) (3) (6) (7)
GDPPC 2.29∗∗∗ 2.88∗∗∗ 1.88∗∗∗ 2.82∗∗∗ 1.79∗∗∗
(0.41) (0.62) (0.43) (0.70) (0.43)
SUM PR CL −0.69∗∗∗ −0.53∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.15)
PR CL Q3 3.09∗∗∗ 2.64∗∗∗
(0.59) (0.62)
HLTHEXP 0.57∗∗∗
(0.21)
HLTHEXP Q3 1.32∗
(0.68)
Constant −23.50∗∗∗ −26.23∗∗∗ −20.89∗∗∗ −28.93∗∗∗ −20.12∗∗∗
(4.12) (5.96) (4.41) (7.01) (4.41)
Observations 165 165 165 165 165
Log Likelihood −56.25 −31.30 −39.30 −27.11 −37.45
Akaike Inf. Crit. 116.50 68.59 84.60 62.23 82.91
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.13: Modified HDI Logistic Regression Model (Cuba level or above = 1)
Dependent variable:
hdi cuba
(1) (2) (3) (6) (7)
GDPPC 2.66∗∗∗ 5.43∗∗∗ 2.64∗∗∗ 6.04∗∗∗ 2.63∗∗∗
(0.50) (1.39) (0.64) (1.64) (0.67)
SUM PR CL −1.26∗∗∗ −1.51∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.46)
PR CL Q3 3.98∗∗∗ 3.94∗∗∗
(0.84) (1.01)
HLTHEXP −0.31
(0.36)
HLTHEXP Q3 0.05
(0.83)
Constant −27.64∗∗∗ −51.03∗∗∗ −29.87∗∗∗ −54.89∗∗∗ −29.73∗∗∗
(5.04) (13.34) (6.80) (14.69) (7.15)
Observations 165 165 165 165 165
Log Likelihood −47.78 −16.93 −28.45 −16.54 −28.45
Akaike Inf. Crit. 99.57 39.85 62.91 41.09 64.90
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.14: Response Probability of Cuba Attaining EPI Indexes and Modified HDI Performance
Levels
Response Probability Cuba actual
(lr test significance/p-level)
Model epi cuba eh cuba ev cuba hdi cuba
1) 8.2 4.4 34.3 2.4
2) .5 (***) 0 (***) 17.2 (***) 0 (***)
3) 34.1 (***) 17.5 (***) 46.7 (.18) 10.4 (***)
4) .6 (***) 0 (***) 16.8 (***)
5) 17.4 (***) 7.2 (***) 51.5 (***)
6) 0 (.38)
7) 10.8 (.95)
Response Probability Q3 epi Q3 eh Q3 ev Q3 hdi Q3
1) 6.8 11.1 9.3 5.3
2) .3(***) 3.1 (***) 1.2 (***) 0 (***)
3) 31.6 (***) 26.1 (***) 33.4 (***) 29.4 (**)
4) .5 (***) 3.7 (**) 1.8 (***)
5) 13.7 (***) 20.0 (***) 18.5 (***)
6) 1.2 (**)
7) 48.0 (*)
Assumptions: Cuba actual counterfactual
GDP per capita 8020 no change
FH status non free free
FH sum political civil liberties 13 <=3 (Q3)
Health expend. (share of GDP) 10.57 5.23 (Q3)
Models 3), 5), and 7) are counterfactual models.
Note LR tests: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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2.5 Conclusions
This paper provides evidence of the positive empirical relationship between higher levels of GDP
per capita and environmental performance as well as health and education outcomes. The impor-
tance of democratic factors reflected in Freedom House indicators are also shown to be highly
significant in influencing results in the composite indexes of environmental performance as well as
health and education, as proxied by the modi f ied hdi. The signs of the indicators are as expected
in the literature and suggests that Cuba’s environmental performance could benefit significantly
from improvements in that area. The approach here appears to confirm Cuba’s better relative rank-
ing in the Environmental Health subindex vs. Ecosystem Vitality as suggested in Table 2.14 by the
lower response probability of achieving its results in the EH compared to the EV index. This oc-
curs in spite of non-inclusion of CO2 in the Ecosystem Vitality subindex, an indicator where Cuba
achieved weak results as shown in Chapter 1. A comparison of Cuba’s environmental performance
vs. the Modified HDI appears to reveal that results in the latter are more difficult to achieve given
low GDP per capita, suggesting higher relative performance in health and education. However,
the analysis also seems to indicate that improving performance on the Freedom House variables
would help produce better outcomes in health care and education. Also, it is also suggested that
current expenditures on health care are relatively high in Cuba and strong results may also be
achieved by reducing relative health care expenditures, which would reallocate available resources
to improving the environment.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Description of Variables
Environmental Performance Index, Environmental Health Index, Ecosystem Vitality Index,
respectively EPI, EH, and EV, 2014, are represented by epi 2014, eh 2014, and ev 2014.
See Hsu et al. (2016).
modi f ied hdi, calculated from the United Nations Human Development Index, 2014.
Downloadable at hdr.undp.org, for description of modifications see Section 2.6.4.
Dummies for EPI, EH, EV and modi f ied hdi with a value = 1 for observations at or above
the third quartile are epi Q3, eh Q3, ev Q3, and hdi Q3, while a value = 1 is given for
observations at or above Cuba’s level for epi cuba, eh cuba, ev cuba and hdi cuba.
FREE (free status), Freedom Rating, Freedom House, 2014.
Downloadable at freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016.
A Freedom Rating of 1.0 to 2.5 is attributed a value of 1.
GDPPC (Gross domestic product per capita, chain-weighted, 2014. see Feenstra et al.
(2015), natural logarithm.
HLTHEXP (health expenditures as a percentage of GDP per capita), 2014. Downloadable at
databank.worldbank.org.
HLTHEXP Q3, (health expenditures as a percentage of GDP per capita at or above the third
quartile level), 2014.
A dummy = 1 for health expenditures as a percentage of GDP per capita at or above the third
quartile level, or 5.23%.
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NONFREE (non free status), Freedom House, 2014, . Downloadable at freedomhouse.
org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016.
Called the Freedom Rating, this is determined as “the average of a country's or territory's
political rights and civil liberties ratings.” This figure determines the status of Free (1.0 to
2.5), Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0), or Not Free (5.5 to 7.0).
PR CL Q3 (political rights and civil liberties), Freedom House, 2014.
The Freedom House variable for first quartile of a combined sum of political rights and civil
liberties, which results in a dummy value of 1 for values of 3 or less.
SUM PR CL (sum of political rights and civil liberties), Freedom House, 2014.
Downloadable at freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016.
The sum of political rights and civil liberties ratings based on total scores on a series of
questions determined by Freedom House. Each rating corresponds to a specific range of
total scores. A country or territory is assigned two ratings, one for political rights and one
for civil liberties. The scale for each indicator is from 1 through 7, with 1 representing the
greatest degree of freedom and 7 the smallest degree of freedom.
2.6.2 Data - Descriptive Statistics
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Table 2.15: EPI 2016 Descriptive Statistics
GDP per capita (2014) EPI Environmental Health Ecosystem Vitality
Cuba 8021 79.04 91.09 66.98
Min 570 37.10 25.11 23.02
1st Qu 4545 58.38 59.44 51.82
Median 11903 70.00 77.66 64.52
Mean 18158 68.35 73.12 63.57
3rd Qu 23595 79.98 87.03 74.67
Max 163294 90.68 98.71 90.09
Source: Hsu et al. (2016), Feenstra et al. (2015).
a For Cuba GDP per capita calculation see Section 1.5.2.
Table 2.16: Health Expenditure Descriptive Statistics (2014)
Health Expenditure
(percentage of GDP per capita)
Cuba 10.57
Min 0.79
1st Qu 2.34
Median 3.50
Mean 4.01
3rd Qu 5.23
Max 10.76
Source: World Bank DataBank.
Table 2.17: HDI Descriptive Statistics (2014)
Exp. Schooling Mean Schooling Life Expectancy Modified HDI
(years) (years) (years)
Cuba 13.80 11.50 79.40 0.84
Min. 5.42 1.37 49.00 0.36
1st Qu. 11.11 5.60 65.00 0.58
Median 13.33 8.45 73.50 0.74
Mean 13.02 8.13 71.12 0.70
3rd Qu. 15.19 10.83 77.20 0.82
Max. 20.22 13.07 83.50 0.98
Source: UN HDI Report 2015.
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2.6.3 Environmental Performance Index Weights
Table 2.18: Environmental Performance Index Weights (2016)
Objective Issue Category Indicator
EH (50%) Health Impacts (33%) Environmental Risk Exposure (100%)
Air Quality (33%) Household Air Quality (30%)
Air Pollution - AVG Exposure to PM 2.5 (30%)
Air Pollution - PM 2.5 Exceedance (30%)
Air Pollution - AVG Exposure to NO 2 (10%)
Water & Sanitation (33%) Unsafe Sanitation (50%)
Drinking Water Quality (50%)
EV (50%) Water Resources (25%) Wastewater Treatment (100%)
Agriculture (10%) Nitrogen Use Efficiency (75%)
Nitrogen Balance (25%)
Forests (10%) Change in Forest Cover (100%)
Fisheries (5%) Fish Stocks (100%)
Biodiversity & Habitat (25%) Terrestrial Protected Areas (National*) (20%)
Terrestrial Protected Areas (Global*) (20%)
Marine Protected Areas (20%)
Species Protection (National) (20%)
Species Protection (Global) (20%)
Climate & Energy (25%) Trend in Carbon Intensity (75%)
Trend in CO 2 Emissions per KWH (25%)
Source: Hsu et al. (2016).
*- Biome weights.
2.6.4 Calculation of Modified HDI
The methodology for calculating the Modified HDI index is derived from the published HDI cal-
culation (see hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2015_technical_notes.pdf). The
HDI is calculated as a geometric mean across three dimensions, health, education and standard
of living, each with an equal weight of 33%. In each dimension, indicators are scaled by an upper
bound “aspirational goal,” max, and a lower bound “natural zero,” min. This is performed such that
each indicator, reported in different units, is scaled to a number between 0 and 1. The upper and
lower bound numbers are fixed in each indicator category. A geometric mean is then calculated
across the three dimension indices.
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I exclude standard of living (proxied by Gross National Income) such that the Modified HDI
is a geometric mean in two dimensions, health and education. Health is proxied by life ex-
pectancy (years) and education is calculated as the arithmetic mean of expected years of schooling
(educationa) and mean years of schooling (educationb). To illustrate, for country i, the health
dimension would be calculated as
healthi =
(yearsi−min)
(max−min) .
For Cuba, its Modified HDI is calculated as:
educationa =
(13.8−0)
(18−0) = .77
educationb =
(11.5−0)
(15−0) = .77
education = (educationa + educationb)/2 = .77
health =
(79.4−20)
(85−20) = .91
Modi f ied HDIcuba = (.77∗ .91).5 = .84.
Chapter 3
Forest Cover, Sugar’s Decline and External
Debt: Links and Opportunities
3.1 Introduction
Many aspects of environmental conditions in Cuba may be understood more clearly by examining
developments in the sugar industry. In particular, the quantity of Cuba’s forest cover was affected
adversely by the increase in land devoted to sugarcane cultivation through the twentieth century un-
til a sharp decline occurred in sugar cultivation after 1989. Abandonment of sugarcane fields then
led to a rapid increase in forest cover but the quality deteriorated at the same time as an invasive
and undesirable tree species named sickle bush, known locally as “marabu´”, became widespread.
Sickle bush is listed in the Global Invasive Species Database and is considered a threat to agri-
culture. Management and control of sickle bush is an important issue for forest monitoring and
quality in Cuba. With sugarcane industry as the mainstay of the Cuban economy and exports for
many decades, imbalances had developed. Heavy imports of fertilizers, machinery and oil were
needed to support the industry, contributing to the growth of external debt which grew to signif-
icant proportions. Hence, the link between forest cover quantity and quality, the sugar industry
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and external debt is apparent. Studies such as Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) have also pointed
to the negative effect of external debt on forest cover. The objective of this chapter is to explore
these links empirically in the years 199-2014 and to propose debt-for-nature swaps as a policy tool
which may be used to alleviate forest quality issues such as the spread of sickle bush.
I begin with a brief historical overview of the sugarcane industry. Cuban revolutionary leaders
at first de-emphasized sugarcane’s role as the pillar of the economy, but they were obliged to accept
it as its dominant factor. Within the confines of favorable trading arrangements in the Soviet bloc,
relatively high production levels of sugar were attained namely in the 1980’s, but the industry
began a sharp decline once the subsidized trading arrangements with COMECON came to an
abrupt end after 1989.1 Trading relationships with COMECON members were discontinued, and
the use of energy, machinery, fertilizers and other inputs became severely restricted, while other
factors such as lower export prices,2 the availability of sugar substitutes, and inefficient practices
all contributed to the decline. Also, the natural productivity of the land declined due to its long-
term overexploitation.3 With increasing international competition and lower demand for traditional
sugar exports, the industry continued to shrink, leaving Cuba, once the world’s top producer, with a
fraction of its previous output (see Figure 3.1). Land under sugarcane cultivation, shown in Figure
3.2, declined dramatically.4
By 2010, various restructuring efforts designed to use only the most productive sugarcane fields
and the most efficient mills had failed and the once powerful Ministry of Sugar (“MINAZ”) was
eliminated. Alvarez (2004) estimated the loss of jobs in the sugar industry at 213,000, many of
them sent to worker retraining, nearly half of the workers that had been employed in the industry
1Morris (2014) indicates that under COMECON, sugar exports were 73% of export earnings while in 2012, they
were 3%.
2World market prices were higher subsequently, reaching their highest point since 1981 in 2009.
3Dı´az-Briquets and Pe´rez-Lo´pez (2000) indicate that mechanized forms of agricultural production, which are typ-
ical in centrally planned economies, heavy use of fertilization and pesticides and improper irrigation techniques con-
tributed to serious damages to Cuba’s soils, including compaction, loss of fertility, depletion of organic matter, as well
as salinization, erosion and waterlogging.
4Pe´rez-Lo´pez (2016) indicates a higher peak in cultivated land devoted to sugarcane than suggested by this figure,
indicating 1.9M hectares under cultivation by the end of the 1980’s.
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Figure 3.1: Sugarcane Production 1986-2013
Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n (2015).
Notes: Year refers to the second year of a harvest.
in peak periods.5 In more recent years, the results of the harvest have improved somewhat, but
remain far below the levels achieved in the 1970’s and 1980’s. The level of sugar milled in 2014-
15 was the highest in 11 years (1.6M tons)6 and the target sugar production is now 2 million tons,
though there are indications that the goal will not be reached. Other developments in the sugar
industry are discussed in Pe´rez-Lo´pez (2016), Alvarez (2004), Alvarez (2005), Hagelberg and
Alvarez (2006a), Hagelberg and Alvarez (2006b), and Peters (2003).
The precipitous drop in sugar production after 1989 led to important effects in the structure
of the economy and the environment. Aside from the immediate collapse in economic output,
5Pe´rez-Lo´pez (2016), however, indicates that statistics on the number of displaced workers are not widely available
and cites that in 2003, 122,000 former sugar industry workers were in educational programs for dislocated workers.
6This level is, however, about the same as it was in the early part of the twentieth century.
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Figure 3.2: Land Used for Sugarcane Harvests 1986-2013
Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n (2015).
discussed in Section 1.5.2, employment in the service sector rose significantly in the period under
study as economic activity and workers shifted away from the sugar industry. Dı´az-Briquets and
Pe´rez-Lo´pez (2000) provides an extensive discussion of the environmental damages resulting from
the sugar industry.7 The sharp decline in land dedicated to sugarcane cultivation was also accom-
panied by an increase in measured forest land. Forest land is especially important because of its
capacity to act as a sink for carbon and to absorb CO2, and thus forest cover has become a key
indicator of environmental performance. Chapter 1 showed that, in an international comparison,
CO2 emissions are high in Cuba. Chapter 1 also showed the heavy reliance on fossil fuels for
energy in Cuba. An increase in forest cover could help reduce the resulting negative environmental
7Aside from damages to the soils, the sugar and agricultural sector also generated the elimination of creeks and
wetlands, leveling of tree fences, smoke and soot from burning sugarcane fields. and pollution in estuaries, aquifers,
reservoirs, rivers and ocean fronts due to agricultural runoff.
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effects, although it is also important to consider the quality of the forest, which includes control of
the propagation of sickle bush.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the rapid rise in forest cover in Cuba vs. two samples of countries with
geographical similarities. One is a sample of tropical countries, based on the study by Bhattarai
and Hammig (2001) and the other is a Caribbean sample. The contrast between the rise of forest
cover in Cuba vs. the decline in these samples is striking. Reforesting efforts were carried out in
Cuba in the 1980’s, but Figure 3.4 suggests that planted forest is a relatively small contributor to
increased forest cover. Rather, naturally generated forest appears to be significantly more impor-
tant. Significantly, there is a substantial drop in “other” land, while agricultural land shows a small
decline.8
A substantial part of transfered idled land requires extensive work to be converted to agricul-
ture. It is known that the end of sugarcane cultivation and departure of workers led idled lands to
be covered by the tree species sickle bush. This thorn-covered tree species can grow to a height of
8-10 meters. Because the species meets the World Bank DataBank definition of forest cover (“nat-
ural or planted trees at least 5 meters in height”), this qualifies as forest land.9 Hence, it is part of
naturally regenerating forest area in Figure 3.4, and this also illustrates that it is likely a substantial
part of the increase in forest cover as well as the total forest area in Cuba. This agrees with Canada
Institute of Forestry (2016), which estimates that sickle bush covers 1.7 million hectares of once
productive agricultural land and 34% of Cuba.10
8The drop in “other land” may be attributed in part to attempts by the government to rescue agriculture by transfer-
ring idle land in usufruct to individuals. This included Decree-Law No.259, issued in July 2008. The transferred land
is higher than prior attempts that have been made, and it is estimated at 920,000 hectares (see Hagelberg (2010)). This
author also notes that the amount of idle land at the time of the Decree-Law was 1.7M hectares, a total that exceeded
by 350,000 hectares the sugarcane area harvested in 1988/9, when the crop was over 8M metric tons. This figure is
lower than the previously discussed amount estimated in Pe´rez-Lo´pez (2016).
9Monitoring of the quantity and quality of forests is a complex issue. A brief summary is provided in https:
//globalforestatlas.yale.edu/conservation/forest-monitoring.
10Another estimate puts the coverage at five million acres (20,000 km2) of agricultural land (see http://www.en.
wikipedia.org/Dichrostachys/cinerea. Cuba’s total land area is 109,880 km2.
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Source: World Bank DataBank.
Sickle bush harbors many disadvantages. As per Canada Institute of Forestry (2016), its growth
competes with native vegetation in protected areas and in forests it hinders management and crop
harvesting. Farmers and land managers consider it highly undesirable and it can grow to impene-
trable thickets if not managed correctly. The government asserts it has recovered important areas
previously covered by the species but claims regarding reforestation success appear to be over-
stated, as made apparent also by Figure 3.4.11 The species has some advantages as its wood has
qualities that make it useful to produce certain objects as well as for fuel and charcoal. Indeed,
production of wood charcoal, destined almost entirely for export, is on the rise and is illustrated in
11For the extent of the suggested reforestation see, for example, Green Left Weekly downloadable from https:
//www.greenleft.org.au/content/almostthirdcubaforestthanksprogram.
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Source: FAOSTAT.
Figure 3.5 and Table 3.1.12 Additionally, although it would contribute to carbon emissions, it has
been touted as a potentially significant form of renewable energy, especially in areas surrounding
sugarcane fields, attracting foreign investment.13 Both its disadvantages and advantages and its
massive spread throughout the island make it apparent that this is a highly significant issue. In-
deed, the Cuban government mentions impacts on forest cover, including fires, past exploitation
and invasive species in some forests, as one of the main environmental problems facing the country,
along with soil degradation and pollution.14 Readers observing the data on the increase in forest
12A shipment in January 2017 of artisanal charcoal made from marabu´ became the first Cuban export to the United
States since the embargo. See “El carbo´n de marabu´ rompe el hielo” in El Nuevo Herald, January 25, 2017.
13See “Cuba sugar cane marabu weeds could be turned to fuel” in https://thecubaneconomy.com/articles/
tag/marabu/.
14 See http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/9623_Cuba_Enviro_Strategy_2007-2010.pdf.
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area in Cuba should benefit from understanding the underlying causes or composition of this rise
discussed in this Chapter.
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Figure 3.5: Wood Charcoal Production - Cuba, 1990-2015
Source: FAOSTAT.
Table 3.1: Cuba Wood Charcoal Exports
Year Tons (thousands)
2009 26.498
2010 31.483
2011 46.553
2012 64.302
2013 75.431
2014 90.234
2015 103.962
Source: World Bank Data-
Bank.
131
Table 3.3 highlights the empirical negative relation between forest cover and external debt,
which implies that of forest resources may be used for external debt service. This may also be
exacerbated if there is a need for foreign exchange, such as in Cuba as forests were cleared to
allow for sugarcane harvesting and sugar exports. A reduction in external debt is possible through
the use of debt for nature swaps as a policy tool, as discussed in Sections 3.5.1, 3.5.2 and 3.5.3, This
could also yield benefits to Cuba through improved forest cover and forest management, which is
desirable as discussed below.
This chapter first reviews literature which explores traditional factors thought to be responsible
for changes in the quantity of forest cover. This is followed by a data section and a methodology
section, which discusses the identification of the empirical link between the structural changes
resulting from the decline of sugarcane and the measured increase in forest area. I compare the
empirical results from this analysis with those which follow a more conventional approach. In the
empirical results and discussion section, the framework presented suggests that Cuba has achieved
a high increase in forest cover, but one which is likely due significantly to a largely undesirable
byproduct, sickle bush. In the last sections of this Chapter, I propose the use of debt-for-nature
swaps as a tool option that may be available to contribute to manage and improve the potentially
valuable but currently challenged forests in Cuba.
3.2 Factors Influencing Forest Cover
Studies such as Bhattarai and Hammig (2001), Bhattarai and Hammig (2004) and Arvin and Lew
(2011) which examine the factors influencing deforestation often make use of the Environmental
Kuznets Curve (EKC) framework. These studies confirm the existence of an inverted “U”-shaped
curve for deforestation for Latin America and the Caribbean. Hence, GDP per capita exerts a
negative effect on forest cover at low income levels but at higher levels it is associated with less
deforestation, higher levels of forest cover indicative of reforestation programs. While this is
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based on a positive linear term for GDP per capita and a negative term for its square, the cubic
term is positive for Latin America and Africa, which signals that deforestation rises again at higher
income levels. The studies control for various factors including external debt. The latter was
shown to be a significant positive contributor to deforestation, hence debt management, discussed
in Section 3.5.1 becomes a crucial issue for protecting forest resources. Democracy is also used as
a control variable. In Bhattarai and Hammig (2001), higher political rights and civil liberties were
shown to have a positive effect on reducing deforestation, such as through empowering citizens
through better institutions to improve forest conservation. However, in Arvin and Lew (2011), it
is interesting to point out that the democracy variable was not shown to have an effect in reducing
deforestation for the Latin American and Caribbean sample. These authors posited that this may
be due to the fact that a stronger government may be able to exercise greater control of a common
resource, such as forests, which is renewable, and from which the government may draw a direct
benefit, whereas there are lower relative local net benefits from reducing air emissions and water
pollution.
Mendelsohn (1994) stressed that forest cover is generally determined over long periods and
does not typically vary significantly over short spans, an observation that seems contrary to Cuba’s
recent observed performance. Another study which examines fundamental changes affecting forest
cover and which makes use of the EKC framework is Liu et al. (2017). This study examines
change in forest cover in nine Asia-Pacific countries from 1960-2010 through the lens of what may
be the pathways to achieving “forest transition” (FT), defined as the moment in which a country
reverses from annual decreases in forest cover to annual increases. Based on prior work in the
area identifying various pathways to FT, the authors examine the influence of GDP per capita
and its square, plus 8 other variables (rural population density, population growth, agricultural
land, cereal yield per hectare, forest protection laws, national forest plan or decree, forest products
and roundwood export value, and forest products and roundwood import value). Rather than a
panel data approach, the authors run country by country OLS regressions. Their results notably
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highlight that the expected EKC signs of GDP per capita and its square do not appear significant
in any country when only these two variables are considered. The evidence for a forest EKC is
more favorable in the regressions when all the dependent variables are included and the influence
of income level and state environmental policy emerged as the most significant factors. More
important though is the conclusion that generalized statements across countries should be avoided
and studies which account for heterogeneous economic, social and cultural influences are more
valuable.
3.3 Data
The purpose of the empirical work in this study is to identify which factors may be the primary
contributors to Cuba’s high rate of growth in forest cover for the years 1990-2014. I compare
Cuba’s performance against a broad universe before carrying out a single country examination for
Cuba.
Details on the data variables are provided in Section 3.7.1. I use a sample of countries with
tropical characteristics similar to Cuba’s, which is described in Section 1.5.3, and is based on that
used in Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) and Bhattarai and Hammig (2004). These studies conducted
their empirical analysis across Africa, Asia and Latin America, presenting their results separately
for each region. It is interesting to note that Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) point out that the
deforestation data for developing countries is based on annual projections done at 10-year intervals.
This introduces potential biases but the authors note that the quality of this data improved after
1972, hence forestation data in this study is more reliable. I denote the percentage of land covered
by forest as f orest cover and the annual change in this as re f orestation.
GDP per capita (GDPPC) is sourced from Feenstra et al. (2015) and the Cuban data for this
variable is based on the discussion in Section 1.5.2. There were no reported external debt to GDP
per capita (EXTDBT) figures for Cuba included in the World Bank DataBank, the source used
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for this variable. The rural population percentage of total (RURPOP), rural population growth
(RURPOPGR), and population density (POPDENS) are sourced from the World Bank DataBank.
The sum of political rights and civil liberties (SUM PR CL), a variable also used in Chapter 2,
is derived from Freedom House. The data on sugar harvest area (SUGHRVAREA), and the in-
strumental variables, sugarcane yield per acre and service sector employment, is sourced from
Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n (2015).
3.4 Methodology
The discussion in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 suggests the following variables may have an impact on
reforestation: GDPPC (negative), GDPPC2 (positive), GDPPC3 (uncertain), EXTDBT (negative),
SUM PR CL (positive)15. RURPOP, and RURPOPGR, should be expected to have negative coef-
ficients, as they reflect increased pressures on forest resources, while POPDENS may be uncertain
as this represents total, not rural, population density so this variable may conceal increases in rural
areas.
As a first step to identify what factors may influence forest cover in countries with similar geo-
graphic characteristics as Cuba. I regressed re f orestation on GDPPC for a tropical country panel
of 63 countries. To adjust for varying country sizes and to reduce the effect of resulting outliers,
the same procedure as in Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) is used and this model is estimated with
weighted least squares (GLS), reducing the weight of outliers, as a function of the reciprocal of
their variance. Weighted least squares were further iterated and converged to produce reported fea-
sible GLS (FGLS). I also included various independent variables similar to those used in Bhattarai
and Hammig (2001): EXTDBT, RURPOP (instead of rural population density), and SUM PR CL.
Separately, following the partial variable coefficient methodology (“PVCM”) used in Chapter 1, I
also sought evidence of forest cover outperformance by Cuba in this sample as had been suggested
15As I construct this variable, higher values reflect lower political rights and civil liberties, so we should actually
observe a negative coefficient for this variable.
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by the samples in Figure 3.3. This approach reflects both individual country intercept and slope
effects of GDPPC and GDPPC2 on reforestation.
To further account for fixed effects that may be present in Cuba, in the next step, I follow Liu
et al. (2017) and regress re f orestation against first differences of GDPPC and GDPPC2, RUR-
POPGR, and POPDENS in Cuba for 1190-2014. The final identification involves more directly
identifying the role of the fall in SUGHRVAREA in reforestation. As the prior analysis indicates
that there are numerous explanatory variables that may have a causal effect on reforestation, exam-
ining the role of SUGHRVAREA in reforestation as a single explanatory variable can be plausibly
thought to produce an omitted variable bias, such that cov(SUGHARVAREA,ε) 6= 0. Hence, an in-
strumental variable estimation may be useful. External debt is likely to be an omitted variable, but
it should not be included in the regression as highly correlated to SUGHRVAREA, due to the sugar
industry’s important role in export earnings and its need for imports such as oil, farm equipment
and fertilizers, which influence EXTDBT. Note also, as indicated, that no series is available for
Cuba for EXTDBT. I therefore search for instrumental variables for SUGHRVAREA that are cor-
related with SUGHRVAREA but uncorrelated with EXTDBT. I selected sugarcane yield per acre
(IV(1)) and service sector employment (IV(2)) as instrumental variables for SUGHRVAREA, al-
though it’s plausible that sugarcane yield per acre may be correlated with EXTDBT. Figure 3.7
illustrates the declines in yield per hectare, which reveals the underlying production inefficien-
cies which arose after 1989. As mentioned previously, the underlying structural changes in the
economy include a significant rise in service sector employment as workers departed sugarcane
fields, such that there should be a significant correlation between service sector employment and
SUGHRVAREA, as required in IV estimation.
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3.5 Empirical Results and Preliminary Discussion
Table 3.2 describes the variables in the sample used for the regression in Table 3.3. Cuba’s re-
forestation levels lie significantly above the sample. Its RURPOP is below the sample mean and
its SUM PR CL is significantly weaker political rights and civil liberties than the sample mean.
Although EXTDBT for Cuba is not included in the sample, recent developments discussed in Sec-
tion 3.5.3 suggest Cuba’s EXTDBT has declined significantly, which allow one to infer that it was
high during the period under study.16 Its below average RURPOP would imply less pressure on
rural lands, hence higher reforestation. This is suggested by the departure of workers from rural
areas, which contributed to the abandonment of previously harvested sugarcane areas, facilitating
the spread of sickle bush. Cuba’s GDP per capita at a relatively low level would imply a priori
reduced pressures on re f orestation, a stylized fact among poorer countries. Hence, among these
variables, only RURPOP would suggest that Cuba should obtain higher re f orestation results than
the sample.
Though I examine the more recent period of 1990-2014 as compared with the period studied
in Bhattarai and Hammig (2001), the signs of the GDP coefficients in Table 3.3 confirm those
in the Latin American and African subsamples in Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) and follow the
expected EKC relations.17 Similarly, the coefficients are significant for EXTDBT, RURPOP and
SUM PR CL. They have the expected signs, suggesting a negative effect on forest cover with
higher levels of these variables.18 The GDPPC variable indicates that forest cover first declines
with higher GDP per capita levels, but GDPPC2 indicates an improvement. The GDPPC3 coeffi-
cient was negative, which shows a deterioration of forest cover again at the highest income levels,
however, was not significant.19 It is important to note, as there may be relatively little variation in
16Estimates are provided in Table 3.7.
17Note that Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) measures negative forest cover change as an increase in deforestation, so
the expectation is an inverted “U” curve, whereas I measure forest cover change such that the expected relation is a
“U” shaped curve.
18Higher levels of SUM PR CL imply worsening political rights and civil liberties.
19Various patterns of the stylized relation between environmental stressors and income are shown in Figure 1.7.
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forest cover within countries, that the regression coefficients for the income terms were very small,
which is similar to the result in Bhattarai and Hammig (2001). Nevertheless, improvements in
forest cover with higher income levels conform to the expected EKC pattern. I further discuss the
institutional explanatory variables in Section 3.5.1. However, these empirical results from country
panel data do not provide an empirical indication of the stylized facts in Cuba, which motivates the
need to search for other causes.
The sample data in Table 3.2 and the results in Table 3.3 would lead one to believe that the im-
pact of the variables considered in Cuba would lead to lower than average results for re f orestation
in Cuba. However, comparing Cuba’s reforestation performance vs. the tropical sample universe
provides an indication that its results are above average. Following the methodology used in Chap-
ter 1, including the derivation of country-specific forestation-income relationships, Figures 3.3 and
3.6 graphically show Cuba outperforming vs. the tropical country sample.20 The magnitude of the
outperformance is notable, however, especially given the relatively short period under considera-
tion, an outcome that runs contrary to expectations of time required, as discussed in Mendelsohn
(1994). These results thus provide further motivation to ask what special factors could cause the
pronounced re f orestation in Cuba.
Descriptive statistics for the Cuba sample used in the OLS single country analysis in Table
3.4 highlight that reforestation was positive through the entire observation period and rural pop-
ulation growth appeared to reflect almost continuous declines. The coefficients for the GDPPC
and GDPPC2 terms confirm the expected EKC relationship for reforestation in Cuba, which also
appeared in Table 3.3. The regression results in Table 3.5 indicate how the income coefficients
became more robust once the additional explanatory variables, RURPOPGR and POPDENS, are
added. The coefficient of RURPOPGR was unexpectedly positive, perhaps due to time constant ef-
fects removed with first differencing. This could include workers who were given land in usufruct
20Figure 3.6 is based on the PVCM calculation methodology and follows the results in Table 3.8. Note, however,
that the results in Table 3.8 show very low significance of the income coefficients and have opposite signs versus the
more robust analysis in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.2: FGLS Regression Descriptive Statistics 1990-2014
Forest Cover Reforestation Ext. Debt Rural Popn. Sum PR CL
Min. 0.22 -3.09 3.90 4.85 2
Min. Cuba 19.16 0.35 NA 23.03 13
1st Qu. 20.59 -0.34 28.63 41.70 5
Median 36.10 -0.14 54.05 59.25 8
Mean 37.06 -0.15 77.81 55.18 8.1
Mean Cuba 24.01 0.43 NA 24.54 13.7
3rd Qu. 53.96 -0.01 88.38 70.58 11
Max. 88.49 9.69 1380.77 94.58 14
Max. Cuba 29.56 0.71 NA 26.64 14
NA’s 68 187
Source: World Bank DataBank.
a Forest cover is calculated as a percentage of total land area.
b Reforestation is the annual percentage change in forest cover.
c The adjusted min. and max. are computed after replacing discontinuities in deforestation for
Bhutan, Ecuador and Sudan with interpolated estimates.
and cleared forests for cultivation. However, the coefficient of POPDENS was positive, which
implies that as workers departed from sugarcane fields and rural population declined, population
growth is more likely to have occurred in more concentrated settings which would favor less stress
on forest cover.
The Instrumental Variable models in Table 3.6 help control for omitted variable bias and re-
veal the significant effect of the decline in the area under sugarcane cultivation, SUGHRVAREA,
on f orest cover. The coefficients of the IV estimations are very close to those of the OLS
estimate. This implies high correlations between SUGHRVAREA and yield per hectare and
service sector employment. The standard errors of the IV estimation coefficients are nearly as
low as the OLS result. The decline in the productivity of the sugarcane fields is reflected in Figure
3.7. The coefficient of SUGHRVAREA in the service sector employment IV(2) model, is more
significant than that of the yield per hectare IV(1) model. Although the sample size is relatively
small, these IV models allow us to infer that the estimates of the effect of SUGHRVAREA on
f orest cover are consistent. These results thus allow us to infer more robustly that measured re-
forestation in Cuba was a significant result of the external shock described in Section 3.1, which
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Table 3.3: FGLS Regression Reforestation, 1990-2014
re f orestation
FGLS
(1) (2)
GDPPC −0.0180521∗∗∗ −0.019219∗∗∗
(0.0024092) (0.0040969)
GDPPC2 0.00067438∗∗∗ 0.00090723∗∗∗
(9.421E-05) (0.00034328)
GDPPC3 −8.8872E-06
(9.7418E-06)
EXTDBT −2.9902E-05∗∗∗ −2.9169E-05∗∗∗
(6.5334E-06) (7.0917E-06)
RURPOP −0.0033438∗∗∗ −0.0033805∗∗∗
(0.00057948) (0.00060835)
SUM PR CL −0.0007395∗∗∗ −0.00076811∗∗∗
(0.0002119) (0.00023206)
Observations 1,455 1,455
Countries 62 62
Panel unbalanced unbalanced
Multiple R2 0.46853 0.4685
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 3.4: Cuba OLS Regression Descriptive Statistics 1991-2014
GDPPC Reforestation Rural Popn. Growth Popn. Density
Min. 4047 0.351 -0.66454 99.3
1st Q 4975 0.351 -0.41622 102.3
Median 5767 0.4416 -0.26814 105.3
Mean 6003 0.4332 -0.28139 104.1
3rd Q 7105 0.4902 -0.14753 106.1
Max. 8085 0.7124 0.07695 106.9
Source: World Bank DataBank.
a GDPPC is GDP per capita as per methodology in Section 1.5.2.
b Reforestation is the annual percentage change in forest cover.
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Table 3.5: OLS Regression Reforestation Rate, Cuba 1990-2014
re f orestation
OLS
(1) (2)
GDPPC d −0.169 −0.424∗
(0.215) (0.209)
GDPPC2 d 0.019 0.048∗∗
(0.018) (0.019)
RURPOPGR d 0.270∗∗
(0.128)
POPDENS d 0.168∗∗
(0.069)
Constant 0.431∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.031)
Observations 24 24
R2 0.124 0.390
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.262
Residual Std. Error 0.086 (df = 21) 0.075 (df = 19)
F Statistic 1.490 (df = 2; 21) 3.039∗∗ (df = 4; 19)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
produced the collapse of the sugar industry. We also know anecdotally that the departure of work-
ers from cultivated lands facilitated the spread of sickle bush. Estimates of sickle bush coverage of
upwards of 1 million hectares occurred while SUGHRVAREA was reduced by a similar, or greater
amount.21
3.5.1 Opportunities in Debt-for-Nature Swaps
The empirical results clarify the link between the changes in structural employment and migration
away from rural areas in Cuba that resulted from the decline of the sugar industry and led to the
rise in forest cover, along with the undesirable spread of sickle bush. Cross country analysis also
21A higher amount would correspond to estimates of land cultivated by sugarcane in Pe´rez-Lo´pez (2016).
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Figure 3.6: Forest Cover Loss - PVCM Cuba vs. Tropical Sample Mean
Source: Cuba and Tropical mean graph coefficients follow from Table 3.8.
suggested that lack of political rights and civil liberties as well as high external debt/GDP also play
a role in producing less favorable outcomes in reforestation. Various mechanisms through which
lower debt would improve forest management are discussed in 3.5.2 though one direct pathway for
improved outcomes would result from lower debt service freeing resources for environmental uses.
These factors suggest there are policy options that could improve forest management and mitigate
the negative impact of sickle bush. I have previously mentioned the potential beneficial aspects of
sickle bush including charcoal exports and renewable energy. I will now consider one infrequently
used flexible policy option, debt-for-nature-swaps, which through external debt reduction and the
influence of conservation organizations, could potentially be used to generate improvements in
forest cover and other areas. The discussion also reveals that a higher presence of democracy
increases the likelihood of debt-for-nature-swaps, similar to its positive effect on re f orestation.
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Source: Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n (2015).
3.5.2 Historical Background
The developing countries harbor many of the world’s most diverse and important environmental
and natural treasures. Much of the diversity of the Earth’s species is found in tropical forests and
thousands of them are threatened every year due to deforestation. Important tourist and recreational
destinations are also found in these countries. At the approximate mid-point of my empirical study,
according to the Food and Agricultural Organization, in 1999, approximately 13.7 million hectares
of forests (137,000 sq.km, or 53,000 sq.mi., an area greater than Cuba) are depleted annually (Didia
(2001)).
Faced with the pressures of limited resources with which to service large public external and
internal debt burdens, many governments often turn to exploit many of these important environ-
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Table 3.6: OLS and IV Regression Forest Cover on Sugar Harvest Area, Cuba, 1990-2014
forest cover
OLS instrumental
variable
OLS IV (1) IV (2)
(1) (2) (3)
SUGHRVAREA −0.007∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
constant 30.106∗∗∗ 30.245∗∗∗ 30.412∗∗∗
(0.464) (1.124) (0.514)
Observations 24 24 23
R2 0.911 0.910 0.899
Adjusted R2 0.907 0.906 0.894
Residual Std. Error 0.945 (df = 22) 0.948 (df = 22) 0.976 (df = 21)
F Statistic 224.587∗∗∗ (df = 1; 22)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Instrumental variables = yield per hectare (IV (1)), service sector employment (IV (2))
mental spheres for the economic value of the mineral and forest resources in the search for export
earnings and fiscal revenues. In Cuba, sickle bush is burned to produce wood charcoal, mostly
for export, producing incremental CO2 emissions and smoke. In Chapter 1, relatively high levels
of CO2 emissions were shown to be a characteristic of the Cuban economy. In some cases, this
potential negative dynamic may be exacerbated by the lack of appropriate institutions within these
countries to monitor and enforce environmental protection laws. The inability of international mul-
tilateral and non-governmental organizations to play an effective role in conservation within third
country sovereign jurisdictions may also play a role.
At the end of the 1980s, with many developing countries still reeling from years of lost de-
velopment and growth due to the effects of the multiple external debt defaults that occurred in
the early part of the decade, there appeared little hope to return the countries to growth, to attract
foreign investment and to prevent further ravages to valuable forest and other important natural
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resources. Relief from further environmental deterioration was needed, hence the background was
set for creative solutions to improve both the prospects for growth and environmental quality.
This came in the form of the first debt-for-nature swaps, which occurred in the late 1980s, con-
temporaneously with the launch of the highly successful Brady bond external debt restructuring
program in 1989. Named after the US Treasury Secretary at the time, Nicolas Brady, this pro-
gram gave the opportunity for many emerging countries that had suffered years of subpar growth
and a scarcity of foreign investment to see new opportunities as they emerged from the shadows
of defaulted debt. Similarly, the debt-for-nature swaps seemed to offer an opportunity to also
help alleviate the growing environmental problem.22 At the time, the large discount at which most
emerging countries debt traded offered an ideal situation in which external debt could be purchased
by third party Governments or NGO’s in exchange for an arrangement in which the debt was ei-
ther pardoned or swapped into local currency debt. In exchange, emerging country governments
were to promise to invest in and enforce environmental protection programs in which holders of
restructured debt, developed country governments or NGO’s, would have a considerable input. In
this arrangement, local Governments would gain from the reduction in their debt burdens, while
the third party institutions would play an important role in overcoming local inefficiencies in mon-
itoring environmental projects.
The late 80’s offered the opportunity for large three-way debt reduction transactions to be car-
ried out involving sovereign debtors, commercial banks, which held defaulted sovereign debt, and
NGO’s that could also fund and monitor environmental programs. However, these opportunities
were dramatically reduced with the introduction of the Brady programs, which repackaged the
bulk of the existing external sovereign debt at the time. Over time, deals became more simplified,
involving only bilateral transactions where the commercial banks are replaced by developed coun-
22High expectations accompanied the first debt-for-nature transactions, first suggested by Thomas Lovejoy of the
World Wildlife Fund in an op-ed piece to the New York Times in 1984. One early author (A. Quesada, as cited in Didia
(2001))) noted that these transactions “have captured the imagination of the world, and stand among the innovative
and progressive solutions to problems which will remain in the 21st century.”
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try governments or multilateral organizations as creditors. Such would be the case in Cuba, with
involvement only by sovereign creditors and possibly conservation organizations, and the Cuban
government and its environmental organization. Conservation NGO’s or donors can play a key
role in monitoring the sovereign Central Bank’s funding of the activities and selection of a local
environmental agency or conservation fund. These transactions highlight the transfer of resources
expended in debt service toward environmental spending.
An update to the literature appears in Cassimon et al. (2011), but some early papers are worthy
of highlighting. Deacon and Murphy (1997) provides an empirical look of the history, rationale
and transactional aspects of debt-for-nature swaps. Mohr and Thomas (1998) present a purely
theoretical and largely favorable approach taken to evaluate their welfare benefits. Deacon and
Murphy (1997) described Ecuador’s first debt-for-nature swap with the World Wildlife Fund. This
deal profited from the purchase of highly discounted debt by the WWF, with a resulting doubling
in available funds for conservation in the government’s previous budget for parks and reserves
in spite of only a $1MM reduction in the country’s total $8.3Bn debt at the time of the deal. In
Costa Rica, the authors cite that funds from interest in debt-for-nature swaps is several times that
country’s natural park budget. Warland and Michaelowa (2015) cite various sources to indicate
historical volumes of debt-for-nature swaps. The largest estimate was from the OECD, which
tabulated that $1.1Bn was made available for environmental projects for the period 1991-2003
from debt reductions totaling $3.3Bn. This deal volume concurs with Deacon and Murphy (1997),
who estimated total funding for environmental programs provided through debt-for-nature swaps
since 1987 to the time of their writing at over $1bn, involving over 30 countries. Sizes of the
individual transactions also were reported to be small. Didia (2001) indicates that the swaps have
amounted to a very small percentage of external debt, such as 1.7% in Costa Rica in 1992, yet
this country had the highest percentage, while many areas in need of debt relief and environmental
protection have not been affected.
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Deacon and Murphy (1997) stress the importance of properly structuring contracts to increase
the value of the swaps net of enforcement, monitoring and dispute settlement costs. As issues of
sovereign control are often at the core of disputes, contracts usually do not specify for conservation
agencies or any foreign party to take legal title or control of any land that is the target of environ-
mental improvement and typically efforts are made to mitigate any activities that would be contrary
to the host government’s interests. Often, thus, private contracts seldom include host governments
as parties, with local conservation agencies being party to the contracts instead.
Past instances of enforcement of non-performance of obligations by the host government or lo-
cal agency indicate that transactions in Cuba may not be exempt from such issues. While it appears
that private organizations clearly lack enforcement powers, they seem to rely on the moral force
of loss of reputation to the host government or local agency and the prospect of reducing or elimi-
nating cooperation in the future in the case of non-performance. If a developed country agency or
government is part of a debt-for-nature swap, on the other hand, developed country governments
are in position to enforce non-performance through various means, including withholding future
aid, influencing the lending and aid-granting policies of other nations and organizations, imposing
trade sanctions, and seizing debtor nation assets.
Further challenges could be faced in Cuba. Deacon and Murphy (1997) studied the occur-
rence likelihood of debt-for-nature swaps and the index of political instability in the host country’s
regime. Results showed a negative relation. The explanatory effect of the presence of an undemo-
cratic government is even stronger in the case of public swaps where developed country govern-
ments are likely to pay even greater attention to the risk of high contract costs due to the presence
of an unstable or unreliable host government and lack of an adequate rule of law. However, the
tropical land share indicator as well as the concentration of threatened species/deforestation also
showed large positive and important relations with the incidence of swap transactions. Mohr and
Thomas (1998) argue that the chances of success of an environmental swap are enhanced and its
risks lowered in the presence of a cross-default swap, whereby the incidence of default in any one
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obligation constitutes a default in all other outstanding obligations. Such clauses could potentially
be integrated into new debt transactions in Cuba.
Didia (2001) does not disagree in principle with the idea of debt reduction and debt-for-nature
swaps as a tool to increase resources for environmental projects, but he argues that other factors are
much more important in controlling the degree of deforestation. With special emphasis on the first
three factors, these include the lack of democracy, adequate institutions to foster property rights,
market mechanisms, proper forestry management, better governance, and control of consumption
of charcoal and firewood. Short sighted dictatorships, with inadequate checks and balances in
government, produce unfavorable decisions, a propagation of the “Tragedy of the Commons,”
where no property rights exist and resources are pillaged. The suppression of market mechanisms
and the profit motive, which reduce the possibilities for adequate measurement of net social costs
and benefits, are all the results of these shortcomings.
The author argues that such inadequacies should be resolved first in order for debt-for-nature
swaps to have a more important impact in reducing deforestation. Resources freed from debt
reduction can be used to improve democratic institutions, establish property rights processes and
encourage entrepreneurship. He also advocates that developed countries should provide assistance
in this regard. The author found the strongest relation between deforestation and the intensive
and unregulated use of land by subsistence farmers as well as logging activities directed at raising
scarce foreign exchange resources. This is analogous to the years of intense sugarcane production
in Cuba when clearing of forests occurred, but the virtual collapse of the sugar industry led to an
opposite path of abandonment of agricultural land, with the reported increase in forest land, but
with the accompanying spread of sickle bush.
Implementation in Cuba could be helped by historical experience. Since the first debt-for-
nature transaction in Bolivia in 1987, where peasants rose in protest over the erroneous impression
that Conservation International, the NGO involved in that transaction, would be buying up Boli-
vian land, the practice and experience of debt-for-nature swaps has become less confrontational.
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As discussed previously, it is the typical practice among practitioners to avoid any semblance of
meddling in land ownership or sovereignty (Deacon and Murphy (1997)). Common practices now
are well-established, such that it is now even possible to find a methodological guide to exploratory
conditions, feasibility, construction and implementation provided by a major conservation agency
on the worldwide web.23
The focus of transactions is now characterized as government-to-government bilateral, with
sponsoring creditor countries including Canada, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland and
the United States. The Paris Club’s support for the transactions began in September 1990, with
explicit recognition of provisions for debt-for-development swaps that harbor environmental trans-
actions in debtor countries. The Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) passed by the U.S.
Congress in August 1998 provides conditions to the framework of bilateral transactions. This
program in 2004 and 2005 was authorized for a relatively small $20M per year. The criteria to
qualify for the program represent factors which are deemed to enhance the chances of success:
economic conditions determined by the Department of Treasury, such as agreement or progress on
an IMF standby arrangement, or other IMF mechanisms and implementation of investment reforms
or progress toward an “open” investment regime. Political criteria, determined by the Department
of State, include a democratically elected government, non-involvement in terrorism, cooperation
in narcotics control, and respect for human rights. Although Cuba is not a member of the IMF,
discussion of these issues would be beneficial. The degree of bundling of economic and political
goals likely adds value to the outcomes of the swaps, but such conditions increase the challenges as
well as the opportunities for these transactions in the presence of a government with a poor record
of democratic reforms such as Cuba.
After the Brady programs, combined policy packages including sound fiscal policies, macro-
economic stabilization, privatization to attract foreign investment, and renewed debt issuance in
emerging countries relegated debt-for-nature swaps to a relatively minor role in policy makers’
23http://www.conservationfinance.org/guide/guide/indexba4.htm.
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toolkits. In Cuba, however, these types of policies are less likely to yield the same significant
effects, hence other options are possible.
Debt-for-nature swaps may have a bigger role to play in those countries that remain on the
list of Highly Indebted Poor Countries, of which Cuba is not a part. But it is possible that their
application may be broader in addressing environmental concerns. In countries such as Cuba,
straddling stresses from external debt and forest management and other environmental issues, these
transactions may have an interesting part to play. Environmental programs in Cuba are funded in
part by project funds from the United Nations and bilateral cooperation between the NGOs and
governments,24 so this suggests scope for cooperation in this area. Lo´pez Bastida (2016) also
discusses the potential for cooperation in the environmental and technology area with American
universities. Hence, avenues are open to profit from the flexibility of debt-for-nature swaps, which
could also include innovations to accommodate conversions of debt for stakes in environmentally
friendly innovations in other areas such as the sugar agroindustry. Dialogue and adaption, however,
will face Cuban authorities which, by their own admission, will not be exonerated from “giving
battle in the area of ideas” (Lo´pez Bastida (2016), p. 340).
3.5.3 The Cuban Context
Cuba’s non-performing external debt with various creditors has recently attracted greater attention.
In December 2015, Cuba reached an agreement with the Group of Creditors of Cuba of the Paris
Club to clear $2.6Bn of arrears over an 18 year period.25 This facilitates normalization of credit
activities of this working group of creditors to Cuban export credit agencies. At the end of 2015,
total debt claims to the Paris Club were listed at $10.7Bn.26 In 2014, the massive debt to the former
24http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/9623_Cuba_Enviro_Strategy_2007-2010.pdf, p. 14
25See http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/communications/press-release/
agreement-on-the-debt-between-cuba-and-the-group-of-creditors-of-cuba.
26See www.clubdeparis.org/sites/default/files/2015a.pdf.
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Soviet Union was reduced by 90% to $3.5Bn and Russia pledged to invest the latter remaining debt
amount in Cuba. Japan also reached an agreement on private debt of $1Bn.
The next highest components of Cuba’s external debt include defaulted loans and bonds, which
includes London Club commercial bank creditors, and debt to suppliers. Official government
statistics report only debt to suppliers and current official and bank debt, reporting a total of 12.5Bn
CUP (USD 12.5Bn) for 2012 (Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas e Informacio´n (2015).27 Luis
(2016) provides a more complete status of external debt. In Table 3.7, I have reproduced these
estimates and also calculated the ratio of total external debt to GDP. The latter calculations are
based on an estimated GDP level used by Luis (2016) as well as an alternative ratio based on the
GDP per capita calculations made in Section 1.5.2. Whereas Luis (2013) provided an estimated
external debt/GDP level of 62.6% for Cuba in 2011, as a result of the recent transactions, Luis
(2016) now projects the ratio to be 22%. Salazar-Carrillo (2015) presents a much more dire picture,
based on a significantly lower GDP estimate as well as greater levels of debt.28 As of March 2,
2017, one of the major credit rating agencies, Moody’s continues to rate Cuban sovereign debt at
Caa2, a still speculative category characterizing a poor credit with high risk, but with a stable to
positive outlook.29
27Officially published international statistics on the level of Cuban external debt, are also not available. These
are typically provided through the Joint BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank statistics on the Joint External Debt Hub at
http://www.jedh.org/.
28This author calculates a GDP of $24Bn and external debt of above $70Bn, for an external debt/GDP ratio of
$380%. By category, major differences in debt levels with respect to the calculations of Luis (2016) are higher levels
owed to financial institutions (BIS), debt to other countries including Argentina, China, and Venezuela (other official
debt), sovereign debt (defaulted bonds and loans), and claims by the US as a result of expropriations made from
1960-1968.
29Prior rating actions include changing the outlook from stable to positive on December 10, 2015, notably citing
the US rapprochement, while on April 23, 2014, the rating was downgraded to Caa2 from Caa1. See http://www.
moodys.com.
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Table 3.7: Cuba External Debt Projection December 2016
Dec 2016 projection
BIS banks (Bn USD) 1.2
Paris Club (Bn USD) 7.6
Other official debt (Bn USD) 2.6
Suppliers (Bn USD) 2.5
Defaulted bonds and loans (Bn USD) 4.3
Total (Bn USD) 18.2
Total debt/GDP 22.00%
Implied GDP (Bn USD) 82.73
Alternate GDP estimate (Bn USD) 90.14
Alternate total debt/GDP 20.19%
Population (2014) 11238317
Source: Luis (2016), World Bank DataBank, Oficina Nacional
de Estadı´sticas, Author’s estimates.
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Luis (2013) presents other considerations to assess Cuba’s credit quality where Cuba lags,
especially in comparison with transition countries. International liquidity, reflected by gross re-
serves/GDP is substantially below the average of transition economies. He also discusses policy
options to improve credit worthiness, which is viewed as poor. Many of these include market-
oriented measures, currency reform and areas such as small scale privatization. Some existing
policies have been directed to improve the latter, but there are major hurdles for compliance with
the author’s recommendations, not the least of which include membership in the International Mon-
etary Fund and World Bank. The author also points out the increasing degree of trade being carried
out with friendly nations, such as Venezuela, Russia, China and Brazil, thereby skirting many of
the requirements that would be needed to enhance greater international competitiveness. Such
an environment, together with the economic pronouncements of the 7th Congress of the Cuban
Communist Party (see, for example, Lo´pez Bastida (2016)), which notably discusses updating the
current Socialist model rather than reforming it, point to many hurdles on the path to improving
Cuba’s external position.
The external debt situation described is hence one of a challenged country, but nevertheless
one that has taken some steps toward reform. Referring to transition countries, Tamazian and Rao
(2010) caution but remain optimistic, noting that improvements in financial development can act
as a two-edged sword, first potentially degrading the environment through a direct effect on growth
but it can also lower initial negative effects as lower financing costs can increase the affordability
of more environmentally friendly production. The door is hence open for further creative policies
to reduce and manage the remaining debt. Debt-for-nature swaps, or variants thereof could be such
a tool, with the added benefit of producing a favorable impact on the environment. Historically,
debt-for-nature swaps have not attained an important magnitude, yet they have been used both for
debt management and environmental purposes. In Cuba, they could also have benefits in these
areas. Warland and Michaelowa (2015) indicate that these instruments have become relatively
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dormant in the 2010’s, such that literature on the emerging trend of debt-for-climate swaps does
not make extensive references to the debt-for-nature literature.
The Paris Club remains a promoter of debt swaps,30 such that the agreement with Cuba includes
creation of dedicated accounts in Cuba for agreed upon projects, including renewable energy.31
Negotiations to restructure debt also indicate that Cuban authorities may consider other forms of
debt management. An innovative approach was recently offered to the Czech Republic in a debt-
for-rum swap.32 Such deals in the context of a smaller external debt load respond to the critique
in Cassimon et al. (2011) that debt-for-nature swaps are usually too small in order to be of any
economic consequence. But the authors also indicate that improvements in other areas could pave
the way for these instruments to make a comeback and be useful policy tools. Less perception of
meddling in the internal affairs of recipient countries and the opportunity to swap discounted debt
instruments in highly stressed countries with low debt ratings like Cuba create a more significant
opportunity. The transactions could target the improvement of Cuba’s forests, especially reducing
the invasive impact of sickle bush, but they could also address other areas such as improvements
in the sugar agroindustry or CO2 emissions.
3.6 Conclusions
Disruptions created by the sugarcane industry have caused damages to forests and the environment
in Cuba. The empirical work here and anecdotal evidence focuses on a resulting spread in sickle
bush. A casual observer of data on forest cover in Cuba would otherwise likely observe that an
increase in forests has occurred without any unwanted side effects. The balance of the effects of
the spread of sickle bush is likely negative for the economy and forests though there are gains
in export earnings. There is also a need for further progress on the external debt front, which
30See http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/communications/page/debt-swap.
31See http://econcuba.impela.net/2016/06/rich-nations-use-cubadebt...
32See “Cuba offers to pay off debt to Czech Republic in rum”, downloadable at https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2016/dec/16/cuba-pay-debt-czech-republic-rum.
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may open the way for greater participation in external financing. Empirical results shown here
suggest that democratic reforms may also help to accelerate better forest outcomes. Creative policy
solutions such as adaptations of debt-for-nature transactions to the Cuban context may help to
correct imbalances in all these areas. These instruments could also be used in other contexts, such
as, for example, for a renewal of a higher scale of sugarcane production with external participation
in a context that is less dependent on use of fossil fuels and with more environmentally friendly
methods than in the past.
3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Description of Variables
EXTDBT (external debt stocks %GNI), 1990-2014.
Downloadable at databank.worldbank.org.
Defined as “total external debt stocks as percentage of Gross National Income” (formerly
GNP).
f orest cover (forest area as percentage of total), from 1990 to 2014.
Downloadable at databank.worldbank.org.
This is calculated from forest area provided by World Bank (2012), compiled from the Food
and Agricultural Organization and defined as “land under natural or planted stands of trees
of at least 5 meters in situ, whether productive or not, and excludes tree stands in agricultural
production systems (for example, in fruit plantations and agroforestry systems) and trees in
urban parks and gardens.”
re f orestation refers to the annual change in f orest cover.
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GDPPC (Gross domestic product per capita, chain-weighted), in thousands, see Feenstra
et al. (2015), 1990-2013.
GDPPC d refers to the first difference of GDPPC.
POPDENS (Population density, people per sq. km of land area, Cuba), differenced one pe-
riod, 1991-2014.
Downloadable at databank.worldbank.org.
RURPOP (rural population percentage of total), 1990-2014.
Downloadable at databank.worldbank.org.
Defined as “Rural population refers to people living in rural areas as defined by the national
statistics offices.”
RURPOP d refers to the first difference of RURPOP.
RURPOPGR (rural population growth, Cuba), 1991-2014).
Calculated from RURPOP.
RURPOPGR d refers to the first difference of RURPOPGR.
SUGHRVAREA (logarithm of sugar harvest area, 1000’s of hectares, Cuba), yield per acre
(sugarcane harvested per acre, Cuba), service sector employment (percentage employment
in service sector, Cuba), 1990-2013.
Source, Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas, downloadable at Oficina Nacional de Estadı´sticas
e Informacio´n (2015).
SUM PR CL (sum of political rights and civil liberties), 1990-2014, Freedom House.
Downloadable at freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016.
See description in Section 2.6.1.
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3.7.2 Panel Regression Results for PVCM approach
Table 3.8: OLS Regression Reforestation on GDP per capita
re f orestation
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPPC 0.025∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.014 0.011 0.001
(0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.017) (0.008) (0.014)
GDPPC2 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.000 0.001 −0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
GDPPC3 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant −0.244∗∗∗ −0.241∗∗∗ −0.200∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.023) (0.050) (0.056)
Observations 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632
R2 0.026 0.026 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.026 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003
F Statistic 21.784∗∗∗ 14.531∗∗∗ 0.647 1.074 1.776 1.486
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
a Null hypothesis of pooling rejected (.01) for fixed and variable intercepts.
b Null hypotheses of no individual effects rejected (.01).
c Fail to reject Hausmann test of random effects vs. fixed effects.
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